One Tree Community Services Inc v United Voice (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

One Tree Community Services Inc v United Voice (No 2) [2020] FCA 390

File number: WAD 389 of 2019
Judge: MCKERRACHER J
Date of judgment: 25 March 2020
Catchwords:

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – Judicial power of the Commonwealth – exercise of arbitral power by Fair Work Commission under dispute resolution clause in enterprise agreement – consent needed for valid exercise of arbitral power - where enterprise agreement applies to new employer by operation of s 313 Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) – whether new employer deemed to have consented to the dispute resolution clause – in circumstances where lack of consent would amount to an impermissible exercise of judicial power by the Fair Work Commission

INDUSTRIAL LAW – transfer of business under Part 2-8 of Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) – whether new employer is bound by dispute resolution clause – where new employment contract included term which excluded operation of enterprise agreement – where no order sought under s 318 or s 320 to set aside or vary enterprise agreement

Legislation:

Constitution s 71

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 50AAA

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 14, 22(5), 22(7), 22(8), 55, 122(1), 172, 172(1), 172(1)(a), 182, 182(1), 186, 311, 311(1), 312, 313, 313(1)(a), 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 320, 562, 595, 738, 739, 739(4)

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) ss 39B(1), 39B(1A)(b), 39B(1A)(c), 78B

Cases cited:

Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 410

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Australian Industrial Relation Commission (2001) 203 CLR 645

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Newlands Coal Pty Ltd (2006) 153 IR 110

Ermogenous v Greek Orthodox Community of SA Inc (2002) 209 CLR 95

Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Glengallan Investments Pty Ltd (2004) 218 CLR 471

One Tree Community Service Inc v United Voice [2019] FCA 1309

Smith v Hughes (1871) LR 6 QB 597

Taylor v Johnson (1983) 151 CLR 422

TCL Air Conditioner (Zhongshan) Co Ltd v Judges of Federal Court of Australia (2013) 251 CLR 533

Teys Australia Beenleigh Pty Ltd v Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union  [2015] FCA 1033

Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd (2004) 219 CLR 165

Toyota Motor Corporation Australia Ltd v Marmara (2014) 222 FCR 152

Date of hearing: 5 December 2019
Registry: Western Australia
Division: Fair Work Division
National Practice Area: Employment & Industrial Relations
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 101
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr MJ Follett
Solicitor for the Applicant: DLA Piper Australia
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr C Dowling SC with Mr CJ Tran
Solicitor for the First Respondent: United Voice (Now The United Workers Union)
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submits to any order of the Court, save as to the question of costs
Table of Corrections:

22 March 2021

The medium neutral citation has been amended to ‘ One Tree Community Services Inc v United Voice (No 2) [2020] FCA 390’


ORDERS

WAD 389 of 2019
BETWEEN:

ONE TREE COMMUNITY SERVICES INC. ABN 74…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 390
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

One Tree Community Services Inc, the applicant, sought to challenge the decision of the Fair Work Commission (FWC) under a dispute resolution clause in an enterprise agreement. United Voice, the respondent, defended the FWC's decision. The case was heard in the Federal Court of Australia. The primary legal issue was whether the FWC's exercise of arbitral power under the dispute resolution clause in the enterprise agreement was valid when the clause applied to a new employer who had not consented to the clause. The court had to determine if the new employer was deemed to have consented to the clause, and if not, whether the FWC's exercise of arbitral power would amount to an impermissible exercise of judicial power.

The court considered the relevant statutory provisions and the High Court's decision in the Private Arbitration case. It was established that a power to make a binding determination as to legal rights and liabilities is judicial power unless it is "private arbitral" power. The court found that the arbitral power in question was not private arbitral power because it was not based on the agreement of the parties. Instead, it was an exercise of judicial power by the FWC, which was not a Chapter III court. The court also noted that the new employer had not consented to the dispute resolution clause, and therefore, the FWC's exercise of arbitral power was invalid.

The court dismissed the application and ordered that the parties provide further proposed orders and submissions within 10 days. The court also noted that any additional orders would be determined on the papers unless otherwise ordered. The decision highlights the importance of ensuring that the exercise of arbitral power by the FWC is based on the agreement of the parties and does not amount to an impermissible exercise of judicial power.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. Absent consent, the first respondent is to provide a minute of further proposed orders, if any, and any submissions (not exceeding 3 pages) within 10 days;

3. The applicant is to provide in response a minute of proposed orders and any submissions (not exceeding 3 pages) within 10 days.

4. Unless the Court orders otherwise, any additional orders will be determined on the papers.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

I do not propose to allow these amendments to the originating application which were made well after commencement of the litigation and which, again, relate to constructional matters more appropriately dealt with by the Commission. CONCLUSION The application will be dismissed with costs. I will hear the parties on any other terms.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The drafting and structure of this combination of statutory provisions reflects the constitutional limitations on the capacity of the Commonwealth legislature to confer judicial power on a body other than a Ch III court. It obviously seeks to conform with the judgment of the High Court in the Private Arbitration case: Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Australian Industrial Relation Commission (2001) 203 CLR 645. One of the issues in the Private Arbitration case was the validity of the dispute resolution clause in an agreement between parties to an industrial dispute. The relevant enterprise agreement had been certified by the Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC) pursuant to the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth) and given statutory force accordingly. Like cl 77.5 of the EA in this instance, the clause in question in the Private Arbitration case purported to confer on the Commission’s predecessor a power to resolve disputes between the parties in a binding fashion. A question arose as to whether the dispute resolution clause was valid as a term of an agreement given statutory force by the Commonwealth legislature when ‘certified’ by the AIRC because it sought to confer judicial power on the AIRC which was not a Ch III court. The High Court (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Callinan JJ) (at [26]) held that ‘a power to make a binding determination as to legal rights and liabilities arising under an award or agreement is, in its nature, judicial power’. One Tree says it is beyond debate that the arbitral power purported to be exercised by the Commission in the FWC Application would be judicial power unless it is ‘private arbitral’ power. One Tree also relies for this contention on the passages (at [30]-[31]) of the Private Arbitration case where the High Court said as follows:30There is, however, a significant difference between agreed and arbitrated dispute settlement procedures. As already indicated, the Commission cannot, by arbitrated award, require the parties to submit to binding procedures for the determination of legal rights and liabilities under an award because Ch III of the Constitution commits power to make determinations of that kind exclusively to the courts. However, different considerations apply if the parties have agreed to submit disputes as to their legal rights and liabilities for resolution by a particular person or body and to accept the decision of that person as binding on them.31Where parties agree to submit their differences for decision by a third party, the decision maker does not exercise judicial power, but a power of private arbitration. Of its nature, judicial power is a power that is exercised independently of the consent of the person against whom the proceedings are brought and results in a judgment or order that is binding of its own force. In the case of private arbitration, however, the arbitrator’s powers depend on the agreement of the parties, usually embodied in a contract, and the arbitrator’s award is not binding of its own force. Rather, its effect, if any, depends on the law which operates with respect to it.