Pipe Networks Pty Ltd v 148 Brunswick Street Pty Ltd (Trustee)

Link copied
Case Copied 81 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Pipe Networks Pty Ltd v 148 Brunswick Street Pty Ltd (Trustee) [2019] FCA 598

File number: QUD 940 of 2016
Judge: DERRINGTON J
Date of judgment: 2 May 2019
Catchwords:

CONTRACTS – interpretation of contracts – deed amending lease – outgoings to be charged by lessor at rate (if more than one then the highest) which would have been charged to lessee had supply been direct to lessee – meaning and effect of clause in relation to electricity outgoings – limits on relevance of financial consequences of proffered constructions – limits of construing contracts by reference to commercial business sense

CONTRACTS – illegality – contract to do that which is expressly prohibited – contract to sell energy where not authorised or exempt under National Energy Retail Law – whether charges for outgoings unenforceable due to illegality – whether backdated registration by AER effective to exempt lessor

Legislation:

Competition and Consumer Act 2001 (Cth), s 44AE

National Energy Retail Law (Queensland) Act 2014 (Qld)

National Energy Retail Law (South Australia) Act 2011 (SA), Schedule, National Energy Retail Law, s 88

National Gas (South Australia) Act 2008 (SA), Schedule, National Gas Law, Sch 2

National Energy Retail Rules

Cases cited:

Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (2009) 239 CLR 27

Arnold v Britton [2015] AC 1619

Australian Broadcasting Commission v Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd (1973) 129 CLR 99

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Baxter Healthcare Pty Ltd (2007) 232 CLR 1

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v EnergyAustralia Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 274

Barclays Bank Plc v HHY Luxembourg SARL [2010] EWCA Civ 1248

Blatch v Archer (1774) 1 Cowp 63; 98 ER 969

Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of NSW (1982) 149 CLR 337

Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd v National Westminster Bank Plc [1995] 1 EGLR 97

Ecosse Property Holdings Pty Ltd v Gee Dee Nominees Pty Ltd (2017) 261 CLR 544

Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Haxton (2012) 246 CLR 498

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd (2002) 250 CLR 503

Fitzgerald v FJ Leonardt Pty Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 215

Gnych v Polish Club Ltd (2015) 255 CLR 414

Gramotnev v Queensland University of Technology [2015] QCA 127

Grove Investments Ltd v Cape Building Products Ltd [2014] CSIH 43

International Air Transport Association v Ansett Australia Holdings Ltd (2008) 234 CLR 151

Kilkerrin Investments Pty Ltd v Yiu Ying Mei Pty Ltd (2001) Q ConvR 54-551

Master Education Services Pty Ltd v Ketchell (2008) 236 CLR 101

Medtel Pty Ltd v Courtney (2003) 130 FCR 182, [76]; Apollo Shower Screens Pty Ltd v Building & Construction Industry Long Service Payments Corporation (1985) 1 NSWLR 561

Mount Bruce Mining Pty Ltd v Wright Prospecting Pty Ltd (2015) 256 CLR 104

Napier Park European Credit Opportunities Fund Ltd v Harbourmaster Pro-Rata CLO 2 BV [2014] EWCA Civ 984

Plaintiff M47/2012 v Director-General of Security (2012) 251 CLR 1

Rainy Sky SA v…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Pipe Networks Pty Ltd v 148 Brunswick Street Pty Ltd (Truste... and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2019] FCA 598
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Pipe Networks Pty Ltd v 148 Brunswick Street Pty Ltd (Trustee), the dispute involved the interpretation of a lease agreement concerning the rate at which outgoings, specifically electricity, should be charged. The primary issue before the court was determining the meaning and effect of a clause in the lease that stated the outgoings would be charged at the rate that would have been charged to the lessee if the supply had been direct from the supplier. The secondary issue was whether the charges for outgoings were enforceable due to the illegality of the contract to sell energy without being authorised or exempt under the National Energy Retail Law (NERL). The court was required to decide on the proper construction of the relevant clause and whether the contract was unenforceable due to its illegality.

The court found that the ordinary meaning of the clause in the lease agreement indicated that the outgoings should be charged at the rate that would have been charged to the lessee if the supply had been direct from the supplier. This interpretation was consistent with the principle that courts should prefer a construction that does not flout commercial common sense. The court also considered the commercial background of the parties and the prior agreements they had entered into. The court rejected the argument that the clause should be interpreted in a way that would result in a slight benefit for one party, as it was not supported by any linguistic analysis or implied term. The court concluded that the rate at which 148 Brunswick Street Pty Ltd could charge Pipe Networks Pty Ltd for the supply of electricity was the rate that Origin Energy Limited would have charged Pipe Networks Pty Ltd under a contestable contract for the supply of electricity to the demised premises.

