Paramasivam v Wheeler

Case [2001] FCA 231

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Paramasivam v Wheeler & Ors [2001] FCA 231

GAJA LAKSHMI PARAMASIVAM v CHRIS WHEELER, IRENE MOSS, LAURIE GLANFIELD, YVONNE GRANT, HARRY HERBERT, SUZANNE JAMIESON, RUTH McCOLL AND PETER RYAN

N 1191 of 2000

GAJA LAKSHMI PARAMASIVAM v DAVID KEMP
N 1192 of 2000

GAJA LAKSHMI PARAMASIVAM v JOHN HOWARD
N 1193 of 2000

GAJA LAKSHMI PARAMASIVAM v TOM KARMEL
N 1194 of 2000

GAJA LAKSHMI PARAMASIVAM v BOB SENDT
N 1195 of 2000

GAJA LAKSHMI PARAMASIVAM v JOHN AQUILINA
N 1196 of 2000

HILL, CARR AND TAMBERLIN JJ
16 FEBRUARY 2001
SYDNEY


GENERAL DISTRIBUTION

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

BETWEEN:

GAJA LAKSHMI PARAMASIVAM                  N 1191 OF 2000
APPLICANT

AND:

CHRIS WHEELER
IRENE MOSS
LAURIE GLANFIELD
YVONNE GRANT
HARRY HERBERT
SUZANNE JAMIESON
RUTH McCOLL
PETER RYAN
RESPONDENTS

BETWEEN:

GAJA LAKSHMI PARAMASIVAM                  N 1192 OF 2000
APPLICANT

AND:

DAVID KEMP
RESPONDENT

BETWEEN:

GAJA LAKSHMI PARAMASIVAM                  N 1193 OF 2000
APPLICANT

AND:

JOHN HOWARD
RESPONDENT

BETWEEN:

GAJA LAKSHMI PARAMASIVAM                  N 1194 OF 2000
APPLICANT

AND:

TOM KARMEL
RESPONDENT

BETWEEN:

GAJA LAKSHMI PARAMASIVAM                  N 1195 OF 2000
APPLICANT

AND:

BOB SENDT
RESPONDENT

BETWEEN:

GAJA LAKSHMI PARAMASIVAM                  N 1196 OF 2000
APPLICANT

AND:

JOHN AQUILINA
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

HILL, CARR AND TAMBERLIN JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

16 FEBRUARY 2001

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Leave to appeal against the decision of Moore J in each of the matters be refused.

2.The applicant pay the respondents’ costs of the motions and applications for leave to appeal, in each of the matters.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


GENERAL DISTRIBUTION

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

BETWEEN:

GAJA LAKSHMI PARAMASIVAM                  N 1191 OF 2000
APPLICANT

AND:

CHRIS WHEELER
IRENE MOSS
LAURIE GLANFIELD
YVONNE GRANT
HARRY HERBERT
SUZANNE JAMIESON
RUTH McCOLL
PETER RYAN
RESPONDENTS

BETWEEN:

GAJA LAKSHMI PARAMASIVAM                  N 1192 OF 2000
APPLICANT

AND:

DAVID KEMP
RESPONDENT

BETWEEN:

GAJA LAKSHMI PARAMASIVAM                  N 1193 OF 2000
APPLICANT

AND:

JOHN HOWARD
RESPONDENT

BETWEEN:

GAJA LAKSHMI PARAMASIVAM                  N 1194 OF 2000
APPLICANT

AND:

TOM KARMEL
RESPONDENT

BETWEEN:

GAJA LAKSHMI PARAMASIVAM                  N 1195 OF 2000
APPLICANT

AND:

BOB SENDT
RESPONDENT

BETWEEN:

GAJA LAKSHMI PARAMASIVAM                  N 1196 OF 2000
APPLICANT

AND:

JOHN AQUILINA
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

HILL, CARR AND TAMBERLIN JJ

DATE:

16 FEBRUARY 2001

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

CARR J

  1. In these matters the applicant seeks an extension of time in which to apply for leave to appeal from certain interlocutory judgments of a judge of this Court, and leave to appeal from those judgments.  By consent, orders were made this morning extending the time for the applicant to apply for leave to appeal in each matter and an order was made dispensing with the filing or service of any notice of motion which might otherwise have been required.  To the extent that orders are made granting leave to appeal, the applicant seeks to appeal against the orders made at first instance. Those orders, made in respect of each of the…

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AGLC
Paramasivam v Wheeler [2001] FCA 231
Case
[2001] FCA 231
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Paramasivam v Wheeler is a case concerning the applicant’s appeal against the decision of the Federal Court of Australia, which dismissed her application for judicial review. The applicant had filed complaints with multiple authorities about the handling of her complaints by the University and various government officials, alleging that the refusal to investigate her claims was due to her race. The primary judge terminated the hearings of the complaints, finding them lacking in substance. The applicant subsequently appealed to the Federal Court, which dismissed her appeal and ordered her to pay the respondents' costs. The respondents have now moved to have the notices of appeal struck out, arguing that they are incompetent or disclose no proper ground of appeal.

