Pfizer Inc v Commissioner of Patents

Link copied
Case Copied 29 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Pfizer Inc v Commissioner of Patents [2005] FCA 137

PATENT – application for extension of term – appeal from decision of the Deputy Commissioner of Patents refusing the extension – construction of s 70(2)(a) of the Patents Act1990 (Cth) – whether disclosure and description of a generic formula was an “in substance” disclosure of the compound within that formula – whether there was “real and reasonably clear disclosure” – where there is “real and reasonably clear disclosure” there is also “in substance” disclosure – the existence of a later selection patent is not relevant to whether there is “in substance” disclosure for the purposes of an application for extension of term under s 70(2)(a) – application remitted to the Commissioner

WORDS AND PHRASES – “must in substance be disclosed” – “in substance”

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)
Patents Act 1990 (Cth)

AMP Incorporated v Commissioner of Patents (1974) AOJP 3224
CCOM Pty Ltd v Jiejing Pty Ltd (1994) 51 FCR 260
Coopers Animal Health Australia Ltd v Western Stock Distributors Pty Ltd (1987) 15 FCR 382
Ethyl Corporation's Patent [1972] RPC 169
F. Hoffman-La Roche v Commissioner of Patents (1971) 123 CLR 529
Gambro Pty Ltd v Fresenius Medical Care South East Asia Pty Ltd (2000) 49 IPR 321
ICI Chemicals & Polymers Ltd v Lubrizol Corp (1999) AIPC 91 91-521
Imperial Chemical Industries Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Patents [2004] FCA (1658)
Institut Francais du Petrole des Carburants et Lubricants’ Application [1972] FSR 147
Lockwood Security Products Pty Ltd v Doric Products Pty Ltd (2004) 2121 ALR 1
Merck & Co Inc v Sankyo Co Ltd (1992) 23 IPR 415
Prestige Group (Australia) Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1990) 26 FCR 197
Re ICI Chemicals & Polymers Ltd v The Lubrizol Corporation Inc (2000) 106 FCR 214
Re IG Farbenindustries Patents (1930) 47 RPC 289
RGC Mineral Sands Pty Ltd v Wimmera Industrial Minerals Pty Ltd (1998) 89 FCR 458
Societe Des Usines Chemiques Rhone-Poulenc v Commissioner of Patents (1959) 100 CLR 5
University of Georgia Research Foundation v Biochem Pharma Inc (2000) 51 IPR 222

TA Blanco White, Patents for Inventions, 4th ed., Stevens & Sons, London, 1974

PFIZER INC v COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS

NSD1024 OF 2004

BENNETT J
1 MARCH 2005
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD1024 OF 2004

BETWEEN:

PFIZER INC
APPLICANT

AND:

COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

BENNETT J

DATE OF ORDER:

1 MARCH 2005

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The decision of the Deputy Commissioner of Patents made on 4 June 2004 be set aside with effect from 4 June 2004.

2.The matter be remitted to the Commissioner of Patents for determination according to law.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD1024 OF 2004

BETWEEN:

PFIZER INC
APPLICANT

AND:

COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Pfizer Inc v Commissioner of Patents and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2005] FCA 137
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Pfizer Inc v Commissioner of Patents was heard in the Federal Court of Australia. The dispute arose from an application by Pfizer for an extension of the patent term of a pharmaceutical substance. The Commissioner of Patents rejected the application, and Pfizer appealed to the Federal Court. The legal issue before the court was whether the Deputy Commissioner erred in considering the selection patent in determining whether the pharmaceutical substance, voriconazole, was in substance disclosed in the parent patent. The applicant argued that the Deputy Commissioner should have confined himself to the parent patent and the evidence of a person skilled in the art as to the construction of that patent. The court considered the evidence of a skilled addressee, Dr Stamford, who established that voriconazole is one of the chemical entities covered by the chemical formula in the parent patent. The court concluded that the selection patent was irrelevant to the question of the construction of the parent patent. The Deputy Commissioner had erred in considering the selection patent in the construction of the parent patent. The court set aside the decision of the Deputy Commissioner and remitted the matter to the Commissioner of Patents for determination according to law.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The decision of the Deputy Commissioner of Patents made on 4 June 2004 be set aside with effect from 4 June 2004.

