OneSteel Trading Pty Ltd v Arnold
[2015] ACTSC 81
•30 March 2015
SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
Case Title: | OneSteel Trading Pty Ltd v Arnold and Anor |
Citation: | [2015] ACTSC 81 |
Hearing Date(s): | 30 March 2015 |
DecisionDate: | 30 March 2015 |
Before: | Refshauge J |
Decision: | 1. The sum of $21,800, being part of the sum of $23,776.40 referred to as “agency and conveyancing fees” in the settlement statement of the sale of the subject property, is to be held in trust in accordance with the undertakings given on 12 March 2015. 2. The sum of $21,800, being part of the sum of $23,776.40 referred to as "agency and conveyancing fees" in the settlement statement for the sale of the subject property provided to this Court, for the sale on 27 March 2015, is to be held in trust in accordance with the undertakings given on 12 March 2015 as part of the balance of the sale proceeds. 3. The costs of this application be paid by the First Defendant. |
Category: | Principal Judgment |
Catchwords: | GUARANTEE AND INDEMNITY – Deed of Guarantee and Indemnity – Construction of an undertaking – Interpretation of the terms “agency fees”, “solicitors fees” and “conveyancing fees” PROCEDURE – Miscellaneous procedural matters – Undertakings – Interpretation – meaning of “agency fees”, “solicitors fees” and “conveyancing fees”. |
Legislation Cited: | Land Titles Act 1925 (ACT), s 107(2)(a), 107C |
Cases Cited: | Andara Homes Pty Ltd v Mallitt [2014] ACTSC 142 Andara Homes Pty Ltd v Tai [2014] ACTSC 38 |
Parties: | OneSteel Trading Pty Limited (Plaintiff) Rohan Peter Arnold (First Defendant) The Registrar General of the Australian Capital Territory (Second Defendant) |
Representation: | Counsel Mr G Weetman (Plaintiff) Mr J Pappas (Defendant) |
| Solicitors Boettcher Law (Plaintiff) Aulich Civil Law (First Defendant) Paul Coleman, Solicitor (Second Defendant) | |
File Number(s): | SC 51 of 2015; SC 448 of 2013 |
Refshauge J:
These proceedings involve efforts made by the Plaintiff, OneSteel Trading Pty Ltd (OneSteel), to recover under certain Deeds of Guarantee and Indemnity dated 13 February 2008 and 6 December 2011, from the First Defendant, Rohan Peter Arnold, as a consequence of OneSteel meeting a claim from the liquidator of Mass (Australia) Pty Ltd (Mass Steel), of what was said to be voidable preferential payments, which OneSteel was said to have received from Mass Steel for wholesale steel products which it supplied to Mass Steel. The sum amounted to $739,361.61. Other associated costs also said to be guaranteed totalled $449,857.46.
The Deeds of Guarantee and Indemnity charged all real property of Mr Arnold with the payment of any moneys payable under it. OneSteel lodged a caveat over the property known as 15 Mulga Crescent, O'Connor, being lot 43, section 12, O'Connor, contained in volume 916, folio 93, in the office of the Second Defendant, the Registrar General of the Australian Capital Territory, on 12 December 2012. Mr Arnold is the registered proprietor of that property. The caveat relied on the charge in the Deed of Guarantee and Indemnity made on 6 December 2014.
Although Mr Arnold took no steps to have the caveat removed, he has, in these proceedings, submitted that OneSteel has no caveatable interest, as the Deed of Guarantee and Indemnity was said not to have required Mr Arnold to pay any moneys to OneSteel in the particular circumstances and that the charge did not give OneSteel any interest in the subject property. These issues, however, have yet to be resolved.
On 15 November 2013, lawyers for OneSteel received a notice from the Registrar General under s 107(2)(a) of the Land Titles Act 1925 (ACT), giving notice of the lapsing of the caveat, unless, within 14 days of service of the notice, an order of this Court was made extending the caveat. This Court made an order extending the caveat on 26 November 2013.
On 12 December 2013, the Court further extended the caveat and ordered that Mr Arnold pay OneSteel $20,000 costs on the sale of the subject property or before 31 July 2014, whichever was the earlier. The reason for such a payment is not apparent on the face of the orders. Further, there was no undertaking as to damages given by OneSteel, nor was it required to commence appropriate proceedings to confirm its claim to a caveatable interest in the subject property. See Andara Homes Pty Ltd v Tai [2014] ACTSC 38 at [9], [10].
