Platinum Investment Group Pty Ltd v Anderson

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Platinum Investment Group Pty Ltd v Anderson & Ors [2018] QSC 2

PARTIES:

PLATINUM INVESTMENT GROUP PTY LTD
ACN 161 744 903

(applicant)
v
EMILY SKYE ANDERSON
(first respondent)
and
DECLAN ANTHONY REDMOND
(second respondent)
and
EMILY SKYE FIT PTY LTD ACN 602 692 642
(third respondent)
and
ACN 162 585 533 PTY LTD ACN 162 585 533
(fourth respondent)

FILE NO:

BS No 10745 of 2017

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Originating Application filed on 13 October 2017

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

8 January 2018

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

27 October 2017; supplementary written submissions received on 1 November 2017

JUDGE:

Burns J

ORDER:

The orders of the court are that:

1.     The proceeding pending in the District Court at Brisbane between the applicant as plaintiff and the respondents as defendants (No BD2149 of 2016) be transferred to the Supreme Court at Brisbane;

2.     The applicant is granted leave pursuant to r 375 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) to amend its claim and statement of claim;

3.     The application is otherwise adjourned to a date to be fixed;

4.     The costs of and incidental to this application shall be each party’s costs in the proceeding.

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – SUPREME COURT PROCEDURE – QUEENSLAND – PROCEDURE UNDER UNIFORM CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES AND PREDECESSORS – TRANSFERS AND CONSOLIDATIONS – where the applicant had commenced a proceeding against the respondents in the District Court at Brisbane – where the applicant applied for an order pursuant to s 25(1) of the Civil Proceedings Act 2011 (Qld) to transfer that proceeding to the Supreme Court – whether it was in the interests of justice that the proceeding is transferred – whether the amount sought to be recovered by the applicant in the proceedings exceeds the monetary jurisdiction of the District Court – whether, in determining whether the amount sought to be recovered by the applicant in the proceedings exceeds the monetary jurisdiction of the District Court, account is to be taken of a claim for interest allegedly payable under a deed

Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 14B
Civil Proceedings Act 2011 (Qld), s 13(2), s 25, s 27, s 30, s 33, s 58
Common Law Practice Act 1867 (Qld), s 72
Common Law Practice Act Amendment Act 1972 (Qld), s 5
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), s 86
Constitution of Queensland 2001 (Qld), s 94
District Court Act 1973 (NSW), s 44(2)
District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld), s 3, s 13, s 68, s 68(1)(a), s 68(3)(c), s 69, s 82, s 83, s 118, s 149
District Courts Act and Other Acts Amendment Act 1989 (Qld), s 6
District Courts Act of 1967 (Qld), s 66, s 67, s 68, s 83(1), s 92(1)(a)
District Courts and Magistrates Courts Jurisdiction Act 1976 (Qld), s 5
Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth), s 57
Magistrates Courts Act 1921 (Qld), s 4
Property Law Act 1974 (Qld), s 329

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Details
Case
[2018] QSC 2
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Platinum Investment Group Pty Ltd v Anderson involves an application by the plaintiff to transfer a proceeding from the District Court to the Supreme Court. The applicant, Platinum Investment Group, commenced proceedings against the respondents in the District Court, seeking recovery of outstanding amounts under a deed of compromise. The primary dispute revolves around the interpretation of a clause in the deed that stipulates interest payable in the event of late payment, and whether this contractual interest should be considered when determining the monetary jurisdiction of the court. The applicant argued that the aggregate amount, including the principal debt and contractual interest, exceeded the monetary jurisdiction of the District Court, thus necessitating a transfer to the Supreme Court.

The legal issues before the court were twofold: the scope of the discretion conferred on the court by section 25(1) of the Civil Proceedings Act 2011 (Qld) and whether contractual interest should be taken into account in determining if a claim exceeds the monetary limit of the District Court's jurisdiction. The court had to decide whether the transfer was in the interests of justice and if the total amount claimed, including interest, warranted the transfer to the Supreme Court. The respondents did not contest the application to amend the claim and statement of claim to include an alternative claim for damages for breach of contract.

The court held that the transfer was warranted under the circumstances, as the total amount claimed, including the contractual interest, exceeded the monetary jurisdiction of the District Court. The court emphasised that the discretion under section 25(1) of the Civil Proceedings Act is broad and must be exercised in the interests of justice, considering factors such as the complexity of the case, the amount in dispute, and the need for a fair and efficient resolution. The court concluded that it was in the interests of justice to transfer the proceeding to the Supreme Court and granted leave to amend the claim and statement of claim to include an alternative claim for damages for breach of contract. The application was adjourned to allow the parties to apply for a consolidation order under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld). The costs of the application were to be borne by each party in the transferred proceeding.