2. The matter be remitted to the Commissioner of Patents for determination according to law.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The Deputy Commissioner rejected the submission that regard should only be had to the patent for which the extension was being sought, the parent patent. THE EVIDENCE Evidence of a skilled addressee is relevant to disclosures of the specification. It was accepted that Dr Stamford was such a person. As noted by the Deputy Commissioner, Dr Stamford established that voriconazole is one of the chemical entities covered by the chemical formula and that the description in the parent patent provides an enabling disclosure. Dr Stamford’s conclusion was that ‘amongst the structures included in Formula I in the patent, I can clearly identify voriconazole’.THE APPLICANT’S SUBMISSIONS The main platform of the applicant’s case is that the Deputy Commissioner erred in taking any account of the selection patent in determining whether voriconazole was in substance disclosed in the parent patent. The applicant submits that the Deputy Commissioner should have confined himself to the parent patent, assisted only by the evidence of a person skilled in the art as to the construction of that patent. Similarly, it is submitted that the Deputy Commissioner was not entitled to take into account comments made during prosecution of the selection patent. The applicant also relies upon Prestige Group (Australia) Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1990) 26 FCR 197 at 213 to support the proposition that file wrapper estoppel is not to be taken into account in the construction of the claims or specification of a patent. In this case, the Deputy Commissioner took account of “admissions” made during prosecution of the selection patent in the construction of the specification of the parent patent. Pfizer does not accept that the test of “real and reasonably clear disclosure” necessarily applies to s 70(2)(a) of the Act. Mr Webb SC who appears with Ms Howard for Pfizer, submits that the words “in substance disclosed” in s 70(2)(a) ought to be given a different meaning to the words “fairly based on matter described”, being the words in s 40(3) of the Act and that these words import a different test. Mr Webb submits that the Deputy Commissioner erred in assuming that there is no difference between the requirement of “in substance disclosure” in s 70(2)(a) and the requirement in s 40(3) that a claim be fairly based on matter described in the specification. Counsel relies on the use of different language in different parts of the Act including the words “describe” and “disclose”, to provide different tests. It is submitted that this question of construction of s 70(2)(a) has not been decided in previous decisions of the Court. Mr Webb submits that the test in the Act is in terms of “in substance disclosure” and that emphasis on words such as “real” or “bare disclosure” is not only unwarranted, it is also an attempt to substitute for the words of the section (RGC). Mr Webb also submits that the words “in substance” import a lesser requirement of disclosure than the test for fair basis.

