Peng v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs
[2024] FedCFamC2G 293
•4 April 2024
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Peng v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 293
File number(s): SYG 1590 of 2020 Judgment of: JUDGE D HUMPHREYS Date of judgment: 4 April 2024 Catchwords: MIGRATION – Administrative Appeals Tribunal – whether Tribunal failed to consider evidence – whether the Tribunal otherwise erred – whether the Tribunal erred in its consideration of clauses 892.221(1) and 892.221 of the Regulations – whether there was jurisdictional error. Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) cll 892.221(1), 892.221(a), 892.221(b), 892.212(b)
Cases cited: Carrascalao v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 252 FCR 352
ECT17 v Minister for Immigration [2018] FCCA 730
Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 256 FCR 235
Ko v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCCA 2176
Liang v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 175 FCR 184
Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZIAI [2009] HCA 39
Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SLGB (2004) 207 ALR 12 at [43]
NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1
Shahpari v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCCA 513
Xiang v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 64
Zhu v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCCA 1874
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 69 Date of last submission/s: 22 March 2024 Date of hearing: 22 March 2024 Place: Parramatta Counsel for the Applicants: Ms Tully Solicitor for the Applicants: L’Orient Legal Solicitor for the Respondents: Mr Vethecan, Clayton Utz ORDERS
SYG 1590 of 2020 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: SHUFANG PENG
First Applicant
SHUANGJIN GUO
Second Applicant
JIA CHENG GUO (and another named in the Schedule)
Third Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE D HUMPHREYS
DATE OF ORDER:
4 APRIL 2024
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The name of the First Respondent be changed to Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs.
2.The application is dismissed.
3.The Applicants are to pay the First Respondent’s costs fixed in the sum of $8371.30.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE D HUMPHREYS
INTRODUCTION
The applicants are citizens of China. The first applicant (“the applicant”) applied for a Business Skills Subclass 892 Visa (“the visa”) on 19 August 2010.
The application was based on the involvement of the applicant in running AGF International Pty Ltd (“AGF International”), a wool, sheep and goatskin exporting business. Since then, a lengthy process has ensued with the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) regarding the status of the applicant’s application. The procedural history is set out below.
On 27 January 2011, a delegate of the Minister (“delegate”) refused to grant the applicant her visa. This refusal was because the delegate was not convinced the applicant had operated a main business as required by cl 892.211(1) of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (“the Regulations”).
On 24 February 2011, the applicant sought merits review at the Migration Review Tribunal (“MRT”), as it was then. On 13 September 2013, the MRT remitted the applicant’s application to the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (later known as the Department of Home Affairs) (“the Department”) for reconsideration.
Following the remittal, on 30 April 2014, the Department requested further information from the applicant.
On 26 June 2014, the Department refused to grant the applicant her visa a second time, with the delegate maintaining that the applicant and her spouse’s net assets were below the required minimum as per cl 892.221(b) of the Regulations.
On 14 July 2014, the applicant again sought merits review at the Tribunal. The Tribunal sought further information from the applicant, as well as inviting her to a hearing.
On 27 November 2014, the Tribunal notified the applicant it had affirmed the delegate’s decision and refused the applicant her visa on the basis that the net value of her and her spouse’s personal and business assets again did not reach the required value under cl 892.212(b) and cl 892.221(b) of the Regulations.
On 28 July 2017, the Federal Circuit Court (as it then was) remitted the matter to the Tribunal as a s 375 certificate was left undisclosed to the applicant and certain documents were deemed relevant to the issues in the review.
On 3 September 2018, the Tribunal requested additional information from the applicant regarding her and her spouse’s assets.
On 17 December 2018, a Tribunal hearing was held. On 3 June 2020, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the applicant her visa.
The applicant now seeks judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision.
THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL DECISION
The Tribunal’s decision is both comprehensive and lengthy. After setting out the background of the matter at [4] – [30], the Tribunal correctly instructed itself to the requirements under cl 892.221(b) of the Regulations.
At paragraph [36] of the decision record, the Tribunal outlined that the key issue in the matter was whether the applicant met the “time of decision” requirements under cl 892.221 of the Regulations. Clause 892.221(1) of the Regulations which required the applicant to have maintained an “ownership interest” in an actively operating business in Australia for a minimum period of 2 years immediately preceding the date the visa application was lodged, including during the duration of its lodgement and at the time of the Tribunal’s decision.
