DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
PARTIES:
ABADIA SAAVEDRA OSMAN
Applicant
V
LOIS CHARLES
First Respondent
AND
SUNCORP METWAY (ABN: 83 075 695 966)
Second Respondent
FILE NO/S:
532 of 2005
DIVISION:
Civil
PROCEEDING:
Application for leave to commence proceedings
ORIGINATING COURT:
District Court, Southport
DELIVERED ON:
8 March 2007
DELIVERED AT:
District Court, Cairns
HEARING DATE:
26 February 2007
JUDGE:
Kingham DCJ
ORDER:
1. The Applicant has leave to commence proceedings within 14 days of the date of this order
CATCHWORDS:
PERSONAL INJURIES CLAIM – Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld) – Where proceedings were not commenced within the limitation period – Where consent reached between the parties allowing proceedings to be commenced out of time – Where proceedings not commenced within the agreed time frame – Where explanation given of failure to commence proceedings – Where difficulties complying with requirements of MAIA – Where subsequent solicitor error – Where no fault of the applicant – Discretion exercised.
Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld)
Hall v Nominal Defendant [1966] 117 CLR 423
Morrison-Gardiner v Car Choice P/L & Anor; Crain v Crocker & Anor; O’Dare v Vitanza & Ors [2004] QCA 480
COUNSEL:
R. Morgan for the Applicant
R. Treston for the Respondents
SOLICITORS:
Queensland Law Group for the Applicant
Sparke Helmore Lawyers for the Respondents
Mr Osman is a citizen and resident of Columbia. On 29 March 2002, while stopped at traffic lights on the Gold Coast highway, he was injured when a car driven by Ms Charles collided with the rear of the vehicle he was driving. Mr Osman wishes to recover damages for the injuries he sustained in the accident. He did not commence proceedings within the limitation period, which expired on 29 March 2005.
The parties consented to orders on 28 September 2005 by which Mr Osman was granted leave to commence proceedings within 60 days of certain events occurring, including a court order dispensing with the requirement to hold a compulsory conference. An order dispensing with the compulsory conference (the second order) was made on 8 May 2006 and, pursuant to the consent order, proceedings should have been commenced within 60 days thereafter. Due to error by Mr Osman’s solicitors, proceedings were not commenced.
Mr Osman applied for relief from the consequence of that error. Initially relief was sought on alternative grounds, the first being an application for leave to vary the time for performance of the consent order. That ground was abandoned at the hearing and only the alternative ground for relief was pursued. That is, an order pursuant to s57(2)(b) of the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld) (MAIA) for leave to commence proceedings. The respondents did not argue that the court did not have discretion to make the order, because an earlier consent order was made to extend time[1].
[1] In Hall v Nominal Defendant, Taylor and Owen…
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- AGLC
- Osman v Charles [2007] QDC 27
- Case
- [2007] QDC 27
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether Osman should be granted leave to commence the proceedings out of time, despite not adhering to the agreed schedule. The court had to consider whether Osman's explanation for the delay was reasonable and whether he had acted with due diligence in attempting to comply with the consent agreement. Additionally, the court had to assess whether Osman's solicitor's error constituted an exceptional circumstance warranting leniency. The court had discretion under the MAIA to grant leave if satisfied that the delay was excusable.
The court found that Osman had not acted negligently in the delay and that the error by his solicitor was not attributable to Osman's fault. The court acknowledged the difficulties Osman faced in complying with the requirements of the MAIA and considered the explanation provided. The court exercised its discretion under the MAIA and granted Osman leave to commence the proceedings within 14 days of the date of the order. This decision recognised the applicant's lack of fault in the delay and the presence of exceptional circumstances that warranted the court's leniency.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The Applicant has leave to commence proceedings within 14 days of the date of this order
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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