Regarding the illegality of the contract, the court found that the transaction in question was the agreement to sell energy, which was expressly prohibited by the NERL. Enforcing the agreement to sell energy would necessarily bring the seller within the contravention of the statutory prohibition. The court also noted that the regulator's choice not to take steps against 148 and to amend the registered exemptions did not necessarily mean that the scheme of the NERL did not support unenforceability. The court concluded that the cross-claim seeking the alternative construction of the Service Charges clause should be dismissed, and it was declared that 148 Brunswick Street Pty Ltd was entitled to charge Pipe Networks Pty Ltd for the supply of electricity at the rate which Origin Energy Limited would have charged Pipe Networks Pty Ltd under the specified contestable contract terms. The cross-claimant was ordered to pay the cross-respondent's costs of the cross-claim.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The cross-claim is dismissed.

2. It is declared that pursuant to the terms of a written lease entered into on 19 May 2016, the rate at which 148 Brunswick Street Pty Ltd is entitled to charge Pipe Networks Pty Ltd for the supply of electricity at the demised premises is the rate which Origin Energy Limited would have charged Pipe Networks Pty Ltd had those parties entered into a contestable contract for the supply of electricity to the demised premises the major terms of which were:

(a) the supply of electricity was to be directly to Pipe Networks Pty Ltd as a large on-market customer;

(b) the supply would commence on 1 June 2017;

(c) the duration of the contestable contract is that which would have been agreed as between Origin Energy Limited and Pipe Networks Pty Ltd or any extension, renewal or replacement thereof; and

(d) the supply of electricity was to be for that consumed by Pipe Networks Pty Ltd solely at the demised premises.

3. The cross-claimant pay the cross-respondent’s costs of the cross-claim.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

In effect, 148’s argument is that the financial operation of the clause according to its ordinary meaning is uncommercial for it but that, if the clause is given another meaning, it operates in a way that, in the present market, it receives a slight benefit. It submitted that this “more commercial” construction should be adopted because it would not have entered into a lease in the circumstances in which it did unless it was able to make a significant profit on the resale of electricity. In this way 148’s argument seems to invert the usual process of construction. Rather than there being two alternative constructions of the clause where the Court will prefer that which does not flout commercial common sense, it asserts that the only real construction results in an uncommercial result for it such that some alternative construction must be adopted. Its argument is derived more from the perceived commerciality of the operation of the clause in particular circumstances rather than on any linguistic analysis. In that sense the tacit argument was, seemingly, that there exists a form of implied term which controls the operation of the clause in question, at least to the extent to which it applies to the supply of electricity, although no express attempt was made to advance the case in that manner.The facts To the extent to which the matter was considered as one of the construction of the 2016 Deed, the parties accepted that the clause in question was sufficiently ambiguous to permit the Court to consider the circumstances surrounding its formation: Ecosse Property Holdings Pty Ltd v Gee Dee Nominees Pty Ltd (2017) 261 CLR 544 (Ecosse), [16]. That is, if such ambiguity was needed: Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of NSW (1982) 149 CLR 337 at 350-352; Western Export Services Inc v Jireh International Pty Ltd (2011) 86 ALJR 1. The purpose of considering those circumstances is that they shed light on the imputed intention of the parties as to what they sought to achieve by the words which they have used and the manner in which they have expressed their agreement: Gramotnev v Queensland University of Technology [2015] QCA 127 per Jackson J. In this case the parties had entered into a number of prior agreements in relation to the tenancy and there was no relevant dispute that these prior commercial arrangements were background circumstances against which the present agreement ought to be considered. The demise which is the subject of these proceedings is of part of a commercial building and surrounds located at 148 Brunswick Street, Fortitude Valley in Brisbane. The part leased to Pipe is referred to in these reasons as being “the Property” and is slightly less than 12% of the total building area. Pipe’s business involves operating data centres which, presumably, involves the storage and provision of access to large volumes of electronic data. One such data centre is located in the Property. Pipe is part of a group of companies which include large businesses identified as TPG Telecom and AAPT, both of which are significant participants in the data and telecommunications industry. Pipe’s business necessarily involves the consumption of substantial amounts of electricity, the price of which is an important part of the cost structure of its operations.The various lease arrangements of the premises