At paragraph [37], the Tribunal recounted the applicant’s evidence that she maintained an interest in two businesses: ownership and operation of AGF International since circa. 2007 and operating a cleaning business as a sole trader since June 2014. The Tribunal accepted that the applicant did indeed hold an ownership interest in AGF International spanning the period of 2 years prior to lodging the visa application on 19 August 2010, and that she currently continued to hold such an interest.
At paragraphs [43] – [45], the Tribunal noted the applicant’s evidence regarding her cleaning business and applied Liang v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 175 FCR 184; [2009] FCA 189 (“Liang”) and Zhu v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCCA 1874 (“Zhu”), to find that the applicant did not hold an “ownership interest” in her cleaning business for at least two years prior to the lodgement of the visa application. The Tribunal found only her continuing ownership interest in AGF International would be deemed relevant for the purposes of the Tribunal’s decision.
At paragraph [47], the Tribunal turned its attention to the question of “active operation”. That is, whether the applicant was involved in a business which was deemed to be “actively operating” at the time of the Tribunal’s decision, per cl 892.221(a) of the Regulations. The Tribunal reasoned that while the term “actively operating” was not defined in the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”), the relevant test was as per the one set out in Shahpari v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCCA 513:
whether the business exhibited activity of a ‘repetitive, continuous and permanent character’ at the relevant times, in which the business actively sought to generate business, in fact generated trade and custom, and further…derived some financial gain for its activities…”.
At paragraphs [50] – [54], the Tribunal noted the applicant’s evidence during the hearing. This was the following:
•that AGF International’s revenue was severely disrupted during the GFC in mid-2014, As a result the applicant started her cleaning business;
•The business had begun negotiating a new contract with Del Den Commercial Pty Ltd (“Del Den”) and that her son (the fifth applicant) had prepared the contract;
•AGF International’s last shipments to China were in 2015 and four years post that period, the business did not sent any shipping containers of Australian agricultural products to China.
At paragraph [55] the Tribunal noted that, at the hearing, the Tribunal broached with the applicant the subject of AGF International’s significant gap in business activity in recent years. The applicant admitted to the lack of trading activity since 2015, agreeing that the Del Den Contract negotiations began in December 2018, a month before the Tribunal hearing, with a contract being signed a week prior to the hearing.
At paragraphs [55] – [58], the Tribunal put to the applicant that signing of one contract since its last shipment in 2015 could not substantiate that AGF International was indeed “actively operating”. Probing further, the Tribunal also found that the applicant had no knowledge of the terms of the contract.
The Tribunal concluded that AGF International had not been actively trading; the business was not sourcing and exporting Australian agricultural products to China. At paragraph [55] the Tribunal found that this lack of trading evinced a four-and-a-half-year gap in trading as at the date of the hearing.
At paragraphs [62] – [63], the Tribunal concluded that AGF International was not operating. Therefore, the applicant did not fulfil the requirements of the visa under cl 892.221 of the Regulations. Accordingly, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the applicant her visa.
GROUNDS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
The applicant relies on three grounds of judicial review contained in an application filed with the Court on 1 July 2020. They are as follows (less particulars):
1.The Tribunal failed to consider evidence which was central to an issue in the review;
2.The Tribunal failed to consider evidence or otherwise erred; and
3.The Tribunal erred in its consideration of cl.892.211(1) and cl.892.221 of Schedule 2 to the Regulations.
THE APPLICANT’S SUBMISSIONS
Counsel for the applicant submitted that the Tribunal failed to properly consider AGF International’s bank statements from 3 accounts held with ANZ Bank for certain periods of time during 2014, 2015, 2017 and 2018, along with the statements from one Westpac account from 2012 to 2014.
The applicant submitted that these bank statements were “credible, significant and relevant evidence to whether AGF International was actively operating within limits, including at the time of the Tribunal’s decision.”
It was submitted that the Tribunal considered AGF International not to be actively operating due to a sole signed contract. However, the bank statements from 2015, 2018 and 2018 periods were relevant to consider when ascertaining whether or not the business was actively operating. Hence, applicant submitted that the Tribunal limited its considerations to AGF International’s shipping record when it could have considered other evidence too.
The applicant relied on Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317 at [111] (“SZRKT”) to point out that:
A tribunal’s failure to consider evidence may amount to jurisdictional error depending on the importance of the material to the exercise of its function and the seriousness of any error.
The second ground of contention entailed a claim by the applicant that the Tribunal failed to consider evidence or erred in its conclusion that AGF International was not “actively operating” at the time of the Tribunal’s decision.
