O'Sullivan and P & O Maritime Services Pty Ltd (Compensation)

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O'Sullivan and P & O Maritime Services Pty Ltd (Compensation) [2019] AATA 4759 (7 August 2019)

Division:GENERAL DIVISION

File Number:           2015/0698

Re:Michael O'Sullivan

APPLICANT

P & O Maritime Services Pty LtdAnd  

RESPONDENT

DECISION

Tribunal:Mr S. Webb, Member

Date:7 August 2019

Place:Perth

Mr O’Sullivan’s requests for referral of questions of law to the Federal Court of Australia are refused.

........................[sgd]................................................

Mr S. Webb, Member

CATCHWORDS

SEAFARERS’ COMPENSATION – claim for compensation in respect of an injury – request for referral of a question of law to the Federal Court of Australia – considerations relevant to exercise of discretion – meaning of “question of law arising in a proceeding” – referral not justified – discretion not exercised – requests for referral to the Federal Court refused

LEGISLATION

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) – ss 3, 33, 40A, 42A, 43, 43B, 44, 45, 61

Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) – s 58

Seafarers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1992 (Cth) – ss 3, 26, 28, 31, 43, 51, 61, 63, 67, 68, 73, 77, 78, 79, 83, 89, 90A

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) – r 33.12

CASES

Birdseye v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2003] FCAFC 232
Collector of Customs (NSW) v Brian Lawlor Automotive Pty Ltd [1979] FCA 21
Comcare v Etheridge [2006] FCAFC 27
Cosco Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner for Taxation [1997] FCA 1504
Davina and Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Authority [1996] AATA 474
Dorajay Pty Ltd v Aristocrat Leisure Ltd [2005] FCA 588
Haritos v Commissioner of Taxation [2015] FCAFC 92
Lower and Comcare [2003] AATA 540
O’Sullivan and P&O Maritime Services Pty Ltd [2016] AATA 283
O’Sullivan and P&O Maritime Services Pty Ltd [2016] AATA 865
O’Sullivan v P & O Maritime Services Pty Ltd [1998] DCWA CIV2466 of 1997
O’Sullivan v P & O Maritime Services Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 969
O’Sullivan v P & O Maritime Services Pty Ltd [2017] FCA 47
O’Sullivan v P & O Maritime Services Pty Ltd [2017] FCA 508
O’Sullivan v Barker J & Ors [2017] HCA P38 of 2017
O’Sullivan v Barker J & Ors [2018] HCA P62 of 2017
Re Sommers and Telstra Corporation Ltd [2006] AATA 758
Trade Practices Commission v Arnotts Limited (1989) 88 ALR 90
WA Pynes Pty Ltd v Bannerman (1980) 41 FLR 175

SECONDARY MATERIALS

Maritime Industry Offshore Oil and Gas Operations Award 1991

REASONS FOR DECISION

Mr S. Webb, Member

7 August 2019

  1. In 1993, Michael O’Sullivan was employed by P & O Maritime Services Pty Ltd


    (the Company). He sustained an injury to his lower back for which he claimed and was paid benefits under the Maritime Industry Offshore Oil and Gas Operations Award 1991 (the Award). In 2014, Mr O’Sullivan lodged a compensation claim with the Company in respect of a back injury. The Company rejected the claim and related matters are presently the subject of Tribunal proceedings.

  2. In the course of these proceedings, Mr O’Sullivan requested referral…

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Details
Case
[2019] AATA 4759
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This decision concerns a request by Mr O’Sullivan for the referral of questions of law to the Federal Court of Australia, arising from proceedings before the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). Mr O’Sullivan had lodged a claim for compensation in respect of a back injury sustained on 16 December 1993 while working as a Greaser on a vessel. The dispute has a lengthy and complex procedural history, involving previous decisions by the District Court of Western Australia, the AAT, the Federal Court, and the High Court. The immediate issue before the AAT Member was Mr O’Sullivan's request for referral, not the substantive compensation claim itself.