Nevertheless, on 13 September 2014, OneSteel commenced proceedings in the District Court of New South Wales against Mr Arnold and two companies, all of whom were alleged in the proceedings to have entered into Deeds of Guarantee and Indemnity with OneSteel in respect of debts incurred by Mass Steel owing to OneSteel. It appears that OneSteel compromised the claim of the liquidator from Mass Steel in the sum of $500,000, which was paid to the liquidator on 1 July 2014. It is this sum and associated costs for which the claim was made in the District Court.
In any event, the order extending the caveat was revoked on 1 September 2013, which presumably had the effect of lapsing the caveat. I understand that the order was made in anticipation of a sale of the property, negotiated to be completed in early to mid February 2015.
It appears that the sale did not proceed. For some reason, OneSteel and its lawyers did not initially realise that the caveat had lapsed, but later sought to have its protection reinstated by lodging a subsequent caveat, to be authorised to do so by court order. Before the proceedings could be heard, however, there were negotiations between the parties because, it appears, a further sale had been negotiated. Through his lawyers, Mr Arnold advised OneSteel of that further sale. He pointed out that the lodging of the caveat would only be an expensive waste of time for it would have to be removed upon the sale, incurring unnecessary costs. By 11 February 2015 the contracts for it had not been exchanged. Subsequently, Mr Arnold's solicitors wrote to the solicitors of OneSteel:
To alleviate your client's concerns in relation to 3 and 4 above, my client is willing to advise that agents' fees and solicitors' costs involved in the conveyance will be no more than $25,000.
On 11 February 2015, these proceedings were commenced. OneSteel sought an order granting it leave to lodge a successive caveat over the subject property. Such an order is necessary as a successive caveat may not be entered on the register or, if entered, may be removed by the Registrar General under s 107C of the Land Titles Act. See Andara Homes Pty Ltd v Mallitt [2014] ACTSC 142 at [7]. Those proceedings were compromised on terms on 13 February 2015.
Those proceedings were compromised on terms on 13 February 2015. Mr Arnold gave undertakings to the court in the following terms:
1.To only sell the Property in an arm’s length transaction and at market value;
2.Not to further encumber the title, whether by drawing down on the present mortgage or in any way borrowing against the title; and
3.To pay from the gross proceeds of sale following any adjustment for rates, taxes, levies or charges only the following:
i.The balance owing at settlement on the presently registered mortgage;
ii.Not more than $25,000.00 in agents’ fees, commission, solicitors’ fees and necessary out-of-pocket expenses;
iii.$20,000.00 to your client in satisfaction of the costs order made on 12 December 2013 in ACT Supreme Court proceedings SC 448 of 2013; and
iv.Then the net proceeds of sale into an interest bearing trust account in the joint names of our client and OneSteel Trading Pty Ltd (ACN 007 519 646) (“OneSteel”). That trust account to be established by this firm and the proceeds not to be disbursed except as authorised in writing by both our client and OneSteel and in the absence of agreement or authorisation by order of the ACT Supreme Court.
I shall call these the first undertakings.
Directions were then made for the filing of affidavits and submissions and the proceedings adjourned until 12 March 2015 for hearing. On that day, however, further extensive undertakings were given (the subsequent undertakings), which included the first undertakings, except for that numbered 3(iii), which was provided for separately. It is not necessary to set out all the undertakings save for those additional undertakings numbered 5 and 6, which are as follows:
5. to provide copies, to the Plaintiff, of the following documents within 7 days of the exchange of, or entry into, any contract for sale of the Property (or, if this has already occurred, within 1 day of the date on which this undertaking is given):
i.the front page of any contract for sale of the Property;
ii.any statement from the current mortgagee of the property, Commonwealth Bank of Australia, which records or evidences the amount to be paid to it on settlement of the sale of the property; and
iii.draft figures setting out the proposed disposition of the proceeds of sale of the Property at settlement;
6. to inform the Plaintiff, in writing, of the proposed date of the settlement of any sale of the Property, not less than 7 days before the date of the proposed settlement;
On 25 March 2015, an application was made to the Court for various orders, including orders that Mr Arnold be dealt with for contempt in not complying with undertakings 5 and 6. At this stage, I make no finding that the advice required by undertaking 5(iii) was not provided within one day of the entry into the contract or that the proposed date of sale, 27 March 2015, was only advised on 24 March 2015 in breach of undertaking 6.
