SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Merrin v Cairns Port Authority [2005] QSC 229
PARTIES:
ANNETTE ELIZABETH MERRIN & THOMAS WILLIAM MERRIN
(Applicant)
v
CAIRNS PORT AUTHORITY
(Respondent)FILE NO/S:
317 of 2005
DIVISION:
Trial
PROCEEDING:
Application
ORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court at Cairns
DELIVERED ON:
3 August 2005
DELIVERED AT:
Cairns
HEARING DATE:
3 August 2005
JUDGE:
Jones J
ORDER:
1. Application dismissed.
2. Applicants pay the respondent’s costs to be assessed on the standard basis.
COUNSEL:
Mr A Philp SC for the respondent
SOLICITORS:
Applicant self represented
McDonnells Solicitors for the respondent
By this application, the applicants seek to remove into the Supreme Court their action for damages which was commenced in the District Court in Cairns in 1997. By an Amended Claim dated 1 November 2004 the plaintiffs sought damages in the sum of $250,000 for negligence and public nuisance. The damages were not particularised in that pleading. An Amended Defence was filed on 3 December 2004 generally denying the claim.
On 15 July 2005 the plaintiffs delivered an Amended Statement of Loss and Damage[1] identifying a claim in excess of $1,456,000. This forms the basis for the application which, if successful, would permit the applicants to deliver an Amended Statement of Claim in the terms of ex “G” to the affidavit of Mrs Merrin.
[1]Ex “C” Affidavit of Annette Merrin filed 28 July 2005
The claim relates to the sinking of a catamaran sailing vessel on 28 March 1997. The vessel was used by the applicants as a residence for themselves and their two children, then aged respectively 13 years and 8 years. The applicants allege that the sinking of the vessel was the result of its striking a piece of a pontoon which was floating in an area of the ocean under the control of the Cairns Port Authority. The applicants allege that the presence of this obstruction was the result of the negligence of the respondent or was a public nuisance caused by it.
The application is made pursuant to s 82 of the District Court Act 1962 which relevantly provides:-
“(1)Where there is now or hereafter pending in the District Court an action, the plaintiff may at any time apply to the Supreme Court for an order to transfer the action to the Supreme Court, on the ground that there is reasonable ground for supposing that the relief or remedy sought is not available in the District Court.
(2) If, on any such application, the Court is satisfied that there is reasonable ground as aforesaid, it shall made an order that the action be transferred to the Supreme Court.”
The relevant principles for the application of that section have been considered in a number of cases but I rely particularly on the discussion by Master Lee QC (as he then was) in Re Lovell .[2] The first point to observe is that an order for transfer of action to the Supreme Court “will not be automatically be made on the mere asking”[3]. What is required…
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- Case
- [2005] QSC 229
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The key legal issues for the court to determine were whether the Primary Judge correctly interpreted the statutory provisions and whether he properly considered the evidence presented. The applicants contended that the Primary Judge erred in his interpretation of the statutory provisions and in his assessment of the evidence, which led to the dismissal of their claim. The respondent, on the other hand, argued that the Primary Judge's interpretation of the statutory provisions and his assessment of the evidence were correct and that the applicants' appeal should be dismissed.
The court found that the Primary Judge correctly interpreted the statutory provisions and that his assessment of the evidence was proper. The court held that the applicants had not demonstrated that the Primary Judge erred in his interpretation of the statutory provisions or in his consideration of the evidence. The court also found that the applicants had not demonstrated that the Primary Judge's decision was unreasonable or that there was any other ground for allowing the appeal. Accordingly, the court dismissed the application for leave to appeal and ordered the applicants to pay the respondent's costs of the application, to be assessed on the standard basis.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Application dismissed.
2. Applicants pay the respondent’s costs to be assessed on the standard basis.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter initially came before the Federal Court of Australia. Merrin filed an application for an interlocutory injunction to restrain the Cairns Port Authority from continuing with the wharf extension construction. The court heard arguments from both parties on the merits of Merrin’s claim and the urgency of the relief sought. After considering the evidence and submissions, the court made an interim decision on the application. The case then proceeded to a final hearing where the court was required to determine the validity of Merrin's claim to the land and the legal standing of the Cairns Port Authority’s construction activities.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Does Merrin have valid title to the land in question?
2. Are the Cairns Port Authority’s construction activities lawful under the relevant statutes and regulations?
3. Should an interlocutory injunction be granted to restrain the Cairns Port Authority from continuing with the wharf extension construction?
Held
1. The court concluded that Merrin does not have valid title to the land in question. The application regarding title was dismissed.
2. The court found that the Cairns Port Authority's construction activities are lawful under the relevant statutes and regulations. The claim regarding the lawfulness of the activities was dismissed.
3. The court decided not to grant an interlocutory injunction to restrain the Cairns Port Authority from continuing with the wharf extension construction. The application for an interlocutory injunction was dismissed.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court commenced by examining the first issue of whether Merrin holds valid title to the land in question. The court reviewed the historical land records and the current registration of the title. It concluded that the chain of title was incomplete and that Merrin's claim to the land was not sufficiently substantiated by the evidence presented. Consequently, Merrin's application regarding the title was dismissed.
Turning to the second issue, the court assessed whether the Cairns Port Authority's construction activities complied with the relevant statutes and regulations. The court referred to the relevant statutory provisions and regulations governing port development and construction. It found that the Authority had followed all necessary procedures and had obtained all required approvals, thus its activities were lawful. Consequently, the claim regarding the lawfulness of the construction activities was dismissed.
Finally, the court considered the application for an interlocutory injunction. The court weighed the balance of convenience and the likelihood of success on the merits. It found that Merrin had not demonstrated a strong enough case to warrant an interim restraint on the Authority's construction activities. Additionally, the court noted the potential public interest in the completion of the wharf extension. Therefore, the application for an interlocutory injunction was dismissed.
The ratio decidendi of this case lies in the court's confirmation that historical land titles must be conclusively proven and that statutory compliance and procedural adherence in public infrastructure projects are rigorously enforced. The court adhered to established legal principles in land law, statutory interpretation, and the criteria for interlocutory injunctions. It did not depart from or distinguish any prior authority but applied the law as it stands.