In paragraph [62] of its decision, the Tribunal acknowledged the existence of the Del Den Contract, stating that “there is no evidence confirming that an order was placed pursuant to that contract such that goods were purchased by AGF International for shipment to China or elsewhere.” Accordingly, at paragraph [60] and [71], the Tribunal found that AGF International was not “involved in ongoing continuous business activity of a permanent character”. The applicants, however, highlight that when the Tribunal looked for evidence of orders being placed under a contract, it failed to consider the terms of the contract before the Del Den Contract had been executed.
The applicant claims that the Tribunal erred in two respects within this ground:
a)The Tribunal failed to consider the actual terms of the contract; and
b)The Tribunal failed to consider when the contract had been executed.
With regard to the former, the Tribunal did not consider cl 3 of the Del Den Contract which outlined that the contract commenced on execution and would continue until termination. The Tribunal deemed the contract to be signed the week before the hearing on 10 January 2019 at [55], however, upon the terms, the contract did not actually commence until it was finally executed by AFG International on 17 January 2019 (the hearing date). The applicant thus claimed that if the contract was only executed on the hearing date, the Tribunal would have failed to consider the prospect that no orders could be placed under those terms. That such an order would be legally unreasonable as per Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 240 CLR 611 at [124] and [130]
On the latter point, the applicant submitted that the applicant had signed the Del Den Contract and it would be executed on 17 January 2019. Consequently, the Tribunal failed to consider the correct timing at which the contract would be executed, and by virtue of this omission, it was “legally unreasonable” to find no evidence of orders being placed post-contractual execution. The applicant relied on ECT17 v Minister for Immigration [2018] FCCA 730 at [19], stating that a “jurisdictional error can arise where a finding of fact is illogical irrational or legally unreasonable.”
Further, the applicant submitted that the Tribunal failed to make inquiries in relation to the orders placed under the contract. However, an order was in fact placed with AGF International from a Chinese company but could not be shipped because of Del Den’s failure to obtain a permit from the Chinese authorities. Therefore, the applicants claim that the Tribunal failed to “conduct an obvious inquiry about a critical fact, the existence of which was easily ascertained, which was sufficiently linked to the outcome to constitute a failure to review”: (see; Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZIAI [2009] HCA 39 at [25]-[26] per French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ “SZIAI” ).
Additionally, the applicant asserted that the Tribunal needed to consider the impact of the lapse of time on the Del Den Contract between the date of the hearing and the decision. It was noted that the Tribunal had considered the potential impact of its decision and the passage of time elsewhere, acknowledging at [34] that the Tribunal would need to obtain further evidence regarding the value of the applicant’s assets. According to the applicant, the Tribunal ought to have considered the “effect of the time which had elapsed between the time of its hearing (17 January 2019) and its decision (3 June 2020) on whether there had been any developments under the contract”. Hence, in its failure to consider the probative evidence before it, the Tribunal erred: (see; SZRKT at [111]).
On the third ground, the applicant submitted that the chief issue in the review was whether the primary applicant had an interest in a business or businesses at the visa application. At [44] – [45], the Tribunal found that only the applicant’s interest in AGF International would be relevant and not her interest in the cleaning business. The Tribunal went on to rely on Liang and Zhu to come to the conclusion that an applicant is unable to rely on an ownership interest arising at the time of the decision in order to satisfy the requirements under cl 892.221 of the Regulations. In response to this, the applicant submitted that the questions in Liang purported to a Subclass 845 visa and that its comments were “strictly obiter”. The applicant submitted, the Court in Liang considered itself bound by the Full Court judgment of Xiang v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 64 (“Xiang”) to construe the meaning of the word “continues”. The applicant applied the same approach as that in Xiang, reaching the conclusion that the meaning and effect of the words “continues to” in cl 892.221 of the Regulations in the current context referred to “either an activity-based criterion on the part of a visa applicant or pertained to their status, and furthermore might or might not carry a temporal condition” [47]. The applicant derived from this analysis that the Court in Liang at [53] had erred by departing from the approach in Xiang.
THE FIRST RESPONDENT’S SUBMISSIONS
The first respondent submitted that ground one is without merit. The first respondent asserted that while it is established that when a decision-maker decides upon the statute to consider a claim or other mandatory criteria, it still does not require, as per Carrascalao v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 252 FCR 352; [2017] FCAFC 107 (“Carrascalao”) at [45]:
…the decision-maker to refer in the reasons for decision to every piece of evidence and every contention made by an applicant, and it may be that some material provided will not be relevant to the criteria.