No statement from the current mortgagee was provided. There was, however, no evidence to suggest that such a statement existed at the relevant time. On a provisional basis, I was prepared to construe the undertaking to mean that Mr Arnold only had to provide any statement then in existence.
The settlement statement provided with the advice that the sale was proceeding was drafted in such a way as to raise real questions about compliance with the first undertakings, set out above. In particular, the statement:
(a) made no provision for the deposit to be retained in a trust account as required by the first undertakings;
(b) failed to explain how it was that a very large amount payable to the ACT Revenue Office related solely to the subject land; and
(c) contained agency and conveyancing fees which were problematic in that the signed contract for sale showed that there was no agent, leaving only conveyancing fees, which seemed very high, beyond reasonableness.
An application in Proceedings returnable on 25 March 2015 sought information about these matters and, as an alternative, an injunction restraining Mr Arnold from making the payments referred to at [14] (b) and (c) above. At the initial hearing, however, a statement from the ACT Revenue Office was tendered, showing that the amount claimed was correct. The claimed amount included substantial arrears in land tax charges. No complaint could be made that that was not payable in accordance with the undertakings. I was also informed that the agency and conveyancing costs did, indeed, not include any agents' fees or commissions, but included solicitors' costs, not only of the conveyance but associated legal costs that may have been secured in some way and payable from the proceed of the sale.
At the hearing of the Application in Proceedings, OneSteel did not require the sale to be deferred so as to give the full seven days required by the subsequent undertakings. It sought, however, to be protected in relation to the fees, which it said included, on the brief description given, fees that were not deductable from the net proceeds that was to be held in trust pending the conclusion of the proceedings in the District Court in New South Wales, or any court into which those proceedings were transferred and any appeal from them.
As a result, in order to progress the matter, I ordered as follows:
1.That the solicitors for the First Defendant file and serve an affidavit, on or before 1:00pm on Friday 27 March 2015, setting out the components of the amount of $23,776.40 set out in the Settlement Statement for the sale of Block 43, Section 12 O’Conner on 27 March 2015, annexed to the letter from Aulich Civil Law to Boettcher Law, dated 24 March 2015, so as to make clear what is payable in respect of the legal costs and disbursements for the sale and what is payable for other costs, including, as such other costs, any costs in respect of these proceedings, namely SC 51/15 and SC 448/13.
2.That the solicitor for the First Defendant will advise, by 4:15pm today, 25 March 2015, whether it is prepared to give an undertaking that the costs referred to as ‘other costs’ in Order 1, will, upon settlement of sale referred to in that order, be held on trust pending further order.
The undertaking contemplated in order 2 was duly given later that afternoon. The affidavit contemplated in order 1 was duly filed on 27 March 2015. In it, Benjamin Joseph Aulich, the director of Mr Arnold's solicitor, set out some background to the proceedings and the involvement of the solicitor company in it.
The solicitor company had received instructions from Mr Arnold to act in succession to a former solicitor for him. It had not been involved in the proceedings, obviously, prior to taking over conduct of the matter and was not aware of some of the matters that had previously occurred. In the matter, he deposed:
11. Mr Arnold had not been a client of [the two companies conducted by Mr Aulich] previously and I was conscious to have security for the legal costs incurred by either AC or ACL. I had discussions with Mr Arnold and agreement was reached that any fees due to my firm or firms would be paid out of the proceeds of sale of the O’Conner Property, in the event Mr Arnold had not paid invoices issued to him on an interim basis. I do not recall the exact words of that conversation.
It is not clear from the terms of this paragraph that there was any form of security given by Mr Arnold that would attach to the land the subject of these proceedings or, indeed, to the gross proceeds of the sale of the land. Mr Aulich then made reference to the letter of 11 February 2015, a portion of which I have quoted above at [8] and continued:
13. I had not discussed with Mr Arnold whether he had used a Real Estate Agent for the sale of the O’Conner Property. I arrived at the figure of $25,000.00 as an estimate, simply because I believed it would cover the fees associated with using a Real Estate Agent including payment of his or her commission, legal fees, disbursements and any other sundry costs involved with the conveyance of the O’Conner Property.
