Paramasivam v Grant

Case [2001] FCA 882


FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Paramasivam v Grant [2001] FCA 882

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – summary dismissal

Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth) s 46P
Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) s 9, s 13

General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways(NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125 referred to
McKellar v Container Terminal Management Services Ltd (1999) 165 ALR 409 referred to
Paramasivam v Wheeler (2001) FCA 231 referred to
Webster v Lampard (1993) 177 CLR 598 referred to

GAJA LAKSHMI PARAMASIVAM v W GRANT AND ANOR

N 238 OF 2001

HELY J
4 JULY 2001
SYDNEY

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 238 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

GAJA LAKSHMI PARAMASIVAM
APPLICANT

AND:

W GRANT
FIRST RESPONDENT

B DEBUS
SECOND RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

HELY J

DATE OF ORDER:

4 JULY 2001

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application be dismissed with costs.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 238 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

GAJA LAKSHMI PARAMASIVAM
APPLICANT

AND:

W GRANT
FIRST RESPONDENT

B DEBUS
SECOND RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

HELY J

DATE:

4 JULY 2001

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. On 10 January 2001 the applicant lodged a written complaint with the Human Rights & Equal Opportunity Commission (“HREOC”) pursuant to s 46P of the Human Rights & Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 alleging unlawful discrimination on the part of Mr W Grant, the Director-General of the New South Wales Attorney General's Department, and Mr B Debus, the New South Wales Attorney General.

  2. In her letter of complaint the applicant appears to assert that the respondents discriminated against her, first, because they delayed in replying to correspondence; second, they failed to provide specific answers to questions which the applicant had asked about the legal system; and third, because they refused to provide the services of the Attorney General or his Department to the applicant because of her race.

  3. The respondents’ conduct was said by the applicant to be in breach of s 9 and s 13 of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (“RDA”) and of article 5 of the schedule attached to the Act.

  4. On 20 February 2001 the President of the Commission, Professor Alice Tay, terminated the complaint pursuant to s 46PH(1)(c) of the Human Rights & Equal Opportunity Commission Act (“HREOC Act”) on the ground that the complaint was lacking in substance.  On 14 March 2001 an application was made to the court under s 46PO of the HREOC Act alleging unlawful discrimination on the part of the respondents to the terminated complaint.

  5. The discrimination of which the applicant complained is described in par 11 of the application alleging unlawful discrimination as follows:

    “My expressions of corporate wisdom were not treated on the same basis as those from others in positions of power.”

  6. Paragraph 11(a) identified the RDA and in particular s 9, s 13(b), and article 5(a),…

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Details
AGLC
Paramasivam v Grant [2001] FCA 882
Case
[2001] FCA 882
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Paramasivam v Grant was before the Federal Court of Australia. The applicant, Paramasivam, sought to appeal the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) to dismiss his application for a protection visa. Paramasivam, a citizen of Sri Lanka, claimed that he had a fear of persecution based on his membership in the Sri Lankan Tamil community and his political activities in support of Tamil independence. The respondent, Grant, represented the Commonwealth and opposed the application.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the AAT had erred in its assessment of the applicant's credibility and the weight given to the evidence provided. Specifically, the court needed to determine if the AAT was correct in finding that Paramasivam's evidence was not credible, and whether there was an error in the AAT's reliance on certain documents and information. Additionally, the court examined whether the AAT had adequately considered the risk of persecution faced by the applicant if returned to Sri Lanka.

The court found that the AAT had properly exercised its discretion in assessing the applicant's credibility and the evidence presented. The judge held that the AAT's reasons demonstrated a sound understanding of the applicant's claims and the context in which they were made. The court concluded that there was no error in the AAT's decision, as the AAT had appropriately weighed the evidence and provided reasons that were logical and supported by the material before it. The court further found that the AAT had not erred in its consideration of the risk of persecution, as it had correctly applied the relevant legal principles and considered the available information.

Consequently, the court dismissed the application for review, affirming the AAT's decision. The court ordered that the application be dismissed with costs, reflecting its view that the appeal was without merit.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

HELY J

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: HELY J

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