Orders

Orders of the court

The orders of the court are that:

1. The proceeding pending in the District Court at Brisbane between the applicant as plaintiff and the respondents as defendants (No BD2149 of 2016) be transferred to the Supreme Court at Brisbane;

2. The applicant is granted leave pursuant to r 375 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) to amend its claim and statement of claim;

3. The application is otherwise adjourned to a date to be fixed;

4. The costs of and incidental to this application shall be each party’s costs in the proceeding.

Background

Background to the litigation

The application raises two discrete issues: (1) the nature of the discretion conferred on the court by s 25(1) of the Civil Proceedings Act; and (2) whether contractual interest is to be taken into account when determining whether a claim is likely to exceed the monetary limit of the jurisdiction of the District Court.Background The proceeding in question was commenced by the applicant in the District Court at Brisbane on 3 June 2016. By the claim and statement of claim, the applicant sues on a deed of compromise entered into with the respondents and others on 16 April 2015. Under the deed, the respondents agreed to purchase the applicant’s shareholding in two companies. The purchase price was $750,000, which sum was to be paid in instalments with the last instalment due on 16 November 2016. Relevantly, it was agreed that a failure to pay any of the instalments by the date on which it was due would “attract interest at the rate of 10% per month on the unpaid portion of that payment, accruing daily from the day following the date specified for payment until the date the payment is made in full”: clause 3.4. According to the statement of claim, although the applicant transferred the shares in accordance with its obligations under the deed, the respondents only paid the first three instalments of the purchase price (in total, $183,333.33) and, despite demand, have refused to pay any more. The respondents on the other hand maintain by their defence that no money is owing under the deed. In particular, it is pleaded that the applicant by its director, Mr Evans, breached the express or implied terms of the deed in various ways, that this caused ongoing loss and damage to the third applicant, that the respondents thereby became entitled to suspend performance of their obligations under the deed and that clause 3.4 is, in any event, a penalty and, for that reason, unenforceable. One of the terms of the deed that the respondents allege was breached by the applicant provided that the parties to it would “not disparage or communicate in any way to any other person disparaging or derogatory remarks or comments about each other”: clause 17. In particular, the respondents allege that:“[As] set out in proceedings commenced by the third [applicant] against Evans in the Supreme Court of Queensland (No 6843/15), from on or about 19 to 23 June 2015, Evans sent or caused to be sent millions of unsolicited commercial electronic messages which purported to be from the third [applicant] and to be about the third [applicant’s] business, thereby causing the third [applicant] loss and damage which is ongoing.”[1][1] Defence filed on 11 July 2016, par 5(d). At the time the proceeding was commenced in the District Court, the applicant claimed $366,666.63 as a debt due under the deed together with $173,333.32 for interest.[2] The debt was comprised of the instalments of the purchase price that had not, to the date of filing, been paid and the interest was claimed pursuant to clause 3.4 of the deed. However, by the time the subject application was brought, on the applicant’s case at least, all outstanding instalments had become due – a total of $566,666.67 – and the interest under the deed had climbed to $1,019,999.69. Thus, the applicant contended that because both amounts were “due and payable pursuant to the deed” and the aggregate ($1,586,666.36) exceeded the monetary jurisdiction of the District Court, it was necessary for application to be made for a transfer order pursuant to s 25(1) of the Civil Proceedings Act. In addition, leave was sought pursuant to r 375 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) to amend the claim and statement of claim to “increase the amount claimed and add an alternative claim for damages for breach of contract”.[2]It is relevant to what is later discussed to note that the following relief is sought in the claim:“1. The [respondents] pay the [applicant] $366,666.63 as a debt due and owing;2. The [respondents] pay interest to the [applicant] up to and including 16 April 2016 in the sum of $173,333.32 and thereafter, interest calculated in accordance with clause 3.4 of the Deed;3. Alternatively to paragraph 2, the [respondents] pay interest to the [applicant] pursuant to section 58 of the Civil Proceedings Act 2011 from the date each payment became due and payable up to and including the date of judgment or payment has been received in full, plus costs;4. Costs.”The transfer power

Decision

Reasons for decision

The respondents did not oppose the granting of leave to the applicant to amend its claim and statement of claim to increase the amount claimed and add a claim for damages for breach of contract, and rightly so. There will be a grant of leave. Conclusion For these reasons, it will be ordered that the proceeding currently pending in the District Court be transferred to this court,[66] but the application will be adjourned to allow the parties to apply for a consolidation order under r 78 UCPR. [66]When a transfer order is made, the registrar of the court to which the proceeding is transferred is required to give the registrar of the other court a copy of the order together with all filed documents: Civil Proceedings Act, s 30. Accordingly, no further orders need to be made to facilitate the transfer. Leave will also be granted to amend the claim and statement of claim. The costs of and incidental to this application shall be each party’s costs in the transferred proceeding.[67][67]This application aside, the costs incurred in the court below will fall to be assessed in accordance with the District Court scale of costs unless this court subsequently makes a different order: Civil Proceedings Act, s 33.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court examined the nature of the discretion conferred on it by section 25(1) of the Civil Proceedings Act, which allows the transfer of proceedings if it is in the interests of justice. The court noted that this discretion is broad and is not confined to considerations of procedural fairness or the merits of the case. The court considered various factors, including the complexity of the issues, the need for a unified determination of the proceedings, and the potential for prejudice to either party if the proceedings are not transferred. The court concluded that it was in the interests of justice to transfer the proceeding to the Supreme Court to ensure a proper and efficient resolution of the issues.

Regarding the second issue, the court considered whether contractual interest should be taken into account when determining whether a claim exceeds the monetary jurisdiction of the District Court. The court noted that contractual interest is not a debt and is not a claim for money. Instead, it is a remedy for the breach of a contractual obligation. The court held that contractual interest should not be taken into account when determining whether a claim exceeds the monetary jurisdiction of the District Court. The court found that the applicant's claim for interest accrued under the deed did not increase the amount sought to be recovered beyond the District Court's jurisdiction. The court relied on previous authority which held that interest is not to be taken into account in determining whether a claim exceeds the jurisdiction of the court. The binding legal principle established by the decision is that contractual interest is not to be taken into account when determining whether a claim exceeds the monetary jurisdiction of the District Court.