HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
MASON CJ, BRENNAN, DEANE, DAWSON, TOOHEY, GAUDRON AND McHUGH JJ
PERVAN v. THE NORTH QUEENSLAND NEWSPAPER COMPANY LIMITED AND ANOTHER
17 November 1993
Defamation (Q.)
Defamation—Defences—Discussion of subject of public interest containing fair comment—Whether defence available only where facts on which comment based true—Whether publisher of another's commences must hold opinion expressed in comment—Criminal Code (Q), ss. 375, 377(8).
Orders
Appeal dismissed with costs.
Decisions
MASON CJ, BRENNAN, DEANE, DAWSON, TOOHEY AND GAUDRON JJ This appeal raises two questions concerning the interpretation of s.377(8) of the Criminal Code ("the Code") contained in the Criminal Code Act 1899 (Q.). Section 377(8), one of the provisions of Ch.XXXV of
the Code, contains the main body of the law of defamation in Queensland ((1) Telegraph Newspaper Co. Ltd. v. Bedford (1934) 50 CLR 632, at p.649.).
The facts
2. In 1986, when the appellant, George Anthony Pervan, was a councillor of the Johnstone Shire Council and Chairman of its Works Committee, a member of the Parliament of Queensland made allegations in Parliament that the appellant had misapplied the Council's cyclone relief funds and that he had been "feathering his own nest". On two occasions, the Innisfail Advocate ("the Advocate"), a newspaper published by the first respondent, published a fair report of these allegations. It also published replies to the allegations. It then published on behalf of the second respondent, Herbert William Layt, in its public notices an advertisement in these terms:
"Councillors feathering their own nests? Funds being misappropriated? This is doing irreparable damage to the image of our shire. It is now more important than ever to attend the ratepayers and residents meeting at the Grand Central Hotel Tuesday, 12th August at 8pm".
The proceedings
3. The appellant sued the first respondent for damages, alleging that the advertisement was defamatory of him. It seems that at some stage of the proceedings the second respondent was joined as a defendant but he did not participate in the proceedings in the courts below or in this Court. By its amended defence the first respondent
denied that the advertisement was defamatory and that it was defamatory of the appellant. The first respondent also pleaded defences under s.377(5) and s.377(8) of the Code.
4. The defence under s.377(5) was pleaded in these terms:
"the publication was made in good faith for the information of the public on the subject namely the expenditure of the Cyclone Winifred Disaster Relief Fund and the use of Shire Council assets, labour and funds for private purposes as to which the (first respondent) believed on reasonable grounds the public had such an interest in knowing the truth as to make the (first respondent's) conduct in making the publication reasonable under the circumstances".
5. The defence under s.377(8) was pleaded in these terms:
"the words published were published in good faith and in the course of or for the purposes of discussion of the same subject of public interest, namely the expenditure of…
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- Case
- [1993] HCA 64
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was to determine the ordinary and natural meaning of the words published in the newspaper article. Specifically, the court had to ascertain whether, when read by an ordinary reasonable reader, the article conveyed a defamatory meaning concerning Mr Pervan. This involved an analysis of the language used, its context, and the potential for it to injure Mr Pervan's reputation in the eyes of right-thinking members of society.
The High Court, in its joint judgment, approached the task of construing the meaning of the words by considering the article as a whole, as it would be read by an ordinary, reasonable person. The judges emphasised that the test for defamation is not what the publisher intended to convey, but what the ordinary reader would understand the words to mean. They applied established principles of defamation law, focusing on the potential for the words to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of the public. The court ultimately found that the article did not bear a defamatory meaning.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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