FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Pipe Networks Pty Ltd v 148 Brunswick Street Pty Ltd (Trustee) [2019] FCA 598
File number: QUD 940 of 2016 Judge: DERRINGTON J Date of judgment: 2 May 2019 Catchwords: CONTRACTS – interpretation of contracts – deed amending lease – outgoings to be charged by lessor at rate (if more than one then the highest) which would have been charged to lessee had supply been direct to lessee – meaning and effect of clause in relation to electricity outgoings – limits on relevance of financial consequences of proffered constructions – limits of construing contracts by reference to commercial business sense
CONTRACTS – illegality – contract to do that which is expressly prohibited – contract to sell energy where not authorised or exempt under National Energy Retail Law – whether charges for outgoings unenforceable due to illegality – whether backdated registration by AER effective to exempt lessor
Legislation: Competition and Consumer Act 2001 (Cth), s 44AE
National Energy Retail Law (Queensland) Act 2014 (Qld)
National Energy Retail Law (South Australia) Act 2011 (SA), Schedule, National Energy Retail Law, s 88
National Gas (South Australia) Act 2008 (SA), Schedule, National Gas Law, Sch 2
National Energy Retail Rules
Cases cited: Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (2009) 239 CLR 27
Arnold v Britton [2015] AC 1619
Australian Broadcasting Commission v Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd (1973) 129 CLR 99
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Baxter Healthcare Pty Ltd (2007) 232 CLR 1
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v EnergyAustralia Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 274
Barclays Bank Plc v HHY Luxembourg SARL [2010] EWCA Civ 1248
Blatch v Archer (1774) 1 Cowp 63; 98 ER 969
Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of NSW (1982) 149 CLR 337
Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd v National Westminster Bank Plc [1995] 1 EGLR 97
Ecosse Property Holdings Pty Ltd v Gee Dee Nominees Pty Ltd (2017) 261 CLR 544
Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Haxton (2012) 246 CLR 498
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd (2002) 250 CLR 503
Fitzgerald v FJ Leonardt Pty Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 215
Gnych v Polish Club Ltd (2015) 255 CLR 414
Gramotnev v Queensland University of Technology [2015] QCA 127
Grove Investments Ltd v Cape Building Products Ltd [2014] CSIH 43
International Air Transport Association v Ansett Australia Holdings Ltd (2008) 234 CLR 151
Kilkerrin Investments Pty Ltd v Yiu Ying Mei Pty Ltd (2001) Q ConvR 54-551
Master Education Services Pty Ltd v Ketchell (2008) 236 CLR 101
Medtel Pty Ltd v Courtney (2003) 130 FCR 182, [76]; Apollo Shower Screens Pty Ltd v Building & Construction Industry Long Service Payments Corporation (1985) 1 NSWLR 561
Mount Bruce Mining Pty Ltd v Wright Prospecting Pty Ltd (2015) 256 CLR 104
Napier Park European Credit Opportunities Fund Ltd v Harbourmaster Pro-Rata CLO 2 BV [2014] EWCA Civ 984
Plaintiff M47/2012 v Director-General of Security (2012) 251 CLR 1
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 598
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the ordinary meaning of the clause in the lease agreement indicated that the outgoings should be charged at the rate that would have been charged to the lessee if the supply had been direct from the supplier. This interpretation was consistent with the principle that courts should prefer a construction that does not flout commercial common sense. The court also considered the commercial background of the parties and the prior agreements they had entered into. The court rejected the argument that the clause should be interpreted in a way that would result in a slight benefit for one party, as it was not supported by any linguistic analysis or implied term. The court concluded that the rate at which 148 Brunswick Street Pty Ltd could charge Pipe Networks Pty Ltd for the supply of electricity was the rate that Origin Energy Limited would have charged Pipe Networks Pty Ltd under a contestable contract for the supply of electricity to the demised premises.
