Parsons & Anor and Masson

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FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

PARSONS AND ANOR & MASSON [2018] FamCAFC 115  

FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – CHILDREN – Relocation – Two children born as a result of artificial conception procedures – Where the first appellant is the biological and birth mother of both children, the second appellant is a parent of the youngest child by operation of s 60H of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the federal Act”) and the respondent is the biological father of the eldest child – Where the primary judge found the respondent is a “legal parent” of the eldest child, allowed him extensive time with both children and restrained the appellants from relocating – Where the primary judge only applied the federal Act – In a case heard in federal jurisdiction it is mandatory for s 79 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) to be applied – Rizeq v Western Australia (2017) 91 ALJR 707 and Northern Territory of Australia vGPAO (1999) 196 CLR 553 considered – No constitutional reason why s 79 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) ought not apply to “pick up” the Status of Children Act 1996 (NSW) (“the State Act”) – Held s 60H of the federal Act does not “otherwise provide” within the meaning of s 79 of the Judiciary Act – Section 14 of the State Act must therefore be applied – The respondent is presumed not to be the father of the eldest child – Section 60H of the federal Act does not enlarge the category of persons entitled to the status of “parent” as there can only be two parents for the purposes of the federal Act – Held primary judge erred in finding the respondent is a “legal parent” of the eldest child – Appeal allowed – Matter remitted – Costs certificates issued.

FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – CHILDREN – Interpretation of the federal Act in relation to the meaning of “parent” considered – Where the rebuttable Division 12 presumptions are trumped by s 60H of the federal Act – Bernieres & Dhopal (2017) FLC 93‑793 considered – Biology alone does not determine who is a “parent” for the purposes of the federal Act – State of knowledge of the putative father about the nature of the mother’s relationship with another person irrelevant in the application of s 60H – The intention of a person to “parent” a child does not make them a “parent” within the meaning of the federal Act – Donnell & Dovey (2010) FLC 93-428 and Tobin v Tobin (1999) FLC 92-848 considered – First instances decisions considered – Re Mark: An Application Relating to Parental Responsibilities (2003) FLC 93‑173 no longer to be regarded as good law – If state legislation lays down a presumption that members of a class of men are not to be regarded as fathers of a specific class of children, then a court is obliged to apply that presumption unless it is repugnant to the federal Act – Re Patrick:…

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Details
Case
[2018] FamCAFC 115
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Parsons and Anor and Masson was a case heard in the Family Court of Australia, which was subsequently appealed to a higher court. The dispute involved two children born through artificial conception procedures. The first appellant, who was the biological and birth mother of both children, and the second appellant, who was a parent of the youngest child under section 60H of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), were appealing against the biological father of the eldest child, who was granted extensive time with both children and restrained from relocating by the primary judge. The primary judge only applied the federal Act, but the higher court found it mandatory for section 79 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) to be applied.

The legal issues the court had to decide included whether section 60H of the federal Act enlarged the category of persons entitled to the status of "parent" and if the primary judge erred in finding the respondent to be a "legal parent" of the eldest child. The court found that biology alone did not determine who was a "parent" for the purposes of the federal Act, and that state legislation laying down a presumption that members of a class of men are not to be regarded as fathers of a specific class of children should be applied unless repugnant to the federal Act. The court also found that the primary judge erred in treating the respondent as if he were the parent of both children.

The court concluded that the appeal should be allowed, and the matter remitted to the Family Court of Australia for rehearing by a different judge. The court set aside the orders made by the primary judge and issued costs certificates to all parties involved in the appeal and rehearing.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

Appeal number EA 11 of 2018 be dismissed.

2.

Appeal number EA 111 of 2017 be allowed.

3.

The matter be remitted to the Family Court of Australia for rehearing by a judge other than the Honourable Justice Cleary.

4.

The orders made by Justice Cleary on 3 October 2017 (as varied by the orders her Honour made on 18 December 2017) be set aside upon the matter being determined by the Family Court of Australia on either an interim or final basis, whichever is the earlier.

5.

There be no order as to costs.

6.

The Court grants to the appellants a costs certificate pursuant to the provisions of s 9 of the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth) being a certificate that, in the opinion of the Court, it would be appropriate for the Attorney‑General to authorise a payment under that Act to the appellants in respect to the costs incurred by them in relation to the appeal.

7.

The Court grants to the respondent a costs certificate pursuant to the provisions of s 6 of the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth) being a certificate that, in the opinion of the Court, it would be appropriate for the Attorney‑General to authorise a payment under that Act to the respondent in respect to the costs incurred by him in relation to the appeal.

8.

The Court grants to each of the appellants and the respondent a costs certificate pursuant to the provisions of s 8 of the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth) being a certificate that, in the opinion of the Court, it would be appropriate for the Attorney-General to authorise a payment under that Act to each of them in respect of the costs incurred by each of them in relation to the rehearing.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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