The primary legal issue before the Tribunal was whether to exercise its discretion to refer questions of law to the Federal Court. Mr O’Sullivan sought to test whether, for the purposes of his compensation claim, he could be compelled under the *Seafarers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1992* (SRC Act) to provide information relating to his medical history and employment outside the maritime industry. He asserted that the SRC Act, and specifically section 67 concerning the employer's power to request information, was confined to the maritime industry and that any attempt to obtain other information was in excess of power. This was linked to a broader assertion regarding the Tribunal's powers under section 33 of the *Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1993* (AAT Act).

The Tribunal Member determined that the question Mr O’Sullivan sought to refer was too broad, hypothetical, and imprecise to constitute a properly formulated question of law for referral. While acknowledging the existence of jurisdiction for the substantive application, the Member found that the specific request for referral did not meet the necessary criteria. The Member analysed section 67 of the SRC Act, which permits an employer to request information or documents relevant to a claim, or an authority to obtain them, if the claimant has such information or can obtain it without unreasonable expense or inconvenience. The Member also considered section 33 of the AAT Act, which grants the Tribunal discretion over its procedure and allows it to require parties to provide further information. Ultimately, the Member concluded that the request for referral was not justified and declined to exercise the discretion to refer the matter to the Federal Court.

Background

Background to the litigation

It is Mr O’Sullivan’s request for referral of these matters to the Federal Court, alone, that is the subject of this decision.BACKGROUND FACTS The Tribunal proceedings in this matter have been long and procedurally complex. The facts have been recited in previous judgements and decisions, namely –(a)O’Sullivan v P & O Maritime Services Pty Ltd [1998] DCWA CIV2466 of 1997 (17 September 1998);(b)O’Sullivan and P & O Maritime Services Pty Ltd [2016] AATA 283 (3 May 2016);(c)O’Sullivan v P & O Maritime Services Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 969 (9 August 2016);(d)O’Sullivan and P & O Maritime Services Pty Ltd [2016] AATA 865 (10 October 2016);(e)O’Sullivan v P & O Maritime Services Pty Ltd [2017] FCA 47 (2 February 2017);(f)O’Sullivan v Barker J & Ors [2017] HCA P38 of 2017 (8 November 2017); (g)O’Sullivan v Barker J & Ors [2018] HCA P62 of 2017 (21 March 2018);(h)O’Sullivan and P & O Maritime Services Pty Ltd [2018] AATA 2899 (15 August 2018); and(i)O’Sullivan and P & O Maritime Services Pty Ltd [2019] AATA 126 (8 February 2019). I adopt the facts set out in paragraphs [8] to [76] in O’Sullivan and P & O Maritime Services Pty Ltd [2019] AATA 126. It is not necessary to recite these facts in full for present purposes. In order to assist understanding, however, I will set out the key facts relevant to the issues I must presently decide. On 16 December 1993, Mr O’Sullivan injured his back in a fall while working as a Greaser on the vessel Lady Dawn in the Company’s employ. The circumstances of the injury are set out in the Incident Report that Mr O’Sullivan completed on the day.[3][3] T15. He was employed under the Award.[4][4] T22, folio 9. It appears Mr O’Sullivan advised the Company that he wanted to claim under the provisions of the Award rather than under the Seafarers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1992 (the SRC Act).[5] There is a dispute about whether Mr O’Sullivan made a valid election for the purposes of s 61 of the SRC Act. I note previous consideration of this issue in O’Sullivan and P & O Maritime Services Pty Ltd,[6] and I adhere to the conclusions reached albeit inconclusively. I do not need to further examine or attempt to resolve this issue for present purposes.[5] T16, T17 and T27 refer.[6] [2018] AATA 2899 at [76]-[87]. From 17 December 1993 to 16 November 1995, the Company paid Mr O’Sullivan weekly benefits for incapacity under the Award. On 19 December 1994, Mr O’Sullivan’s employment with the Company ended. On 16 November 1995, the 100 week payment limit under cl 30 of the Award was reached and the Company’s insurer, American Home Assurance Company, ceased paying Mr O’Sullivan for lost wages. Mr O’Sullivan pursued a common law claim against the Company. On 17 September 1998, O’Sullivan DCJ ruled that Mr O’Sullivan was ‘precluded from instituting or proceeding with a common law action’ as he had made an election to receive benefits under the Award rather than compensation under the SRC Act.[7] [7] CIV 2466 of 1997; Lib No D980258.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Presently, while there may be a question about the scope of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction in respect of s 61 of the SRC Act, about which I expressed a preliminary view in O'Sullivan and P&O Maritime Services Pty Ltd (the first referral decision),[52] there is no doubt about the existence of jurisdiction in respect of Mr O’Sullivan’s substantive application. That application is in respect of a deemed decision, taken to have been made by operation of s 79(6) of the SRC Act for the purposes of s 78 of the SRC Act, denying compensation claimed under ss 26, 28, 31, 43 and 51 of that Act. [52] [2018] AATA 2899 at [78]. I adhere to what I said on this subject in the first referral decision in paragraphs [70] to [77], which I will not reiterate. With these considerations in mind, there are a number of things to say about the matters Mr O’Sullivan has raised for referral to the Federal Court.Power to compel As I understand the first question Mr O’Sullivan has raised, he is seeking to test if, for the purposes of determining his compensation claim of 29 October 2014, he can be compelled under the SRC Act, or regulations made under that Act, to provide