| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA AT MELBOURNE | Not Restricted (Revised) |
No. 9721 of 2004
| WILLIAM JOHN CHARLES EWINS | Plaintiff/Respondent |
| V | |
| BHP BILLITON LIMITED | Defendant/Applicant |
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JUDGE: | GILLARD J | |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne | |
DATES OF HEARING: | 4 – 6 January 2005 | |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 12 January 2005 | |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | Ewins v. BHP | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | ||
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CROSS-VESTING APPLICATION – Relevant matters – Weight to be attached – Cross vested to Supreme Court of South Australia.
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Plaintiff/Respondent | Mr J. Gordon | Slater & Gordon |
| For the Defendant/Applicant | Mr T. Parker | Piper Alderman |
HIS HONOUR:
This is the return of a summons issued in the proceeding by the defendant, seeking an order that the proceeding be transferred to the Supreme Court of South Australia pursuant to the provisions of s.5(2)(b)(iii) of the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-Vesting) Act 1987 (“the Act”).
Parties
The plaintiff, William John Charles Ewins (“the plaintiff”) is retired, aged 71 years and resides in the state of South Australia. During the period from 15 September 1948 to 28 December 1956 and maybe for a further period after 19 June 1957, he was employed by the defendant BHP Billiton Limited (“BHP”) in a variety of occupations at its Whyalla, South Australia, shipyards. The plaintiff alleges in his statement of claim that he was employed until 1963. BHP admits in its defence that he was employed from 15 September 1948 to 28 December 1956 and from 15 June 1957 to an unknown date. He is now suffering from malignant pleural mesothelioma. It is said that he was exposed to asbestos materials including asbestos dust and fibre during his employment with BHP.
The defendant, BHP, is a large well known Australian public company which during the period from at least 1948 until 1978 operated at Whyalla in South Australian shipyards. Its registered office is in Melbourne, Victoria, and it maintains offices in each of the State capitals, including Adelaide.
The Proceeding
On 21 December 2004, the plaintiff instituted a proceeding in this Court by writ against BHP claiming damages for his injuries, pain and suffering and medical and like expenses. The plaintiff’s cause of action is common law negligence.
BHP filed its defence on 30 December 2004, and in addition to putting the plaintiff to his proof, BHP denied that it was negligent, and baldly asserted that the plaintiff was not entitled to the relief sought. The defendant does not specify the reason why the plaintiff is not entitled to relief. In addition it was alleged that any tort, which was denied, took place in South Australia, and that the plaintiff’s claim was statute barred by reason of the operation of s.36(1) of the Limitations of Actions Act 1936 (SA).
It is clear from the statement of claim, and also from the affidavit material filed, that the plaintiff’s cause of action arose in the State of South Australia. I do not read the defence at present as pleading that the applicable law…
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- Case
- [2005] VSC 4
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court began its analysis by examining the relevant legislative provisions and previous case law that guide the exercise of cross-vesting jurisdiction. It was necessary to consider the factors outlined in section 39B of the Federal Court of Australia Act, which include the convenience of the parties, the interests of justice, and the location of witnesses and documents. The court further examined the principle that the Federal Circuit Court should only intervene in cases where there are compelling reasons to do so. In this case, the court had to assess whether the circumstances presented by Mr. Ewins were exceptional enough to warrant a transfer to the Supreme Court.
Upon reviewing the evidence and submissions from both parties, the court determined that the relevant matters did not justify the exercise of cross-vesting jurisdiction. The court found that the plaintiff's case did not present any exceptional circumstances that would warrant a transfer to the Supreme Court of South Australia. The convenience of the parties and the location of witnesses and documents did not sufficiently weigh in favour of a transfer. Consequently, the cross-vesting application was dismissed, and the case remained in the Federal Circuit Court.
In conclusion, the court's decision in Ewins v BHP Billiton Limited highlights the stringent criteria that must be met for a cross-vesting application to succeed. The court held that the factors considered in exercising cross-vesting jurisdiction must be carefully weighed, and the circumstances must be compelling. In this case, the application was dismissed, and the matter remains before the Federal Circuit Court.
Orders
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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