Pilbara Iron Ore Pty Ltd v Ammon - [2008] WASC 108

JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CHAMBERS

CITATION: PILBARA IRON ORE PTY LTD -v- AMMON [2008] WASC 108

CORAM: TEMPLEMAN J

HEARD: 20 MAY 2008

DELIVERED : 6 JUNE 2008

FILE NO/S: CIV 1310 of 2008

BETWEEN: PILBARA IRON ORE PTY LTD (ACN 100 410 295)
Plaintiff (Respondent)
AND
DEREK NOEL AMMON
First Defendant (Applicant)
DIRECTOR GENERAL OF MINES
Second Defendant

Catchwords:

Practice and procedure - Concurrent jurisdiction between Mining Warden's Court and Supreme Court - Transfer of interest in tenement conditional on completion of feasibility study - Plaint in Warden's Court for declaration condition not fulfilled - Defendant to plaint files claim in Supreme Court for specific performance - Whether plaint in jurisdiction of Warden's Court - Whether Supreme Court proceedings be stayed

Legislation:

Mining Act 1978 (WA), s 132

Result:

Application granted

Category: B

Representation:

Counsel:

Plaintiff (Respondent)          :    Mr S K Dharmananda
First Defendant (Applicant)     :    Mr P J Hannan & Mr G M Irving
Second Defendant          :    No appearance

Solicitors:

Plaintiff (Respondent)          :    Blakiston & Crabb
First Defendant (Applicant)     :    Dwyer Durack
Second Defendant          :    No appearance

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Christmas Island Resort Pty Ltd v Geraldton Building Co Pty Ltd (No 5) (1997) 18 WAR 334
Ewins v BHP Billiton Ltd [2005] VSC 4
Global Doctor Ltd v Hodgkinson (2003) 28 WAR 286
Goldamere Pty Ltd v Metso Minerals Industries Inc [2007] NSWSC 980
O'Grady v Northern Queensland Co Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 356
Plantagenet Wines Pty Ltd v Lion Nathan Wine Group Australia Ltd (2006) 229 ALR 327
Royal Bank of Scotland Ltd v Citrusdal Investments Ltd [1971] 1 WLR 469
Sterling Pharmaceuticals Pty Ltd v The Boots Company (Australia) Pty Ltd (1992) 34 FCR 287
Thames Launches Ltd v Trinity House Corporation of Deptford Strond [1961] Ch 197

TEMPLEMAN J: On 1 April 2008, the plaintiff (PIO) commenced this action by writ indorsed with a statement of claim. The defendants are Derek Noel Ammon (Mr Ammon) and the Director General of Mines (the Director).
By its prayer for relief, PIO seeks a declaration against Mr Ammon that it has earned an 80% 'joint venture interest' in mining tenement E47/1140 (the tenement) pursuant to an agreement made between them on 3 September 2002.
In par 5 of its statement of claim, PIO alleges that by cl 4.5 of the agreement, it was agreed that PIO could acquire such an interest on performing certain obligations, including the completion of a feasibility study during a period specified as the 'earning period'.
In par 10 of the statement of claim, PIO alleges that it provided the feasibility study to Mr Ammon during the earning period, in accordance with cl 4.5 of the agreement.
PIO claims also an entitlement to be registered as to 80% of the tenement E47/1140 and an order requiring the first defendant to execute and provide to the plaintiff a registrable transfer of that interest.
By a notice of motion filed on 11 April 2008, the first defendant applied…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Pilbara Iron Ore Pty Ltd v Ammon and more:

Read every judgment in full
Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
Download judgments as PDF or Word

Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details

Case: [2008] WASC 108
Decision Date: 6 JUNE 2008

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Pilbara Iron Ore Pty Ltd (the applicant) filed a plaint in the Mining Warden's Court seeking a declaration that a condition precedent to the transfer of a mining tenement had not been fulfilled. Ammon (the defendant) responded by filing a claim in the Supreme Court for specific performance of the agreement. The applicant then filed an application in the Supreme Court to stay the proceedings in the Supreme Court on the basis that the same matter was being litigated in the Mining Warden's Court. The court was required to determine whether the proceedings in the Supreme Court should be stayed on the basis that the same matter was being litigated in the Mining Warden's Court. The court referred to the principle that a person should not be allowed to institute proceedings in any court if the circumstances are such that to do so would be vexatious. The court held that the proceedings in the Supreme Court were vexatious as the same issue was being raised by the applicant in the Mining Warden's Court. The court found that the public interest required the court to stay the proceedings in the Supreme Court. The court followed the decision of Buckley J in Thames Launches Ltd v Trinity House Corporation of Deptford Strond [1961] Ch 197 and the Full Court in Christmas Island Resort Pty Ltd v Geraldton Building Co Pty Ltd (No 5) (1997) 18 WAR 334. The court granted the application and stayed the proceedings in the Supreme Court.

Orders

Orders of the court

Application granted

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Plowman J followed the decision of Buckley J in Thames Launches Ltd v Trinity House Corporation of Deptford Strond [1961] Ch 197. There, Buckley J held:I understand the principle to be that if there are two courts which are faced with substantially the same question, it is desirable to be sure that that question is debated in only one of those two courts, if by that means justice can be done. (207)Buckley J said later in his judgment:Counsel for the defendants says that the principle is that a man should not pursue a remedy in respect of the same matter in more than one court. In my judgment, the principle is rather wider than that. It is that no man should be allowed to institute proceedings in any court if the circumstances are such that to do so would really be vexatious. In my judgment, it is vexatious if somebody institutes proceedings to obtain relief in respect of a particular subject-matter where exactly the same issue is raised by his opponent in proceedings already instituted in another court in which he is not the plaintiff but the defendant. [209] (Emphasis supplied) In Christmas Island Resort Pty Ltd v Geraldton Building Co Pty Ltd (No 5) (1997) 18 WAR 334 the Full Court considered whether the Supreme Court had statutory or inherent jurisdiction to order a stay of arbitration proceedings. The question arose because the primary judge had granted an injunction to restrain the appellant from proceeding with arbitration proceedings after the Master had dealt with the same issues in the Supreme Court. In a joint judgment, the court held:The power of a court to control its own proceedings and to arrest an abuse of process exists for the public interest. It has done so for centuries. It is even more critical that a court in the late 20th century should guard its processes jealously and be sensitive to the public interest. Access to justice is a critical factor in the functioning of a fair society. Court resources, both in terms of time and facilities are scarce and shrinking. This makes even more important for a court to ensure that public resources are applied in the best and most efficient means possible. The way in which parties to a dispute seek access to the public resources that the courts represent must be closely monitored. That the courts can have regard to the public interest in deciding whether there has been an abuse of process is beyond doubt: see Moevao v Department of Labour and the joint judgment of Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ in Walton.Looked at in this light the phrase 'abuse of process' is not necessarily a pejorative term. It is a question of balancing the private interests of the parties against broader public interest considerations involved in the administration of justice.As the court's inherent jurisdiction extends to the extent necessary to enable it to act effectively, the court has the inherent jurisdiction to control all abuses of its process. This may not seem a novel statement. However, the key point here is that the inherent jurisdiction of the court is not limited only to control of its own procedures to prevent an abuse of process, but extends to enable it to stay proceedings in inferior courts or tribunals, even private arbitration proceedings, if those proceedings are an abuse of the court's process. The reason is that to abstain from intervening could prevent the court from acting effectively. (345)