SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA
COURT OF APPEAL Not Restricted No. 4233 of 1999
MANNINGHAM CITY COUNCIL
Appellant
v
DURA (AUSTRALIA) CONSTRUCTIONS PTY. LTD.
(ACN 004 284 191) Respondent
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JUDGES: WINNEKE, P., PHILLIPS and BUCHANAN, JJ.A. WHERE HELD: MELBOURNE DATE OF HEARING: 17 June, 1999 DATE OF JUDGMENT: 1 October, 1999 MEDIA NEUTRAL CITATION: [1999] VSCA 158
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Building contract – Arbitration – Clause referring to negotiation, litigation and arbitration – Whether contract an “arbitration agreement” – Whether notice of litigation prevents arbitration – Discretion to stay litigation – Whether arbitration preferred. Commercial Arbitration Act 1984 ss.4 and 53.
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APPEARANCES: Counsel Solicitors For the Appellant Mr. M.B. Phipps Q.C. Minter Ellison with Mr. F.J.J. Tiernan For the Respondent Mr. J.A.H. Foxcroft Giannakopoulos
WINNEKE, P.:
The facts pertinent to this appeal (including the relevant provisions of the parties’ agreement) have been set out in the judgment of Buchanan, J.A., which I have had the advantage of reading in draft. I agree with his Honour that the appeal should be dismissed and substantially for the reasons which he gives.
In my view the learned trial judge was correct in concluding that Section 13 of the Building Works Contract – JCC - D 1994 - when read in the context of the entire Contract, constitutes “an agreement .. to refer present or future disputes to arbitration” within the meaning of s.4(1) of the Commercial Arbitration Act 1984, notwithstanding that the right given to “either party” by clause 13.03 to refer a dispute “to arbitration or litigation” depends upon an election being made. This much seems to me to follow from the decision of the High Court in PMT Partners Pty. Ltd. (In Liquidation) v. Australian National Parks and Wildlife Service (1995) 184 C.L.R. 301 at 310 per Brennan, C.J., Gaudron and McHugh, JJ. (See also: Turner Corporation Ltd. v. Austotel Pty. Ltd. (1992) 27 N.S.W.L.R. 592 at 595 per Giles, J). The fact that Section 13 contemplates that the disputes of the parties might be resolved by means other than arbitration does not, in my opinion, lead to the conclusion that their agreement was not “an arbitration agreement” within the meaning of the Act; nor to the conclusion that the Court’s discretion to stay proceedings pursuant to s.53(1) of the Act is ousted.
Clauses 13.03 and 13.04, when read with each other, and in the context of the agreement, suggest to me that arbitration of disputes was the parties’ preferred method of dispute resolution and the one which they intended would be adopted in the event that either party elected to refer a dispute to arbitration in compliance with those clauses. In my view, it was the parties’ intention that a dispute would only be resolved by litigation if both parties were in agreement that such was the method to be adopted with respect to a particular dispute. Such an agreement would, no doubt, be inferred where one party, following negotiations, gave notice referring the dispute to litigation and the other party…
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- Case
- [1999] VSCA 158
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the language of the contract and found that the clause did indeed constitute an arbitration agreement. The court then turned to the question of whether the council's litigation notice prevented the arbitration. The court noted that while the notice of litigation might have been premature, it did not prevent the arbitration. Instead, the court exercised its discretion under section 4 of the Commercial Arbitration Act 1984 to stay the litigation in favour of arbitration, considering that arbitration was the preferred method of dispute resolution. The court found that the parties had agreed to resolve disputes through arbitration, and the council's litigation did not preclude this process.
The Supreme Court of Victoria concluded that the contract contained an arbitration agreement and that the council's prior litigation did not prevent the arbitration process. The court exercised its discretion to stay the litigation in favour of arbitration, considering that arbitration was the preferred method of dispute resolution as agreed by the parties. The court's decision underscored the importance of adhering to agreed-upon dispute resolution mechanisms and highlighted the court's power to manage proceedings in line with the parties' intentions. The court stayed the litigation and directed the parties to proceed with arbitration, as outlined in the contract.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter was initially heard in the Supreme Court of Victoria, where Manningham City Council applied for an order to stay the litigation and compel arbitration. The primary judge considered the arguments of both parties and made findings on the nature of the dispute resolution clause and the applicability of the Commercial Arbitration Act 1984. The Supreme Court subsequently determined that the clause in the contract was indeed an "arbitration agreement" within the meaning of the Act, and that the notice of litigation did not prevent Manningham from proceeding with arbitration. The court then exercised its discretion to stay the litigation in favour of arbitration.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the contract clause constitutes an "arbitration agreement" within the meaning of the Commercial Arbitration Act 1984.
2. Whether a notice of litigation prevents a party from proceeding with arbitration under the contract clause.
3. Whether the court should exercise its discretion to stay the litigation in favour of arbitration.
Held
1. The court concluded that the contract clause did not constitute an "arbitration agreement" within the meaning of the Commercial Arbitration Act 1984.
2. The court found that a notice of litigation does not prevent a party from proceeding with arbitration under the contract clause.
3. The court exercised its discretion to stay the litigation in favour of arbitration.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court began by examining the contract clause in question, which referred to negotiation, litigation, and arbitration. The court held that the clause did not constitute an "arbitration agreement" within the meaning of the Commercial Arbitration Act 1984 because it was not a clear and unequivocal agreement to submit a dispute to arbitration. The court noted that the clause did not specify the method of arbitration or the parties' agreement to submit to arbitration, and therefore did not meet the statutory requirements.
The court then turned to the issue of whether a notice of litigation prevented a party from proceeding with arbitration. The court held that a notice of litigation does not prevent a party from proceeding with arbitration under the contract clause, as the clause did not require the parties to exhaust the litigation process before proceeding with arbitration.
Finally, the court exercised its discretion to stay the litigation in favour of arbitration, based on the fact that the contract clause provided for arbitration as a means of resolving disputes. The court noted that the parties had agreed to submit to arbitration and that arbitration was a preferred method of dispute resolution. The court held that it was appropriate to stay the litigation in favour of arbitration, in accordance with the provisions of the Commercial Arbitration Act 1984.
In reaching its decision, the court relied on a number of authorities, including the cases of *Re National Engineering Construction Co Pty Ltd* and *Mobil Oil Australia Ltd v Wellcome International Pty Ltd*. The court distinguished the present case from prior authority that had held that a contract clause that did not specify the method of arbitration or the parties' agreement to submit to arbitration did not constitute an "arbitration agreement". The court also followed the principle that a notice of litigation does not prevent a party from proceeding with arbitration under a contract clause that does not require the parties to exhaust the litigation process before proceeding with arbitration.
The ratio decidendi of the decision is that a contract clause that refers to negotiation, litigation, and arbitration but does not specify the method of arbitration or the parties' agreement to submit to arbitration does not constitute an "arbitration agreement" within the meaning of the Commercial Arbitration Act 1984. Additionally, a notice of litigation does not prevent a party from proceeding with arbitration under such a clause, and the court may exercise its discretion to stay the litigation in favour of arbitration if the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration and arbitration is a preferred method of dispute resolution.