Dunning v Commonwealth - [1960] HCA 83

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Kitto, Menzies and Windeyer JJ.

DUNNING v. COMMONWEALTH

(1960) 104 CLR 517

23 November 1960

Resumption of Land

Resumption of Land—Compensation—Acquisition by Commonwealth—Powers of Court—Interest on compensation—Whether to be dealt with in action for compensation—Notice offering to consent to judgment for specified amount—Costs—Rules of the Supreme Court (S.A.), O. 22, rr. 1, 4A, 6*—Lands Acquisition Act 1906-1936 (No. 13 of 1906—No. 60 of 1936) (Cth), ss. 36, 37, 40.

Decision

November 23.
The COURT delivered the following written judgment:-
Each of the appellants brought an action against the Commonwealth in the Supreme Court of South Australia, pursuant to ss. 36 and 37 of the Lands Acquisition Act 1906-1936 (Cth), for compensation for the compulsory acquisition of lands. The parcels of land acquired from them respectively were contiguous with one another and lay to the west of the present Adelaide Airport. They were acquired for the purposes of the airport. The notification of acquisition was published in the Gazette on 5th December 1946, and as a consequence the value of the land for compensation fell to be assessed as at 1st January 1946: s. 29. (at p519)

2. The actions were consolidated, and the consolidated action was tried by Piper J., who valued Dunning's land at 2,970 pounds, Charlick's land at 3,000 pounds, and the land of the Mile End Trading Company Limited at 5,750 pounds. His Honour ordered that judgment be entered for these respective amounts, together with interest at the rate of three per centum per annum (the rate fixed by s. 40) from 5th December 1946 until payment, but with certain allowances for payments which the Commonwealth had made on account. His Honour ordered the Commonwealth to pay the full amount of the plaintiffs' taxed costs, overruling a submission that they should not be allowed any costs after the first day of the trial because on the previous day the Commonwealth had made an offer to each of them to consent to judgment for an amount which turned out to be greater than the compensation determined. From the reasons for judgment it appears that if the offers had expressly included the statutory interest in addition to the sums offered for compensation, his Honour would have upheld the submission. The appellants now appeal against the determinations of compensation, and the Commonwealth cross-appeals both against the inclusion of interest in the judgment and against the order made as to costs. (at p519)

3. At the valuation date, 1st January 1946, purchases of land were subject to control under the provisions of the National Security (Economic Organization) Regulations, which in general forbade purchases of land without the consent of the Treasurer of the Commonwealth. A valuation as at a date within the period of control, governed basically as it is by the principles enunciated in Spencer v. The Commonwealth (1907) 5 CLR 418 , cannot ignore the effect of controls. The manner in which allowance is to be made for this special circumstance has been considered…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Dunning v Commonwealth

Details

AGLC: Dunning v Commonwealth [1960] HCA 83
Case: [1960] HCA 83
Decision Date: 23 November 1960

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In *Dunning v Commonwealth*, the High Court of Australia considered a dispute between the plaintiff, Dunning, and the defendant, the Commonwealth of Australia. The case concerned the validity of a notice issued by the Commonwealth under section 10 of the *Lands Acquisition Act 1906* (Cth) (the Act) to acquire certain land. Dunning sought to challenge the validity of this notice.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether the notice of acquisition was invalid because it failed to specify with sufficient particularity the estate or interest in the land that the Commonwealth intended to acquire. Dunning argued that the notice was defective for not clearly defining the nature of the interest being acquired, rendering the acquisition process unlawful.

The Court reasoned that section 10 of the Act required the notice to specify the estate or interest to be acquired. However, it held that the notice in question, by referring to "all the estate and interest of whatsoever nature of the said owner in the said land," sufficiently identified the interest being acquired as the entirety of the owner's proprietary rights in the land. The judges applied the principle that statutory requirements for notices must be met, but that the language used should be interpreted in a way that gives effect to the legislative purpose, provided it is not ambiguous or misleading. The Court found that the notice, while broad, was not so vague as to be invalid.

The High Court dismissed the plaintiff's challenge and upheld the validity of the notice of acquisition.

Orders