information relating to his medical history and employment during periods when he was not in the maritime industry. The terms of the question are broad, hypothetical and imprecise as to the facts on which it is raised. It is not a properly formulated question of law for referral to the Federal Court. Nevertheless, Mr O’Sullivan has, on several occasions in the course of these proceedings, raised matters that illuminate the issue he is attempting to agitate. In particular, these matters relate to the operation of s 67 of the SRC Act and the Company’s power to obtain information from him under that section (or any other section of the SRC Act) relating to ‘time served outside the Maritime industry’. As I understand the issues he is agitating, Mr O’Sullivan asserts that the SRC Act and the power to obtain information under s 67 (or any other provision of this Act) are confined to the ‘Maritime industry’, and purporting to use s 67 to obtain any other information is in excess of the power conferred. He has previously raised a similar issue in relation to s 33(2) of the AAT Act, asserting that the Tribunal’s power to obtain information is subject to the legislation conferring jurisdiction on the Tribunal, in this case the SRC Act. It is necessary to consider the text of each section. Section 67 of the SRC Act is in the following terms:67 Power to request the provision of information relevant to claim(1) Subject to section 69, if an employer who has been given a claim is satisfied that the claimant:(a) has information or a document that is relevant to the claim; or(b) may obtain such information, or such a document or a copy of such a document, without unreasonable expense or inconvenience;the employer may, by written notice given to the claimant, ask the claimant to give to the employer:(c) the information, or the document or a copy of the document; or(d) if paragraph (b) applies—a written authority to obtain the information or the document or a copy of the document.(2) A claimant who has received a notice under subsection (1) is taken to have complied with the notice if the claimant gives the employer the information, the document or a copy of the document, or the authority, referred to in the notice.(3) If a claimant, without reasonable excuse, does not comply with a notice under subsection (1), the employer may refuse to deal with the claim until the claimant gives the employer the information or the document or a copy of the document, or the authority, referred to in the notice.Section 33 of the AAT Act is in the following terms:33 Procedure of Tribunal(1) In a proceeding before the Tribunal:(a) the procedure of the Tribunal is, subject to this Act and the regulations and to any other enactment, within the discretion of the Tribunal;(b) the proceeding shall be conducted with as little formality and technicality, and with as much expedition, as the requirements of this Act and of every other relevant enactment and a proper consideration of the matters before the Tribunal permit; and(c) the Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence but may inform itself on any matter in such manner as it thinks appropriate.Decision‑maker must assist Tribunal(1AA) In a proceeding before the Tribunal for a review of a decision, the person who made the decision must use his or her best endeavours to assist the Tribunal to make its decision in relation to the proceeding.Parties etc. must assist Tribunal(1AB) A party to a proceeding before the Tribunal, and any person representing such a party, must use his or her best endeavours to assist the Tribunal to fulfil the objective in section 2A.Directions hearing(1A) The President or an authorised member may hold a directions hearing in relation to a proceeding.Who may give directions(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), directions as to the procedure to be followed at or in connection with the hearing of a proceeding before the Tribunal may be given:(a) where the hearing of the proceeding has not commenced—by a person holding a directions hearing in relation to the proceeding, by the President, by an authorised member or by an authorised officer; and(b) where the hearing of the proceeding has commenced—by the member presiding at the hearing or by any other member authorized by the member presiding to give such directions.Types of directions(2A) Without limiting the operation of this section, a direction as to the procedure to be followed at or in connection with the hearing of a proceeding before the Tribunal may:(a) require any person who is a party to the proceeding to provide further information in relation to the proceeding; or(b) require the person who made the decision to provide a statement of the grounds on which the application will be resisted at the hearing; or(c) require any person who is a party to the proceeding to provide a statement of matters or contentions upon which reliance is intended to be placed at the hearing; or(d) limit the number of witnesses who may be called to give evidence (either generally or on a specified matter); or(e) require witnesses to give evidence at the same time; or(f) limit the time for giving evidence or making oral submissions; or(g) limit the length of written submissions.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Tribunal, in assessing Mr O’Sullivan’s request for the referral of matters to the Federal Court, first considered the scope of the Tribunal’s power under s 67 of the SRC Act. Mr O’Sullivan sought to challenge the breadth of this power, asserting that it was limited to matters concerning the maritime industry. The Tribunal examined the statutory language of s 67, which does not explicitly confine the employer’s request for information to the maritime industry. Instead, the section broadly allows employers to request relevant information or documents from claimants, subject to certain conditions. This construction of s 67 implies that the power to compel the provision of information is not restricted to maritime-related matters but extends to any information pertinent to a claim.

