PAUL LAWRENCE REYNOLDS v BRENDAN JAMES MCTERNAN
[2012] ACTMC 7 (7 NOVEMBER 2012)
CRIMINAL LAW –– whether charge under s 32(2)(b) of the Road Transport (Driver Licensing) Act 1999 (ACT) may be brought in circumstances where the elements of an offence under s 61C of the Road Transport (General) Act 1999 (ACT) are made out
Road Transport (Driver Licensing) Act 1999 (ACT) s 32(2)(b)
Road Transport (General) Act 1999 (ACT) s 61
Legislation Act 2001 (ACT) ss 191, 139, 141
Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) ss 308, 321, 403
Crimes Act1900 (ACT) s 116(3)
Road Transport (Alcohol and Drugs) Legislation Amendment Bill 2010
Supplementary Explanatory Statement for the Road Transport (Alcohol and Drugs) Legislation Amendment Bill 2010
Debates of the Legislative Assembly for the Australian Capital Territory 18 November 2010
Environment Protection Authority v Djura [2012] NSWLEC 122
Maxwell v The Queen 184 CLR 501
Russell v Pangallo [2012] ACTMC 4
Saraswati v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 1
Lawson v Gault (2002) 145 FCR 1
Hoffman v Chief of Army (2004) 137 FCR 520
Anthony Hordern & Sons Ltd v Amalgamated Clothing and Allied Trades Union of Australia (1932) 47 CLR 1
No. CC 4335 of 2012
Magistrate: Mossop
Magistrates Court of the ACT
Date: 7 November 2012
IN THE MAGISTRATES COURT OF THE )
) No. CC 4335 of 2012
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY )
BETWEEN:PAUL LAWRENCE REYNOLDS
Informant
AND:BRENDAN JAMES MCTERNAN
Defendant
ORDER
Magistrate: Magistrate Mossop
Date: 7 November 2012
Place: Canberra
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
(a)The defendant’s oral application made on 6 November 2012 is dismissed.
History of Proceedings
Yesterday, when these proceedings were before me, the defendant made an oral application that the proceedings on charge CC2012/4335 be stayed. The ground for the application was that it is not open to the informant to proceed with a charge under s 32(2)(a) of the Road Transport (Driver Licensing) Act 1999 (“Driver Licensing Act”) in circumstances where the elements of an offence under s 61C of the Road Transport (General) Act 1999 (ACT) (“General Act”) were made out. Although, as ultimately articulated, the precise basis for the application was not clear, I treated the application as based on the proposition that:
(a) the enactment of s 61C of the General Act removed from the scope of s 32(2)(a) offences which fell within s 61C or, alternatively,
(b) to charge an offence against s 32 where a charge against s 61C was available amounted to an abuse of process.I dismissed the application and indicated that I would give reasons for my decision today, which I now do.
It is not necessary to recite the full history of the proceedings for the purposes of determining this application save to say that the defendant was charged before the Court with this charge on 8 May 2012 and pleaded guilty to the charge on 8 June 2012.
On 2 August 2012, after I had delivered my decision on another interlocutory application made by the defendant:…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Paul Lawrence Reynolds v Brendan James McTernan and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2012] ACTMC 7
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue the court had to decide was whether the enactment of s 61C of the General Act precluded the informant from proceeding with a charge under s 32(2)(a) of the Driver Licensing Act. Alternatively, the court needed to determine whether charging an offence under s 32, when a charge under s 61C was available, constituted an abuse of process. The defendant argued that the two statutes could not operate concurrently in the manner suggested by the prosecution, asserting that it would result in an illogical outcome and potential double jeopardy.
The court dismissed the defendant's application for a stay of proceedings. The court found that the enactment of s 61C did not exclude the application of s 32(2)(a) and that there was no abuse of process in bringing a charge under s 32 when s 61C applied. The court reasoned that the two statutes addressed different aspects of the legal framework and could operate in tandem without conflict. Additionally, the court determined that charging under s 32 did not amount to an abuse of process, as it was not a matter of double jeopardy but rather the application of appropriate statutory provisions.