14. I later learnt that there was no Real Estate Agent involved with the sale of the O’Conner Property.
I assume, from paragraph 14 especially, that this knowledge post-dated the letter of 13 February 2015 and the giving of the undertaking on that day. Mr Aulich then deposed:
15. The legal expenses incurred by Mr Arnold in relation to the O’Conner Property have been much more significant than expected. Whilst Mr Arnold has not incurred the expense of a Real Estate Agent for the sale of the O’Conner Property, Mr Arnold’s legal fees have made up much more of the $25,000.00 estimate than was first expected.
Mr Aulich annexed the two memoranda of costs. The first was for "fees and disbursements for the conveyancing of the O'Connor property", which were in the sum of $1,976.40. The second was for "other costs in relation to the dispute concerning O'Connor property", amounting to $21,800, including council fees of $11,060.
While the second memorandum set out the work done, it was described, entirely appropriately, in generic terms, eg "email to…" "Peruse email from…" "Draft letter to…" "Peruse letter from…" and so on. It is, however, quite unhelpful so far as assisting me to understand the nature of the work to see whether payment of that sum to the solicitor from Mr Arnold would breach item 3(ii) of the first undertakings. At the hearing it was not contended that those costs came in any way within that item.
The construction of the undertaking
The question then is to determine the meaning of the undertaking. In particular, "solicitors' fees" in item 3(ii) of the first undertakings and, as subsequently became relevant, the meaning of "charges" in the chapeau to clause 3.
How should the court approach this task?
In SmithKline Beecham plc v Apotex Europe Ltd [2006] 1 WLR 872, Lewison J said, at 885-6; [42]-[43]:
It is important to recall at the outset that a cross undertaking is not given to a party to the proceedings; it is given to the court. As Lord Diplock explained in Hoffman v La Roche at 361:
‘The undertaking is not given to the defendant but to the court itself. Non‑performance of it is a contempt of court, not breach of contract, and attracts the remedies available for contempt, but the court exacts the undertaking for the defendant's benefit...’
It follows from this that the proper interpretation of a cross undertaking is not a question of defining the mutual understanding of the parties to the litigation for the terms of the cross undertaking are a matter for the court.
In Indoor Holdings Pty Ltd v Bennett [2010] WASC 242 at [32], Le Miere J relied on this passage to point out that the proper interpretation of an undertaking is not a matter of ascertaining the mutual intention of the parties. What was at issue there, however, was an undertaking as to damages, given in terms of the usual undertaking as to damages set out in a practice direction.
As his Honour pointed out, "The words in a standard or prescribed form should be given the same meaning and not vary according to the circumstances of each case." I do not disagree with that conclusion, and accept that the task is to construe what was the undertaking to the court, which is a matter of solemnity. I am not here concerned with a standard or prescribed undertaking, but one fashioned for the particular circumstances of the case. There are, it seems to me, some accepted principles in the construction of such undertakings.
Clarity of expression is very important, for deliberate breach of an injunction is a criminal attempt and wilful disobedience, unless the breaches were caused accidentally, were casual, accidental or unintentional, as pointed out in Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union v Mudginberri Station Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 98 at 108, 113. This means that an essential element of such offences is that the alleged contemnor must be shown to have known that what was being done was inconsistent with the terms of the injunction: Z Ltd v A-Z and AA-LL [1982] 1 QB 558.
In Law Society of New South Wales v Kinsella (Unreported, New South Wales Court of Appeal, CA 155 of 1980, 2 July 1980), Hope JA stated in respect of proceedings for disobedience to an injunction or breach of an undertaking:
Proceedings such as the present are brought primarily to ensure that a person who has given undertakings to the court complies with those undertakings. They are concerned to ensure what has been ordered by the court or what has been undertaken to the court shall be carried out. The court does not make orders uselessly. It makes orders in order that they be complied with. If they be flouted, the court must ensure that the person who flouts them realises that he does so at his peril. In the same way, if undertakings are given to the court, they are given to the court and accepted by the court on the basis that they will be carried out. The court will not be flouted by flagrant breaches of the undertakings.
It follows that the approach to be taken to the breach of the undertakings is the same as the approach taken to the breach of an injunction. This is in accordance with ancient authority. See, for example, London and Birmingham Railway Co v Grand Junction Canal Co (1835) 1 Ry & Can Cas 224, Neath Canal Company v Ynisarwed Resolven Colliery Company (1875) LR 10 Ch App 450, and Howard v Press Printers Ltd (1904) 91 LT 718.
