Palm Gardens Consolidated Pty Ltd v PG Properties Pty Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil)

PALM GARDENS CONSOLIDATED PTY LTD v PG PROPERTIES PTY LTD

[2009] SASC 311

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Kourakis

1 October 2009

REAL PROPERTY - TORRENS TITLE - CAVEATS AGAINST DEALINGS - WHO MAY LODGE AND WHAT INTEREST SUFFICIENT - OTHER CASES

EQUITY - EQUITABLE REMEDIES - INJUNCTIONS - INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTIONS - SERIOUS QUESTION TO BE TRIED - PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS

ESTOPPEL - ESTOPPEL BY CONVENTION

ESTOPPEL - ESTOPPEL IN PAIS - EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL - PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL

The parties entered into negotiations for the sale of certain retirement villages by the defendant to the plaintiff - a collateral agreement was entered into which provided that in the event that all of certain recently constructed units in one of the retirement villages were licensed and occupied, either of the parties could require the other to effect the sale and purchase of those units - before all of those units were licensed and occupied, the defendant decided that there was no realistic prospect of licensing the remaining unlicensed units at an acceptable price - the defendant therefore sought planning approval to convert the remaining unlicensed units to domestic residences and contracted to sell some of those units as residences - the plaintiff caveated the Certificates of Title on which the remaining unlicensed units are built, claiming an equitable interest - the defendant lodged an application to remove the caveat - the plaintiff seeks an order that the time for removal of the caveat be extended until its claim to an equitable interest in the remaining units is determined - whether the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case that it has such an equitable interest - whether the defendant was obliged under the agreement to license the remaining units - whether the plaintiff has a caveatable interest over the remaining units - whether the plaintiff can establish a proprietary or promissory estoppel based on the defendant's representations that it would license the remaining units - whether the plaintiff can establish an estoppel by convention - whether plaintiff entitled to interlocutory injunction.

Held: it is not arguable that there is an obligation on the defendant under the agreement to license the remaining units - the plaintiff has not established a prima facie case that it has a caveatable interest over the remaining units - the plaintiff has no probability of success in establishing a proprietary or promissory estoppel based on the alleged representations because they are equivocal and referable to an earlier agreement which was terminated - the plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of estoppel by convention because there is no evidence of the mutuality required to support an estoppel by convention - the approach that should be taken to interlocutory applications with respect to caveats is the same as the approach that should be taken to interlocutory injunctions generally - the plaintiff has failed to show that it has any material likelihood of establishing an equitable interest in the land it has caveated -…

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Details
Case
[2009] SASC 311
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Palm Gardens Consolidated Pty Ltd (Plaintiff) sought to establish an equitable interest in retirement village units owned by PG Properties Pty Ltd (Defendant). The Plaintiff caveated the Certificates of Title on which the units are built, arguing it had an equitable interest. The Defendant applied to remove the caveat, and the Plaintiff sought an extension of the removal time to determine its claim. The central legal issues were whether the Plaintiff established a prima facie case of having an equitable interest, whether the Defendant was obligated to license the remaining units, whether the Plaintiff had a caveatable interest over the units, whether the Plaintiff could establish a proprietary or promissory estoppel based on the Defendant's representations, and whether the Plaintiff could establish an estoppel by convention.

The court found that the Defendant was not obligated under the agreement to license the remaining units. The Plaintiff did not establish a prima facie case that it had a caveatable interest over the remaining units. The Plaintiff had no probability of success in establishing a proprietary or promissory estoppel based on the alleged representations because they were equivocal and referred to an earlier agreement which was terminated. The Plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of estoppel by convention because there was no evidence of the mutuality required to support such an estoppel. The court held that the approach to interlocutory applications concerning caveats should align with the general approach to interlocutory injunctions. The Plaintiff failed to demonstrate any material likelihood of establishing an equitable interest in the caveated land. Therefore, the interlocutory injunction was refused, and the application was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