The legal issues before the court were whether the decisions under challenge were attended with sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration, and whether substantial injustice would result if leave to appeal were refused. The court considered whether the primary judge had applied the correct stringent test before summarily dismissing the applications. The court found that the primary judge had applied the correct test and that the applications should not have been permitted to go to trial in the ordinary way, as it was apparent that they must fail.

The court further held that the decisions under challenge were not attended with sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration by the Court. The court did not think that substantial injustice would result if leave were refused, even if the decision were wrong. The court found that the primary judge had applied the correct stringent test before summarily dismissing the applications and that the material before the primary judge was such that the applications should not have been permitted to go to trial in the ordinary way. The court concluded that the primary judge can be seen, quite clearly, to have applied the correct stringent test before summarily dismissing these applications.

The court made two orders. Firstly, leave to appeal against the decision of Moore J in each of the matters was refused. Secondly, the applicant was ordered to pay the respondents’ costs of the motions and applications for leave to appeal, in each of the matters.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Leave to appeal against the decision of Moore J in each of the matters be refused.

2. The applicant pay the respondents’ costs of the motions and applications for leave to appeal, in each of the matters.

Background

Background to the litigation

The University conducted an internal investigation into the matter. The applicant was, and remains, dissatisfied about the manner in which that matter was investigated. Thereafter she complained to the Prime Minister, Ministers of both the Commonwealth and the State of New South Wales, a Commonwealth departmental officer as well as the New South Wales Ombudsman, the Operations Review Team of the New South Wales Independent Commission Against Corruption and the New South Wales Auditor-General. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The applicant had previously complained about these matters to the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (“the Commission”). On 6 April 2000 the hearings of those complaints were terminated by the President of the Commission on the grounds that she was satisfied that the complaints were lacking in substance. In barest summary, the complaints related to the handling by the respondents of correspondence from the applicant and refusals to investigate her allegations which, so she asserted, were because of her race. Each of the respondents has lodged a notice of motion seeking to have the notices of appeal struck out, either on the ground that they are incompetent or that they disclose no proper ground of appeal. WHETHER LEAVE TO APPEAL SHOULD BE GRANTED In my view, the decisions under challenge are not attended with sufficient doubt to warrant them being reconsidered by this Court. Furthermore I do not think that substantial injustice would result if leave were refused supposing the decision to be wrong: Décor Corporation v Dart Industries (1991) 33 FCR 397. The notices of motion for summary dismissal all came before the learned primary judge for directions on 22 August 2000. Directions were made for each side to file affidavit evidence. Extensive evidence was filed by each party. The applicant, in particular, availed herself of that opportunity and filed voluminous affidavit evidence. If there had been further evidence which the applicant had hoped to adduce at trial, but which she had not been able to obtain by discovery or other curial process, she could either have said this in her affidavits or told the primary judge so at the hearing of the motions. The applicant did not do so nor did she refer to any such possibility at the hearing of these matters today. One of the respondents was the subject of a request by the applicant to be present at the hearing of the motions, for possible cross-examination. We were informed, without objection, by counsel appearing for the Commonwealth respondents this morning, that that particular respondent, Dr Karmel, was made available for cross-examination at the hearing of the motions, but that the applicant did not cross-examine him. His Honour (in his reasons for judgment, at paragraph 8), acknowledged that the respondents needed to establish a high degree of satisfaction in the Court before he summarily dismissed the proceedings. In my view, tracking the language of the High Court of Australia in Webster v Lampard (1993) 177 CLR 598 at page 602, the material before the primary judge was such that the applications should not have been permitted to go to trial in the ordinary way, because it was apparent that they must fail. In my opinion, the primary judge can be seen, quite clearly, to have applied the correct stringent test before summarily dismissing these applications.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

HILL, CARR AND TAMBERLIN JJ (dissent)

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by:

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