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

It follows that whilst it can be appreciated that on 148’s construction it might receive substantial revenue from the sale of electricity, the total revenue received from the Property as between the 2008 Lease and the 2016 Deed is not significantly altered. Again, the respective benefits and detriments of the rights and obligations of the parties under the 2017 Lease provide an insufficient foundation on which to construe the Service Charges clause. The full nature and value of the respective benefits under the lease cannot be ascertained in a way which provides any sure footing for determining how the clause should be applied.Conclusion on the question of construction of the Service Charges clause The necessary conclusion from the above is that, under the Service Charges clause of the 2017 Lease, the rate at which 148 may charge Pipe under the 2017 Lease is that which Pipe would have been charged by Origin had Pipe entered into a contestable contract with Origin commencing on the date on which the 2017 Lease commenced. Necessarily, it follows that the rates at which Origin supplies electricity under its standard contracts for large customers are irrelevant to the operation of the clause. The rate charged by Origin will reflect the terms of an agreement which Pipe would have entered into taking into accounts its consumption demand and demand profile for its use of electricity at the premises at 148 Brunswick Street, Fortitude Valley, Brisbane. The term of any such agreement will be that which Pipe, acting reasonably, would have entered into for the purposes of obtaining direct supply at the demised premises from the date of the commencement of the lease. If that contestable contract would have come to an end, the current rate is to be ascertained by reference to any extension or replacement agreement. It follows that, in the circumstances and on the correct construction of the Service Charges clause, it ought to be declared that pursuant to the terms of a written lease entered into on 19 May 2016, the rate at which 148 Brunswick Street Pty Ltd is entitled to charge Pipe Networks Pty Ltd for the supply of electricity at the demised premises is the rate which Origin Energy Limited would have charged Pipe Networks Pty Ltd had those parties entered into a contestable contract for the supply of electricity to the demised premises the major terms of which were:(a)the supply of electricity was to be directly to Pipe Networks Pty Ltd as a large on-market customer;(b)the supply would commence on 1 June 2017;(c)the duration of the contestable contract is that which would have been agreed as between Origin Energy Limited and Pipe Networks Pty Ltd or any extension, renewal or replacement thereof; and (d)the supply of electricity was to be for that consumed by Pipe Networks Pty Ltd solely at the demised premises. As a consequence of the correct construction of the Service Charges clause, the cross-claim seeking the alternative construction ought to be dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

148 submitted that the agreement should not be unenforceable for a number of reasons:(a)Firstly, it submitted that the NERLQ contemplated that contracts survived contraventions, because the NERLQ affords the regulator various powers to oblige persons engaged in contraventions to remedy them. Reference was made to ss 288, 289 and 291. However, nothing in those provisions requires contravening contracts to remain enforceable. They might equally be taken as indicators for the regulator to act to prevent persons being affected by contraventions and, in particular, contraventions of civil penalty provisions. Although s 289(1) prevents individuals from taking action against a contravener, that need not be taken to require an individual to remain subject to obligations in a contravening contract. (b)Secondly, it submitted that a contravening contract is not intended to be rendered void by the NERLQ, because it contains detailed discretionary remedial powers (including for civil penalties) to regulate the consequences of contraventions. There is some force in that submission, especially by analogy to the provisions and decisions in Yango and Gnych discussed below.(c)Thirdly, it submitted that the NERLQ does not prohibit entry into the contract (but, impliedly, only its performance). That may be so (subject to the effects of the accessory and attempt liability provisions in ss 298 and 299), however it does not answer the case under the second category restated in Equuscorp, but is merely a factor to consider in construing the statutory intention.(d)Fourthly, it submitted that the regulator’s choice in the present case not to take any steps against 148 and simply to amend the registered exemptions indicates that the scheme of the NERLQ does not support unenforceability. That submissions is really a particularisation of the submission about the existence of a detailed compliance regime and, in any case, depends upon the veracity of the submission that contravention could be cured by retrospective amendment to the register, discussed below.(e)Fifthly, it submitted that the consequences of unenforceability of energy sale agreements might be severe. It may result in a consumer receiving a windfall at the expense of an on-supplier. Such consequences may be relevant: see eg Yango at 426-427 per Mason J. In this case the severity is likely to be directed at the contravener, more so than the “innocent” party, however there remains some force to the argument. Consideration Here the transaction in question is the agreement to sell energy provided for in the Service Charges clause. The selling of energy other than as permitted by the NERLQ is expressly prohibited by s 88(1) and enforced by the imposition of a civil penalty. It necessarily follows that any court giving judgment to a seller of energy who has acted in contravention of s 88 will be enforcing the agreement to sell and necessarily bringing the seller within the contravention. Indeed, in order to recover under the Service Charges clause, 148 would necessarily have to plead and prove the particular essential act which is a breach of the statutory prohibition. It cannot be said that the illegality was incidental to the course of the performance of the agreement: Fitzgerald v FJ Leonardt Pty Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 215.