Regarding the illegality of the contract, the court found that the transaction in question was the agreement to sell energy, which was expressly prohibited by the NERL. Enforcing the agreement to sell energy would necessarily bring the seller within the contravention of the statutory prohibition. The court also noted that the regulator's choice not to take steps against 148 and to amend the registered exemptions did not necessarily mean that the scheme of the NERL did not support unenforceability. The court concluded that the cross-claim seeking the alternative construction of the Service Charges clause should be dismissed, and it was declared that 148 Brunswick Street Pty Ltd was entitled to charge Pipe Networks Pty Ltd for the supply of electricity at the rate which Origin Energy Limited would have charged Pipe Networks Pty Ltd under the specified contestable contract terms. The cross-claimant was ordered to pay the cross-respondent's costs of the cross-claim.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The cross-claim is dismissed.
2. It is declared that pursuant to the terms of a written lease entered into on 19 May 2016, the rate at which 148 Brunswick Street Pty Ltd is entitled to charge Pipe Networks Pty Ltd for the supply of electricity at the demised premises is the rate which Origin Energy Limited would have charged Pipe Networks Pty Ltd had those parties entered into a contestable contract for the supply of electricity to the demised premises the major terms of which were:
(a) the supply of electricity was to be directly to Pipe Networks Pty Ltd as a large on-market customer;
(b) the supply would commence on 1 June 2017;
(c) the duration of the contestable contract is that which would have been agreed as between Origin Energy Limited and Pipe Networks Pty Ltd or any extension, renewal or replacement thereof; and
(d) the supply of electricity was to be for that consumed by Pipe Networks Pty Ltd solely at the demised premises.
3. The cross-claimant pay the cross-respondent’s costs of the cross-claim.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
148 submitted that the agreement should not be unenforceable for a number of reasons:(a)Firstly, it submitted that the NERLQ contemplated that contracts survived contraventions, because the NERLQ affords the regulator various powers to oblige persons engaged in contraventions to remedy them. Reference was made to ss 288, 289 and 291. However, nothing in those provisions requires contravening contracts to remain enforceable. They might equally be taken as indicators for the regulator to act to prevent persons being affected by contraventions and, in particular, contraventions of civil penalty provisions. Although s 289(1) prevents individuals from taking action against a contravener, that need not be taken to require an individual to remain subject to obligations in a contravening contract. (b)Secondly, it submitted that a contravening contract is not intended to be rendered void by the NERLQ, because it contains detailed discretionary remedial powers (including for civil penalties) to regulate the consequences of contraventions. There is some force in that submission, especially by analogy to the provisions and decisions in Yango and Gnych discussed below.(c)Thirdly, it submitted that the NERLQ does not prohibit entry into the contract (but, impliedly, only its performance). That may be so (subject to the effects of the accessory and attempt liability provisions in ss 298 and 299), however it does not answer the case under the second category restated in Equuscorp, but is merely a factor to consider in construing the statutory intention.(d)Fourthly, it submitted that the regulator’s choice in the present case not to take any steps against 148 and simply to amend the registered exemptions indicates that the scheme of the NERLQ does not support unenforceability. That submissions is really a particularisation of the submission about the existence of a detailed compliance regime and, in any case, depends upon the veracity of the submission that contravention could be cured by retrospective amendment to the register, discussed below.(e)Fifthly, it submitted that the consequences of unenforceability of energy sale agreements might be severe. It may result in a consumer receiving a windfall at the expense of an on-supplier. Such consequences may be relevant: see eg Yango at 426-427 per Mason J. In this case the severity is likely to be directed at the contravener, more so than the “innocent” party, however there remains some force to the argument. Consideration Here the transaction in question is the agreement to sell energy provided for in the Service Charges clause. The selling of energy other than as permitted by the NERLQ is expressly prohibited by s 88(1) and enforced by the imposition of a civil penalty. It necessarily follows that any court giving judgment to a seller of energy who has acted in contravention of s 88 will be enforcing the agreement to sell and necessarily bringing the seller within the contravention. Indeed, in order to recover under the Service Charges clause, 148 would necessarily have to plead and prove the particular essential act which is a breach of the statutory prohibition. It cannot be said that the illegality was incidental to the course of the performance of the agreement: Fitzgerald v FJ Leonardt Pty Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 215.