I am, however, tasked, not to consider a breach of an undertaking, but the construction of the undertaking so that no anticipatory breach may occur. It is well accepted that an undertaking should, like a court order, be construed in the context of surrounding circumstances, without first considering whether there is any ambiguity. See Australia Energy Ltd v Lennard Oil N.L. (No 2) [1988] 2 Qd R 230, Yates Property Corporation Pty Ltd v Boland (1998) 89 FCR 78, and Kirkpatrick v Kotis (2004) 62 NSWLR 567.
In Franks v Equitiloan Securities Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 693 at [7]-[8], Pembroke J said:
It is well accepted that the construction of an undertaking given to a court will inevitably involve consideration of the surrounding circumstances, including the context in which the undertaking was given, and will require reference to the issues in the underlying proceedings and the competing allegations of the parties. The parties did not disagree about the applicable principles: Owston Nominees No 2 Pty Ltd v Branir Pty Ltd (2003) 129 FCR 558 at 569 per Allsop J; Bryant v Keith Harris & Co Ltd (1980) 33 ALR 437 at 449–450 per Lockhart J.
There is no separate principle that requires any additional leniency or generosity in construing an undertaking compared to that which would apply in the construction of a contract. The question is, what do the words mean, and if there is any ambiguity about the words, or even perhaps if there is no patent ambiguity, what was the context in which those words were made, so as to elucidate their meaning — conformably with the language chosen by the parties in the circumstances which prevailed at the time: Pacific Carriers Ltd v BNP Paribas (2004) 218 CLR 451 at 462. See also Codelfa Constructions Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority (NSW) (1982) 149 CLR 337 at 350; Reardon Smith Line Ltd v Hansen-Tangen (1976) 1 WLR 989 at 995–996 per Lord Wilberforce.
Although an appeal from that decision was upheld by the New South Wales Court of Appeal, it did not disagree with this principle. See Franks v Moribund Pty Ltd (formerly Equitiloan Securities Pty Ltd) (in liquidation) [2011] NSWCA 216.
Given also that the object of the disagreement between the parties were the words "solicitors' fees" or, perhaps, "charges", it is well to bear in mind what Lord Hoffmann said in R v Brown [1996] 1 AC 543 at 561 of the mistake:
... one common among lawyers ... to treat the words of an English sentence as building blocks whose meanings cannot be affected by the rest of the sentence ... This is not the way language works. The unit of communication by means of language is the sentence and not the parts of which it is composed. The significance of individual words is affected by other words in the syntax of the whole.
The High Court approved of these observations in Collector of Customs v Agfa‑Gevaert Ltd (1996) 186 CLR 389 at 397. It is, of course, also necessary to have regard to the whole of the undertakings for the purpose of the proper construction of that which is in issue here.
I note, for completeness, that the Court has power to discharge an injunction when it is proved to be entered into by mistake, even if the mistake is unilateral. See Mullins v Howell (1879) 11 Ch D 763. I note, however, that in that case the mistake was where the party giving the undertaking had mistakenly consented to an undertaking in more extensive terms than he had intended. In this case, I note that Mr J Pappas, who appeared for the First Defendant in the proceedings, very properly indicated that there was no issue with the contemplation of the extension of the terms used to include the particular fees in issue at the relevant time.
The context and circumstances
The undertaking came about when, following the liquidation of Mass Steel, OneSteel compromised a demand by the liquidator and then sought to recover the funds paid to the liquidator by claiming them from Mr Arnold under the Deed of Guarantee and Indemnity that he had executed.
In order to protect its claim, OneSteel lodged a caveat against the title on the subject property which it then permitted to lapse, in order to permit a sale of the subject property, from which it expected to obtain funds to apply towards its claim against Mr Arnold.
When that sale did not eventuate, OneSteel sought to re-lodge the caveat and accepted instead undertakings, which I accepted were intended to have the same effect.
The terms of the undertakings were crafted in the context of the offer by Mr Arnold, contained in his solicitor's letter of 11 February 2015, which referred to "the solicitors' costs involved in the conveyance," which would ordinarily be understood, I am satisfied, as the costs chargeable to effect the conveyance of the property. I will call these "the conveyancing costs".