In determining whether the Tribunal engaged in an “active intellectual process”, its reasons should not be scrutinised “minutely and finely with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error”: (see; Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at [30] per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ). Hence, finding that the decision-maker has not engaged in an “active intellectual process” is not a decision that is to be made lightly and must be supported by clear evidence, for which the applicant carries the onus of proof: (see; Carrascalao at [48]).
The first respondent asserted that the Tribunal expressly referred to the specific bank statements in question and it should, therefore, be inferred that the Tribunal did turn its mind to these documents.
Additionally, in considering whether AGF International was actively operating at the time of the decision, it is clear that the Tribunal did engage in an “active intellectual process”, chiefly, by discussing with the applicant AGF International’s activities in recent years as well as the Del Den Contract. It was stressed that the applicants did not identify in their submissions the relevance of the bank statements to the Tribunal’s decision.
The first respondent further submitted that in order to prove failure of corroborative evidence amounting to jurisdictional error, the applicant needed to demonstrate two aspects: that the relevant evidence was overlooked and that the evidence was of substance in light of the decision-maker’s reasoning: (see; SZRKT at [112]).
The first respondent submitted that the applicant failed to explain the nexus between the bank statements and proving the issue of whether AGF International was “actively operating” during the time of the Tribunal’s decision. This is particularly relevant where the applicant admitted no business activity occurred from 2015 until the Del Den Contract in December 2018.
On ground 2, in response to the applicant claiming that the Tribunal allegedly failed to consider the actual terms of the Del Den Contract, the first respondent submitted that this ground was devoid of merit.
The first respondent submitted the Tribunal “considered and appreciated” the terms of the Del Den Contract and discussed the same with the applicant. In doing so, the Tribunal found that there was no evidence of any orders being placed pursuant to the Del Den Contract, and therefore concluded that AGF International was not “actively operating”.
The first respondent claimed that it was undisputed that there was no evidence before the Tribunal of any agreement between AGF International and another entity, bar the Del Den Contract, to supply beef knuckle. The applicant could not recall the terms of the Del Den Contract, nor name any other involved entities, so it was “logical, reasonable and open” for the Tribunal to find that the business was not involved in ongoing continuous business activity.
The applicant’s argument in relation to the fact that no orders could be placed because the Del Den Contract commenced on 10 January 2019 was misconceived for two reasons: it was “open” for the Tribunal to consider that the Del Den Contract commenced on 10 January 2019 because that is the date which appeared on the execution page, and secondly, even if the Tribunal made a mistake, it would not amount to jurisdictional error because it did not relate to a “jurisdictional fact or manifest any other error of law”: (see; NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1 at [52]-[54).
The first respondent relied on Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 256 FCR 235; [2017] FCAFC 184 at [32]-[33] (“Kaur”), to submit that the role of the Tribunal is to “review, not inquisition”, and therefore, just because an inquiry was made, it does not mean that the “lack of such an inquiry amounts to a jurisdictional error”.
Furthermore, the applicant was represented and given full opportunity to provide information, given evidence and make arguments, with regard to AGF International’s operations in Australia, including “extensive” discussion on the Del Den Contract. At no point did the applicant provide the Tribunal with additional evidence in relation to supply and orders that AGF International was negotiating with any other entity.
In response to ground 3, the first respondent submitted that applicant’s arguments in relation to relying on her ownership interest in her cleaning business were misguided. The applicant’s arguments could not be accepted because of binding judicial authority and that the Tribunal’s approach as informed by cl 892.221 of the Regulations was correct in terms of statutory construction.
Clause 892.211(1) of the Regulations provides that, at the time of application:
“The applicant has had, and continues to have, an ownership interest in 1 or more actively operating main businesses in Australia for at least 2 years immediately before the application is made.”
As an ancillary requirement, cl 892.221(a) of the Regulations states that, at the time of decision, the applicant must continue to satisfy the criteria in clauses 892.211 and 892.214, respectively.
The first respondent relied on Liang at [26] to say that it was necessary for the applicant to maintain an ownership interest in the same business at the time of the decision in order to satisfy the application criterion.
The first respondent submitted that in respect of clauses 892.221(1) and 892.221, the authority of Liang was followed in Zhu. Unless the Court considers those decisions to be “plainly wrong”, judicial comity prescribes that they must be followed. Accordingly, no jurisdictional error was present in the Tribunal’s decision.
CONSIDERATION
Ground one is a claim that the Tribunal failed to consider various bank statements for AGF International for 2015 and 2017/18 operating periods. This conclusion is to be inferred from the fact that the Tribunal made no reference to that evidence in its decision record.
