SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: Phillips v Spencer & Anor [2005] QCA 317 PARTIES: CRIS BRIAN PHILLIPS
(applicant/applicant)
v
MAGISTRATE ROBERT SPENCER
(first respondent/first respondent)
STATE OF QUEENSLAND
(second respondent/second respondent)FILE NO/S: Appeal No 3292 of 2005
SC No 638 of 2004DIVISION: Court of Appeal PROCEEDING: Miscellaneous Application – Civil
Application for Extension of Time/General Civil AppealORIGINATING COURT: Supreme Court at Cairns DELIVERED ON: 26 August 2005 DELIVERED AT: Brisbane HEARING DATE: 22 July 2005 JUDGES: de Jersey CJ, McMurdo P and Jerrard JA
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court,
de Jersey CJ and McMurdo P concurring as to the orders
made, Jerrard JA dissentingORDERS:
1. Application for leave to appeal refused 2. Application for an extension of time within which to appeal refused 3. In each case, the applicant pay the respondent State’s costs to be assessed on the standard basis CATCHWORDS: CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL AND INQUIRY AFTER CONVICTION – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST CONVICTION RECORDED ON PLEA OF GUILTY – PARTICULAR CASES – where applicant pleaded guilty in Magistrates Court to offence under the Nature Conservation Act 1992 (Qld) – where applicant was represented by counsel – where applicant contended that legal advice to plead guilty was incorrect – where applicant brought application before the Supreme Court for review of the Magistrate’s decision under the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) – where application was dismissed – where applicant made application in Court of Appeal effectively renewing application before the Supreme Court and also seeking leave to appeal from orders of the Supreme Court – whether correct avenue to seek to set aside the plea was taken – whether applicant was bound by apparently freely entered plea of guilty – whether applicant should be granted leave to appeal EVIDENCE – BURDEN OF PROOF, PRESUMPTIONS, AND WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE – GENERALLY – STATUTORY PROVISOS AND EXEMPTIONS – PARTICULAR MATTERS – OFFENCES – where s 88(1) of the Nature Conservation Act 1992 (Qld) (“the Act”) places a restriction on the taking of protected animals – where s 88(2) of the Act states s 88(1) does not apply to the taking of protected animals in a protected area – where charge did not allege taking had occurred in a protected area – whether circumstance that the taking has not occurred in a protected area is an element of the offence which the prosecution must prove, or an exception it must negative – whether charge was invalid Constitution of Queensland 2001 (Qld), s 58
Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld), s 12, s 13, s 41, s 43, s 48
Justices Act 1886 (Qld), s 47, s 142A, s 147A, s 222
Nature Conservation Act 1992 (Qld), s 14, s 29, s 57, s 62,
s 88, s 127, s 146, s 147, s 154, s 162Bell v Bay-Jespersen [2004] QCA 68; [2004] 2 Qd R 235,
cited
Bone v Mothershaw [2002] QCA 120;…
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- AGLC
- Phillips v Spencer [2005] QCA 317
- Case
- [2005] QCA 317
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
In the matter of Phillips v Spencer, the applicant, Phillips, sought to appeal against a conviction for an offence under the Nature Conservation Act 1992 (Qld). Phillips had pleaded guilty to the offence in the Magistrates Court and was represented by counsel at the time. However, Phillips later contended that the legal advice he received to plead guilty was incorrect and sought to set aside the plea. Phillips made an application to the Supreme Court for a review of the Magistrate's decision under the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld), which was dismissed. Phillips then applied to the Court of Appeal to renew the application before the Supreme Court and sought leave to appeal from the orders of the Supreme Court.
The legal issues in this case were whether the correct avenue was taken to seek to set aside the plea and whether Phillips was bound by the apparently freely entered plea of guilty. The Court of Appeal had to consider whether Phillips should be granted leave to appeal.
The Court of Appeal held that the correct avenue to seek to set aside the plea was not taken, as the application should have been made directly to the Court of Appeal rather than through the Supreme Court. The Court also held that Phillips was bound by the plea of guilty as he had entered the plea freely and with the advice of counsel. The Court of Appeal held that Phillips was not entitled to leave to appeal.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave to appeal and the application for an extension of time within which to appeal. Phillips was ordered to pay the respondent State’s costs to be assessed on the standard basis.
The legal issues in this case were whether the correct avenue was taken to seek to set aside the plea and whether Phillips was bound by the apparently freely entered plea of guilty. The Court of Appeal had to consider whether Phillips should be granted leave to appeal.
The Court of Appeal held that the correct avenue to seek to set aside the plea was not taken, as the application should have been made directly to the Court of Appeal rather than through the Supreme Court. The Court also held that Phillips was bound by the plea of guilty as he had entered the plea freely and with the advice of counsel. The Court of Appeal held that Phillips was not entitled to leave to appeal.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave to appeal and the application for an extension of time within which to appeal. Phillips was ordered to pay the respondent State’s costs to be assessed on the standard basis.
Orders
Orders of the court
1.
Application for leave to appeal refused
2.
Application for an extension of time within which to appeal refused
3.
In each case, the applicant pay the respondent State’s costs to be assessed on the standard basis
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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