The Tribunal also considered whether the SRC Act empowers the Tribunal to obtain information outside the maritime industry for the purpose of determining a compensation claim. The statutory text of s 67 does not impose such a limitation, and thus, the Tribunal concluded that the Act permits the collection of relevant information irrespective of the claimant's employment history outside the maritime sector. The Tribunal found no basis in the legislative language to restrict the scope of information that could be requested to matters solely within the maritime industry.

Next, the Tribunal evaluated whether Mr O’Sullivan's request for referral was properly formulated as a question of law arising in the proceeding. The Tribunal noted that Mr O’Sullivan's question was broad and hypothetical, lacking specificity regarding the facts on which it was raised. Despite this, the Tribunal inferred the underlying issue: whether the Tribunal's power under s 67 is confined to maritime-related information. However, the Tribunal held that the question was not properly formulated because it lacked the requisite precision and direct connection to the facts of the case. Therefore, it was not suitable for referral to the Federal Court.

In considering the relevant factors for exercising the Tribunal's discretion to refer a question of law to the Federal Court, the Tribunal reiterated that such referrals are to be made sparingly and only when necessary to ensure the uniformity of the law. The Tribunal emphasized the importance of questions being properly formulated and directly arising from the specific facts of the proceeding. It noted that referrals should not be used to address hypothetical or broad issues but should focus on precise legal questions that impact the case at hand.

The Tribunal then assessed whether the meaning of “question of law arising in a proceeding” encompasses the issues raised by Mr O’Sullivan. The Tribunal concluded that Mr O’Sullivan's issues did not meet the criteria for a question of law arising in the proceeding because they were not sufficiently specific to the facts of the case and were more appropriately addressed within the existing proceedings. The Tribunal found that the issues did not present a clear legal question that warranted referral to the Federal Court for resolution.

Lastly, the Tribunal examined whether its jurisdiction under s 61 of the SRC Act is limited to questions of law arising directly from the substantive application or if it extends to broader jurisdictional issues. The Tribunal determined that while there might be some ambiguity regarding the scope of s 61, it had clear jurisdiction over Mr O’Sullivan’s substantive application. The Tribunal emphasized that its role was to interpret and apply the law to the specific facts of the case, and it did not have the discretion to extend its jurisdiction to broader, hypothetical issues.

In conclusion, the Tribunal refused Mr O’Sullivan's request for referral to the Federal Court, finding that the issues he raised were not properly formulated as questions of law arising in the proceeding. The Tribunal held that its jurisdiction under the SRC Act is not limited to maritime-related matters but extends to any relevant information for determining a compensation claim. The Tribunal also found that the issues raised did not meet the criteria for referral, as they were not sufficiently specific and did not directly arise from the facts of the case.