Decision

Reasons for decision

BENNETT J
In any event, as stated by Whitford J in Institut Francais du Petrole des Carburants et Lubricants’ Application [1972] FSR 147 at 154 selection patents proceed on the basis that there has been a disclosure in general terms of a broad description or claim covering a large number of compounds. There is then a further inventive step in the identification of the characteristics of a sub-class of those compounds.THE DECISION OF THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER The Deputy Commissioner noted that there was no question that voriconazole ‘in substance falls within the scope of the claims’, although it was not specifically claimed or identified. The sole question before him was whether voriconazole is in substance disclosed in the specification. If it is, the extension must be granted (s 74(1) of the Act). The Deputy Commissioner expressed the view that a ‘fundamental problem’ with the argument that the substance was in substance disclosed was that, if it were, it would then be possible to claim that substance per se in the parent patent. Consequently, the selection patent would be invalid by reason of anticipation. This would, he said, be inconsistent with the grant of the selection patent. He then considered that ‘a key issue for consideration’ is what evidence can be considered to establish whether voriconazole is “in substance disclosed” in the specification. Noting that the question whether something was in substance disclosed is a question of fact Merck & Co Inc v Sankyo Co Ltd (1992) 23 IPR 415 (‘Merck’) at 421, the Deputy Commissioner observed that the term “in substance disclosed” relates to the extent of the disclosure. This issue of the extent of disclosure arises in various contexts and with respect to various configurations of words. For fair basis, the context is real and reasonably clear disclosure; for amendments “in substance disclosed”. The Deputy Commissioner also observed that the issue in each case, as with the question of anticipation, is ‘how different can something be from the express disclosure and still meet the relevant requirement’. The Deputy Commissioner concluded, by reference to Merck; Gambro Pty Ltd v Fresenius Medical Care South East Asia Pty Ltd (2000) 49 IPR 321 (‘Gambro’); Re ICI Chemicals & Polymers Ltd v The Lubrizol Corporation Inc (2000) 106 FCR 214 (‘ICI’); and RGC Mineral Sands Pty Ltd v Wimmera Industrial Minerals Pty Ltd (1998) 89 FCR 458 (‘RCG’) that, despite using different words, the test of “in substance disclosed” is essentially the same as the “real and reasonably clear disclosure” test. In Merck at 421, the tests are described as ‘basically the same’. In Gambro at 326, the Full Court said that the requirement of substantial disclosure ‘is very similar’ to the requirement of fair basis. In ICI, the Full Court did not decide whether or not the two tests were virtually the same but observed that it would be a rare case where satisfaction of one test would not also satisfy the other (at [118]).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: BENNETT J

Mr Catterns submits that the words “in substance” do not import a lesser test of meaning “it’s nearly there” but rather looks to the question as a matter of substance or quality.CONSIDERATIONIs the selection patent relevant to the question of the construction of the parent patent? Section 70(2)(a) is in Chapter 6, Part 3 of the Act entitled ‘Extension of term of standard patents relating to pharmaceutical substances’. There is nothing in the section that requires examination of the validity of the patent sought to be extended. It is a question of whether s 70(2)(a) is satisfied. It is accepted that voriconazole falls within the scope of the claims, so the question is whether voriconazole is in substance disclosed in the specification. This requires examination of the specification itself. On 18 November 2004, the High Court delivered its judgment in Lockwood Security Products Pty Ltd v Doric Products Pty Ltd (2004) 2121 ALR 1 (‘Doric’), after the hearing of this matter had concluded. The High Court made it clear that, in considering fair basis, an examination of the specification goes to the form that the specification takes (at [44]). There is no reason to introduce “inventiveness” or “meritoriousness” or inventive step (Doric at [46] and [48] and [53]-[54]). It is a question only of what is said in the specification (Doric at [72]). To the extent that there is any conflict between Doric and the observations of Gibbs J in Roche which were not part of the ratio of that case, clearly Doric is authoritative. The same principles apply to a consideration of “in substance disclosure” in a specification. In effect, the Deputy Commissioner took into account the selection patent in the construction of the parent patent. He considered the alleged new inventive step that resulted in the selection patent to be relevant to the construction of and the disclosures of the parent patent. In my opinion the selection patent, either by reason of its existence or as evidence in the construction of the parent patent for the purpose of ascertaining disclosure within the meaning of s 70(2)(a), was irrelevant. Counsel for both the applicant and the respondent compared the test in s 70(2)(a) with that of fair basis on matter disclosed in priority documents and of fair basis on matter described in the specification. They also discussed concepts of inventiveness and inventive step. It was in that context that the selection patent was taken as evidence of an inventive step. In particular, Mr Catterns submits that, if it takes an inventive step to derive the compound from the bare formula, there can be no real and reasonably clear disclosure of the compound. In support of that proposition, Mr Catterns relies upon Roche at 542-543 and Coopers Animal Health Australia Ltd v Western Stock Distributors Pty Ltd (1987) 15 FCR 382 (‘Coopers’) at 398. As noted by the Deputy Commissioner, Roche is authority for the proposition that a claim to a single compound included in the class of chemical compounds covered by a chemical formula is fairly based (see Roche at 541). The question is whether the ‘caveats’ identified by Gibbs J in that decision are applicable to deprive the single compound of fair basis on the grounds that it was the subject of a claim to a later selection.