The orders made by the court were that the application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed, and the proceedings on charge CC2012/4335 would continue. The court's decision clarified the interplay between the Road Transport (Driver Licensing) Act and the Road Transport (General) Act, affirming that charges under s 32(2)(a) could proceed even when the elements of an offence under s 61C were made out.
Orders
Orders of the court
1.
Yesterday, when these proceedings were before me, the defendant made an oral application that the proceedings on charge CC2012/4335 be stayed. The ground for the application was that it is not open to the informant to proceed with a charge under s 32(2)(a) of the Road Transport (Driver Licensing) Act 1999 (“Driver Licensing Act”) in circumstances where the elements of an offence under s 61C of the Road Transport (General) Act 1999 (ACT) (“General Act”) were made out. Although, as ultimately articulated, the precise basis for the application was not clear, I treated the application as based on the proposition that:
(a) the enactment of s 61C of the General Act removed from the scope of s 32(2)(a) offences which fell within s 61C or, alternatively,
(b) to charge an offence against s 32 where a charge against s 61C was available amounted to an abuse of process.
2.
I dismissed the application and indicated that I would give reasons for my decision today, which I now do.
3.
It is not necessary to recite the full history of the proceedings for the purposes of determining this application save to say that the defendant was charged before the Court with this charge on 8 May 2012 and pleaded guilty to the charge on 8 June 2012.
4.
On 2 August 2012, after I had delivered my decision on another interlocutory application made by the defendant: see Reynolds v McTernan [2012] ACTMC 3, the defendant foreshadowed a further application in relation to the present charge. As a consequence of a failure to comply with directions and the adjournment of the matter at the request of one of the parties, the matter was ultimately only argued before me yesterday. Whilst no written application for a stay of the proceedings had been filed by the defendant, an oral application for a stay of the proceedings was made in the terms that I have indicated above. Prior to yesterday’s hearing the defendant’s application had been for leave to withdraw his plea of guilty. However, as the basis for that application was that it was either not possible to charge him with an offence under s 32 in circumstances where s 61C applied or, alternatively, to do so would amount to an abuse of process, it appeared to me that the more appropriate application was simply one to have the proceedings stayed and the oral application that was made reflected that.
Background
Background to the litigation
The defendant was initially charged with the offence on 8 May 2012 and pleaded guilty on 8 June 2012. An oral application for leave to withdraw his guilty plea was foreshadowed by the defendant on 2 August 2012. However, the matter was adjourned, and the defendant made an oral application for a stay of the proceedings instead. The application was made on the basis that it was either not possible to charge him with an offence under section 32 in circumstances where section 61C applied or, alternatively, to do so would amount to an abuse of process.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the enactment of section 61C of the Road Transport (General) Act 1999 (ACT) removed from the scope of section 32(2)(a) of the Road Transport (Driver Licensing) Act 1999 (ACT) offences which fell within section 61C.
2. Whether to charge an offence under section 32 where a charge under section 61C was available amounted to an abuse of process.
Held
1. The court concluded that the enactment of section 61C of the Road Transport (General) Act 1999 (ACT) did not remove from the scope of section 32(2)(a) of the Road Transport (Driver Licensing) Act 1999 (ACT) offences which fell within section 61C. The application to stay the proceedings on this ground was dismissed.
2. The court also concluded that to charge an offence under section 32 where a charge under section 61C was available did not amount to an abuse of process. The application to stay the proceedings on this ground was also dismissed.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court examined the legislative history and purpose of sections 61C and 32(2)(a) to determine whether the enactment of section 61C excluded certain offences from the scope of section 32(2)(a). The court found that the two sections serve different purposes and should not be viewed as mutually exclusive. Section 61C deals with general road transport offences, while section 32(2)(a) pertains to the revocation of driver licenses. The court held that the existence of section 61C does not preclude the application of section 32(2)(a) where appropriate. The court also rejected the argument that charging under section 32 when section 61C applies constitutes an abuse of process. It determined that the decision to charge under either section depends on the facts of each case and the discretion of the prosecuting authorities. The court did not find that the charging decision in this case was an abuse of process. The ratio decidendi is that the enactment of section 61C does not exclude certain offences from the scope of section 32(2)(a), and charging under section 32 where section 61C applies does not necessarily amount to an abuse of process.