First, it is not necessary for a decision maker to refer in its decision to every piece of evidence and every contention made: Carrascalao at [45]. In any event at [15], the Tribunal set out in detail the evidence that was before it, which included the various bank statements referred to above. It is difficult, in these circumstances, to infer that the Tribunal did not take these bank statements into account.
The onus of the allegation that the Tribunal did not engage in an ‘active intellectual process’ in considering this evidence lies with the applicant. A perusal of the whole of the decision record indicates that the Tribunal discussed at length with the applicant the issue of whether AGF International had been actively operating at the time of its decision and for the 18 month time period immediately prior to the decision (see; cl 845.213).
At [59] the Tribunal recorded that Mrs Peng admitted there had been a 4-year gap before the Del Den contract was negotiated by her son. Prior to that, at [62] the Tribunal noted that shipments were last sent to China in 2015. Given this admission, the relevance of the bank statements to the ultimate outcome arrived at by the Tribunal is uncertain.
Any suggestion that the Tribunal limited its consideration to shipments to China cannot be sustained as this was the only evidence that was before the Tribunal. Given the state of the evidence the Court is not satisfied that the bank statements were probative to the overall outcome given the admissions that AGF International was effectively not operating from 2015 until just prior to just before the Tribunal hearing. Ground one has no merit.
Ground two is a claim that the Tribunal failed to consider the actual terms of the Del Den contract, and in particular a failure to properly understand that the contract only commenced on 17 January 2019, when the applicant signed the document at the hearing. It is also said the Tribunal fell into error by failing to make an inquiry of the Applicant as to whether or not an order had been placed under that contract. In this regard a purchase order was placed with AGF International on 8 February 29019 and the decision was handed down by the Tribunal on 3 June 2020.
What is clear is that the Tribunal was aware of the existence of the contract and its terms. It specifically referred to the contract at [56] and [58]. What was significant to the Tribunal was that, as the signatory to the contract, the applicant had little, if any, knowledge as to the terms of the contract.
The Court does not regard any issue as to the date of the commencement of the contract to be significant. The issue was whether AGF had been an ongoing business activity prior to the Tribunal hearing. Clearly it had not been. There was no evidence to support such a conclusion.
The Court is reasonably satisfied that, as at the time of the Tribunal hearing, there was no evidence before the Tribunal that an order had been placed pursuant to the contract for the supply of beef knuckle: see [62]. Further, it was open to the applicant to provide post hearing evidence to the Tribunal that an order had been placed. It did not do so, even though the applicant’s representative did make post hearing submissions.
There is no general obligation on a Tribunal to investigate an applicant’s claims: (see; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SLGB (2004) 207 ALR 12 at [43]). The duty imposed on the Tribunal by the Act is a duty to review and not a duty to enquire. The exception is where there is an obvious failure by the Tribunal to make an enquiry about a critical fact, the existence of which is easily ascertained (see; SZIAI at [25]).
The Court accepts the submission that the mere fact an inquiry may have been made does not mean that the lack of an inquiry amounts to a jurisdictional error (see; Kaur at [32] – [33]).
The Court also accepts the submission that while an order had been placed, there was no evidence of any evidence that the order had been filled, and thus actual business activity. Ground two has no merit.
Ground three is an assertion the it was open to the Tribunal to conclude that the applicant could rely upon her ownership in her cleaning business for the purpose of satisfying cl 892.211(a) and cl 892 221 of the regulations.
At [59] the Tribunal made reference to the requirement that the ownership interest in the business used to satisfy(the) time of decision requirement must be the same interest – that is, in the same business, - used (to) satisfy the time of application criterion as outlined in the decision in Liang’s case (see; Liang per Logan J).
Counsel for the applicant submitted that Liang and the subsequent decisions in Ko and Ors v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2019] FCCA 2176 and Zhu are plainly wrong and should not be followed. Rather, the Court should follow Xiang on the proper construction of cl 845.221 and cl 845.213.
The Court does not accept this submission. The Court is satisfied that it is bound by the decision of Liang and must follow the other two decisions, Ko and Zhu set as out above, as a matter of comity. The Court is satisfied the Tribunal correctly applied Laing. No jurisdictional error exists and the ground has no merit.
As none of the grounds of judicial review have merit, the application must be dismissed.
I certify that the preceding sixty-nine (69) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge D Humphreys. Associate:
Dated: 4 April 2024
SCHEDULE OF PARTIES
SYG 1590 of 2020 Applicants
Fourth Applicant:
HAO GUO
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