I do not consider that conveyancing costs would ordinarily encompass the costs of the proceedings relating to the caveat or indeed to the District Court proceedings in New South Wales. While I accept that there were discussions between Mr Arnold and his solicitor about recovery of costs incurred by Mr Arnold for the work his solicitor undertook, other than the conveyancing costs, and there was apparently an agreement that these would be paid from the proceeds of the sale of the subject property, this was never advised to OneSteel, and I did not have details of whether that agreement was anything that could properly be called a "charge".
Whether the reference to a "cap" on those fees at $25,000 be taken as some inference that this was so, I note the following.
As at 13 February 2015, no contract had been signed; it was signed on 25 February 2015. There was, however, a sale, because that was the occasion as to which the solicitors for OneSteel were caused to seek to lodge a successive caveat and which had caused it to bring these proceedings. Mr Aulich deposed that he did not know that no agent had been retained by Mr Arnold to sell the subsequent property. I consider, however, that I can infer that by 13 February 2015, Mr Arnold knew that no agent had been retained. Given that his solicitors had notified the solicitors of OneSteel that there was a sale and that the sale contract was signed 12 days later, for him to give an undertaking in the terms he did was, in those circumstances, at least arguably misleading, though I make no finding on that.
I have no direct evidence as to what the agents' fees and commissions might have been. I also note that there was no reference in any of the inter partes correspondence about the likely sale price. The subject property ultimately sold for $650,000. It could, of course, have sold for more or less. At 2% commission, the agent would have been paid $13,000. If the subject property had sold for $800,000, the agent would have been paid $16,000. At 3% commission, the agent would have been paid $19,500 or $24,000 respectively. The conveyancing costs were actually $1976.40. These could have been higher, but probably no more than $3000.
In the context of the, arguably misleading, assertion that there were agent fees and commissions likely, the "cap" in the undertaking cannot be used as a basis to infer that the solicitors' fees referred to in the undertaking was clearly meant to include fees other than conveyancing costs, especially as there was no disclosure of the intention to include them of the agreement entered into between Mr Arnold and his solicitor or of any charge on the subject property to secure payment of those fees.
In any event, such a charge would, at best, have been an equitable charge and since clearly post dating the charge that OneSteel claimed would, if OneSteel were to make out its charge, be deferred in priority to the charge of OneSteel. As OneSteel's interest in the subject property, if any, was subordinated to that of the mortgagee, which is entitled to be paid out first, so the interest in the subject property, if any, of Mr Arnold's solicitor would be subordinated to that of OneSteel.
At the hearing, Mr Pappas argued that the word "charges" in the chapeau of clause 3 of the first undertakings was sufficient to encompass a payment of the sum of $21,800 to Mr Arnold's solicitor and it took priority to the other payments set out in the subparagraphs of that clause. It seems to me that the word "charges" there must be construed in accordance with the principle expressed in Latin as noscitur a sociis; in particular, as a form of the ejusdem generis rule. See Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Dick (2007) 226 FLR 388 at 391.
It seems to me that the list of matters there set out are all government charges that are usually statutorily based and often given a priority in payment even, as appears from the terms of clause 3, to registered mortgagers. Solicitors' fees are not included in that concept. In any event, the same problem with priority would be encountered and the payment to OneSteel would have a priority over any payment of that sum of $21,800.
I do not accept that the terms of the undertaking were intended to change the priorities of any interests in the subject property as between OneSteel and Mr Arnold's solicitors. It would take more than a vague inference which might be drawn from the terms of the words used to encompass that.
Accordingly, I am of the view that the sum of $21,800, being part of the sum of $23,776.40 referred to as “agency and conveyancing fees” in the settlement statement of the sale of the subject property, is to be held in trust in accordance with the undertakings given on 12 March 2015. I will accordingly so declare.
I will make a declaration that the sum of $21,800, being part of the sum of $23,776.40 referred to as "agency and conveyancing fees" in the settlement statement for the sale of the subject property provided to this Court, for the sale on 27 March 2015, is to be held in trust in accordance with the undertakings given on 12 March 2015 as part of the balance of the sale proceeds.
I will order that the costs of this application be paid by the First Defendant.
| I certify that the preceding fifty-two [52] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Judgment of his Honour Justice Refshauge. Associate: Date: 20 April 2015 |
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