The Option Deed recites the following facts:BACKGROUNDA. The Landowner owns the Land.B.The Landowner intends to cause the Village to be developed on the land with the intent that the Landowner will carry on the Business on the Land.C.PGRV will be the administering authority of the Village, once developed.D.The Unit Vendor is the sole unitholder in the Trust.E.The Landowner and the Unit Vendor (collectively, the Vendors) have agreed to grant to the Purchaser the Call Option and the Purchaser has agreed to grant to the Vendors the Put Option in respect of the acquisition of the Land, the Business, the Assets and the Sale units subject to the terms and conditions of this Deed. The presently relevant operative clauses of the Option Deed provide:[4][4] The meaning of defined terms is included in square brackets within the text of the clauses.2.1Conditions PrecedentThis Deed is subject to and conditional upon:(a)the Purchaser becoming the operator of the Existing Village;(b) the Land being Fully Developed by the Sunset Date [3 years from the date of the Option Deed – 1 September 2010], with the intent that the Purchaser shall, upon exercise of the Put Option or the Call Option, acquire a registered Retirement Village Scheme;(c) the Residence Contracts being substantially the same or superior to the arrangements contained in the residence contracts in place at the Existing Village at the time that each of the Residence Contracts was entered into and, in particular, the DMF regime in the Residence Contracts being substantially the same or superior to the arrangements contained in the residence contracts in place at the Existing Village;(d) there being no material breach of any of the Warranties on the day immediately preceding the Option Commencement Date.(Conditions Precedent).2.2 Meaning of Fully DevelopedFor the purposes of this Deed, the Land shall be taken to be Fully Developed when:(a) the Landowner gives notice in writing to the Purchaser that no further buildings are to be constructed on the Land; and(b) all buildings constructed, on the Land, have reached Practical Completion [unit can be lawfully occupied by a resident]; and(c) PGRV (as administering authority of the Village) has entered into a Residence Contract in respect of each and every Unit constructed, or to be constructed, on the Land.2.3 WaiverThe Conditions Precedent are for the benefit of the Purchaser and may only be waived by the Purchaser in writing.2.4Deed TerminatedIn the event that:(a) the Condition Precedent in clause 2.1(b) is not satisfied or waived by the Sunset Date; or(b) any of the other Conditions Precedent in clause 2.1 are not satisfied or waived by Option Commencement Date [date on which Notice referred to in 2.2(a) is given],then:(c) this Deed shall be immediately terminated and no party shall be under any liability to the other;(d) without limiting the generality of paragraph (c), in the event that this Deed is terminated in accordance with paragraph (c), then:(i)the Call Option shall be taken to have lapsed and expired and shall no longer be capable of being exercised;(ii)the Put Option shall be taken to have lapsed and expired and shall no longer be capable of being exercised.…3. CALL OPTIONSubject to clause 2, in consideration of the payment by the Purchaser to the Vendors of the sum of ten Australian Dollars ($A10.00), the receipt of which the Vendors hereby acknowledge, the Vendors hereby grant to the Purchaser, an option (the Call Option) exercisable by the Purchaser at any time during the Option Exercise Period [period of 30 days after option commencement date ie. date of cl 2.2(a) notice] to purchase from the Vendors (and to require the Vendors to sell to the Purchaser) the Land, the Business, the assets and the Sale Units for the Purchase Price determined in accordance with clause 6 and upon the terms and conditions contained in the Sale Agreements.…5.PUT OPTIONSubject to clause 2, in consideration of the payment by the Vendors to the Purchaser of the sum of ten Australian Dollars ($A10.00), the receipt of which the Purchaser hereby acknowledges, the Purchaser hereby grants to the Vendors an option (the Put Option) exercisable by the Vendors at any time during the Option Exercise Period to sell to the Purchaser (and to require the Purchaser to purchase from the Vendors) the Land, the Business, the Assets and the Sale Units for the Purchase Price determined in accordance with clause 6 and upon the terms and conditions contained in the Sale Agreements.…6.1Purchase PriceIf:(a)The Purchaser validly exercises the Call Option; or(b)the Vendors validly exercise the Put Option,the price (Purchase Price) at which the Vendor shall sell, and the Purchaser shall Purchase, the Land, the Business, the Assets and the Sale Units shall be equal to the percentage of future DMF in respect of each Unit at the Village having regard to the age of the resident in the Unit in accordance with the following scale:Age%DMF60-656.85%66-708.25%71-7516.00%76-8021.75%80+31.00%8.1Deemed entry into Sale AgreementsIf:(a)the Purchaser validly exercises the Call Option; or(b)the Vendors validly exercise the Put Option,the parties (including the warrantor) shall, subject to clause 7, for all purposes be deemed to have entered into and be bound in all respects by the terms of the Sale Agreements and:(c)the parties shall comply with their respective obligations under the Sale Agreements; and(d)the Sale Agreements shall be enforceable by and against all of the parties,as though the Sale Agreements had been duly executed by the parties.…13.11Entire AgreementThis Deed supersedes all prior representations, arrangements, understandings and agreements between the parties and represents the entire complete and exclusive understanding and agreement between the parties. The parties acknowledge and agree that they have not relied on any written or oral representation, arrangement, understanding or agreement not expressly set out or referred to in the Deed.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

It is undoubtedly the case that at the time the Option Deed was executed PG Properties intended, and was taking steps necessary, to license the additional units. It must also have been obvious to both parties that it was likely to be in their mutual interests to have the units “fully developed” and transferred. However, there is nothing to suggest that both parties proceeded on the assumption that PG Properties had bound itself to do so even if the premiums it could obtain for the licences fell to a level where it would not be able to recover the cost of the land and their construction. Even assuming, as I must for the purposes of this application, that Mr Taylor made that assumption, there is no evidence that his assumption was communicated to any representative of PG Properties. Nor is there any evidence to suggest that PG Properties entered into the Option Deed on the assumption that it was bound, or that such an assumption was communicated to Palm Gardens. There is no evidence of the mutuality required to support an estoppel by convention. There is certainly insufficient evidence to establish the high standard of proof applied by Rolfe J.Conclusion The principles governing the exercise of the discretion to grant an interlocutory injunction have been recently restated by the High Court. In Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill,[59] Gummow and Hayne JJ explained those principles in this way:The relevant principles in Australia are those explained in Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Laboratories Pty Ltd. This Court (Kitto, Taylor, Menzies and Owen JJ) said that on such applications the court addresses itself to two main inquiries and continued:‘The first is whether the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, in the sense that if the evidence remains as it is there is a probability that at the trial of the action the plaintiff will be held entitled to relief ... The second inquiry is ... whether the inconvenience or injury which the plaintiff would be likely to suffer if an injunction were refused outweighs or is outweighed by the injury which the defendant would suffer if an injunction were granted’.By using the phrase ‘prima facie case’, their Honours did not mean that the plaintiff must show that it is more probable than not that at trial the plaintiff will succeed; it is sufficient that the plaintiff show a sufficient likelihood of success to justify in the circumstances the preservation of the status quo pending the trial. That this was the sense in which the Court was referring to the notion of a prima facie case is apparent from an observation to that effect made by Kitto J in the course of argument. With reference to the first inquiry, the Court continued, in a statement of central importance for this appeal:‘How strong the probability needs to be depends, no doubt, upon the nature of the rights [the plaintiff] asserts and the practical consequences likely to flow from the order he seeks’.[60] (footnotes omitted)[59] (2006) 227 CLR 57.[60] Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57 at 81-2, [65].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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