Peacock v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Peacock v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission
[2005] FCAFC 45

CATCHWORDS - Discrimination law — compulsory retirement on basis of age — statutory discretion to exempt employees from compulsory retirement — refusal by Secretary of Department of Defence to exercise such discretion — inquiry by Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission into whether such refusal amounted to unlawful discrimination — subsequent refusal to inquire further into appellant’s claims — matter previously litigated and adequately dealt with — need for finality in litigation

Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth), ss 20, 32

Peacock v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [2004] FMCA 466 affirmed
Peacockv Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (2002) EOC 93-235 referred to
Peacock vHuman Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (2003) 73 ALD 341 referred to

Peacock v Commonwealth of Australia (1998) 88 FCR 110 discussed
The Queen v The Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; Ex parte Hardiman (1980) 144 CLR 13 at 35-6 discussed
Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172 at [23] referred to
Fagan v Crimes Compensation Tribunal (1982) 150 CLR 666 at 681-2 referred to
TXU Electricity Ltd v Office of the Regulator-General (2001) 3 VR 93 at [40]-[46] referred to
Commonwealth of Australia v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1997) 76 FCR 513 at 526-7, 531 and 537-9 referred to
Executive Council of Australian Jewry v Scully (1998) 79 FCR 537 at 544 referred to
Elekwachi v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1997) 79 FCR 271 at 273-4 referred to
Minogue v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1999) 84 FCR 438 at [6]-[7] referred to
Commonwealth of Australia v Peacock (2000) 104 FCR 464
Cheesman v Waters (1997) 77 FCR 221 referred to
Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 589 referred to
D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid [2005] HCA 12 referred to

MORTIMER JOHN PEACOCK v HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

N1223 of 2004

WEINBERG, JACOBSON and LANDER JJ
24 MARCH 2005
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N1223 OF 2004

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

MORTIMER JOHN PEACOCK
APPELLANT

AND:

HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

WEINBERG, JACOBSON and LANDER JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

24 MARCH 2005

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1The appeal be dismissed.

2The appellant pay the respondent’s costs.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N1223 OF 2004

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

MORTIMER JOHN PEACOCK
APPELLANT

AND:

HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

WEINBERG, JACOBSON and LANDER JJ

DATE:

24 MARCH 2005

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

  1. This is an appeal from a decision of Raphael FM dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision by the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (‘HREOC’).…

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Details
Case
[2005] FCAFC 45
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Peacock brought a claim against the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC) which was dismissed by the Federal Magistrate and subsequently by the Full Federal Court. The central issue was whether the Federal Magistrate erred in dismissing Peacock's application for judicial review of HREOC's decision to not conduct an inquiry into Peacock's complaint of discrimination. Peacock argued that his complaint should have been considered under a different section of the HREOC Act, which would have allowed for an inquiry into whether he was discriminated against. The court found that Peacock's complaint was misconceived and lacking in substance, and that HREOC had adequately dealt with it. The court further found that Peacock's argument that his complaint should have been considered under a different section of the Act did not make his complaint a new one, and that he was bound by previous decisions regarding his complaints.

The Full Federal Court dismissed Peacock's appeal, finding that the Federal Magistrate did not err in dismissing the application for judicial review. The court noted that Peacock's complaint was misconceived and lacking in substance, and that HREOC had adequately dealt with it. The court also found that Peacock's argument that his complaint should have been considered under a different section of the Act did not make his complaint a new one, and that he was bound by previous decisions regarding his complaints. The court further found that the Federal Magistrate's direction to HREOC to participate in the application before him did not amount to error. The appeal was dismissed, and Peacock was ordered to pay the respondent's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1 The appeal be dismissed.

2 The appellant pay the respondent’s costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

It followed, so the Federal Magistrate found, that the President had acted properly in concluding that the subject matter of the appellant’s claim was both misconceived and lacking in substance, and had been ‘adequately dealt with’ by HREOC. In effect, his Honour accepted the President’s conclusion that merely reclassifying his complaint, and seeking an inquiry under a different section of the HREOC Act, did not make that complaint a new one, or one that could not have been raised previously. In his Honour’s words:‘In summary I do not consider that any of the grounds for review pursuant to s.5 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 suggested by Mr Peacock have been made out. When one tears away all the confusing argument his case is a simple one. He says that his original complaint against Mr Ayres should have been looked at in a manner in which it was not. That failure could have resulted in him being wrongfully discriminated against and he was entitled to an inquiry as to whether that was the case. He claims he did not get that inquiry. But the reason he did not get that inquiry was not because of the discriminatory action of Commissioner Ozdowski or of any reviewable error on the part of President von Doussa. It was a result of him not raising the matter in the way in which he now seeks to put it when he made his original complaint. He became boxed in by rulings given in respect of the complaints he had made and by the reluctance of courts to grant him a new hearing every time he thought of a different way in which to put his argument. I too am bound by those decisions.’CONCLUSIONS ON THE APPEAL The President’s reasons for declining to inquire further into the appellant’s complaints are comprehensive, and answer all of the points raised on the appeal, with the exception of that involving HREOC’s role before the Federal Magistrate. In a sense, that concludes the matter on appeal. As noted earlier, the appellant accepted, correctly in our view, that his appeal could not succeed unless the Federal Magistrate erred in dismissing the substantive grounds for judicial review. Because it is this Court’s opinion that the Federal Magistrate not only did not err, but was right to dismiss the application for judicial review, the ground of appeal complaining of the Federal Magistrate’s direction to HREOC to participate in the application before him does not strictly need to be answered. However, the point achieved some prominence during argument and it may be helpful to address it. It is to be noted, as we have said earlier, that the complaint on appeal relates to the Federal Magistrate’s direction to HREOC to take an adversarial role to rebut the applicant’s application. There is no complaint, as such, regarding HREOC’s ultimate decision to submit to the direction of the Federal Magistrate. In Hardiman, the prosecutor seeking the issue of the prerogative writs before the High Court was the Australian Labor Party. The contradictor was the applicant in the Australian Broadcasting Tribunal seeking approval of its acquisition of half the shares in a company which had a shareholding interest in a licensee.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.