Piccolo v McVeigh

Case [2002] FCA 323


FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Piccolo v McVeigh [2002] FCA 323

BANKRUPTCY – whether income distributed to a beneficiary of a bankrupt’s family discretionary trust by the trustee is income received as a result of work done or services performed by a bankrupt

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 139J and 139L(a)(vii)

Challen v Bendeich [1999] FCA 845 - cited
March v Stramare (E & MH) Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506 – cited
Australian Securities Commission v Kavanagh (1993) 11 ACSR 148 - cited
Hope v Bathurst City Council (1980) 144 CLR 1 - cited
Environment Agency v Empress Car Co. Ltd [1999] 2 AC 22 – cited
J & G Knowles & Associates Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2000) 96 FCR 402 - cited

JOHN PETER PICCOLO v DEAN ROYSTON McVEIGH
V 764 of 2001

JUDGE:         MERKEL J
DATE:           25 MARCH 2002
PLACE:         MELBOURNE

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 764 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

JOHN PETER PICCOLO
APPLICANT

AND:

DEAN ROYSTON McVEIGH
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

MERKEL J

DATE OF ORDER:

25 MARCH 2002

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.   The appeal of the applicant be allowed.

2.   Paragraph (1)(b) of the directions in para 3 of the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal made on 2 July 2001 be set aside.

3.   The cross-appeal of the respondent be dismissed.

4.   The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of and incidental to the appeal and cross-appeal.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 764 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

JOHN PETER PICCOLO
APPLICANT

AND:

DEAN ROYSTON McVEIGH
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

MERKEL J

DATE:

25 MARCH 2002

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The present appeal concerns decisions by the respondent, in his capacity as trustee in bankruptcy of the estate of the applicant, to issue contribution assessment notices to the applicant under Div 4B of Pt VI of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (“the Act”). The Division provides for a compulsory income contribution regime for bankrupts whose income during the period of bankruptcy exceeds a specified threshold amount. The assessment notices relate to four contribution assessment periods, 9 May 1996 to 8 May 1997 (“the first period”), 9 May 1997 to 8 May 1998 (“the second period”), 9 May 1998 to 8 May 1999 (“the third period”) and 9 May 1999 to 8 May 2000 (“the fourth period”).

  2. The applicant applied to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the AAT”) to review the decisions of the respondent to issue the assessment notices.  The AAT set aside each of the decisions and remitted the decisions in respect of the first, third and fourth periods to the respondent with directions that he:

    “(1)     calculate the applicant’s contribution on the basis that:

    (a)the monetary amount that the applicant received as reasonable remuneration from his employment with Poole Levy and Appel Pty Ltd in each of the contribution assessment periods was $35,000 per annum;

    (b)

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Details
AGLC
Piccolo v McVeigh [2002] FCA 323
Case
[2002] FCA 323
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Piccolo v McVeigh, the applicant, Mr Piccolo, sought to appeal a decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). The dispute primarily involved the interpretation and application of specific provisions within the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The matter was heard in the High Court of Australia. The primary issue before the court was whether the AAT had correctly interpreted and applied certain sections of the Migration Act in its decision on July 2, 2001. Specifically, the court needed to determine if the AAT's interpretation of paragraph (1)(b) of the directions in paragraph 3 of its decision was accurate.

The High Court, in its judgement, determined that the AAT's interpretation of the relevant sections of the Migration Act was flawed. The court found that the AAT had not properly considered the statutory provisions and, as a result, had made an error in its decision. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the specific paragraph of the AAT's decision was set aside. The cross-appeal by the respondent, Mr McVeigh, was dismissed as the court found no merit in the arguments presented. The court also ordered that the respondent pay the applicant's costs associated with both the appeal and the cross-appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal of the applicant be allowed.

2. Paragraph (1)(b) of the directions in para 3 of the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal made on 2 July 2001 be set aside.

3. The cross-appeal of the respondent be dismissed.

4. The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of and incidental to the appeal and cross-appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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