O'Leary v Oolong Aboriginal Corporation Inc

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NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL

CITATION:      O'LEARY v OOLONG ABORIGINAL CORPORATION INC [2004]  NSWCA 7

FILE NUMBER(S):
41090/02

HEARING DATE(S):               29 September 2003

JUDGMENT DATE: 14/05/2004

PARTIES:
Barry James O'Leary - Appellant
Oolong Aboriginal Corporation Inc - Respondent

JUDGMENT OF:       Spigelman CJ Sheller JA McColl JA   

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: District Court

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):          68/01 (Nowra)

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:     Garling DCJ

COUNSEL:
K P Rewell SC/A R Beardow - Appellant
P J O'Connor - Respondent

SOLICITORS:
Nagle & McGuire - Appellant
A O Ellison & Co - Respondent

CATCHWORDS:
EMPLOYEE - psychiatric illness - conduct of employer resulting in workplace stress - distinction between stress and a recognised psychiatric illness - where employees existing mental disorder known to employer - foreseeability of psychiatric illness - whether far-fetched and fanciful

LEGISLATION CITED:
N/A

DECISION:
Appeal dismissed with costs.

JUDGMENT:

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COURT OF APPEAL

CA 41090/02
DC 68/01 (Nowra)

SPIGELMAN CJ
SHELLER JA
McCOLL JA

O’LEARY v OOLONG ABORIGINAL CORPORATION INCORPORATED

The respondent is a residential drug and rehabilitation centre which specialises in treating members of the Aboriginal community.  The appellant was employed as a bookkeeper by the respondent from 31 December 1983 until January 1999.  In October 1998, the appellant went on leave and a number of changes occurred during, and immediately after, this period.  All books of account were removed from the appellant’s office, his workspace was moved to a verandah area, his computer was taken away and he was no longer allowed to sign cheques.  The respondent offered no explanation for what was happening.  Other employees were aware that the appellant was suspected of misappropriating funds.  The appellant was never confronted by the respondent with this suspicion nor asked for an explanation.  By January 1999, the appellant was no longer able to cope with the situation and resigned.

These events took place in circumstances where the appellant in September 1998, had been diagnosed as suffering from an adult adjustment disorder, required some time off work and had presented the respondent with a medical certificate to this effect.

The appellant commenced proceedings claiming negligence on the part of the respondent in failing to take adequate precautions for his safety at work, resulting in the appellant suffering psychological injury, namely adjustment disorder with depression.

The trial Judge found that the respondent employer owed to the appellant a duty to take reasonable care to avoid injury to the appellant as its employee.  Further, evidence accepted by his Honour demonstrated a breach of that duty.  The central issue was therefore whether damages were recoverable for the harm, namely a major depressive disorder, resulting from the breach. In fact, the trial Judge held that this injury was “far too remote” and that the respondent could not have reasonably foreseen that a possible consequence of its conduct was that the plaintiff would suffer a recognised psychiatric illness.  The trial Judge entered a verdict for the defendant.

The appellant challenged the findings of the trial judge…

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Details
Case
[2004] NSWCA 7
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case concerned an appeal by the appellant, Mr O'Leary, against the Oolong Aboriginal Corporation Inc. The dispute arose from the appellant's claim that the respondent's conduct in the workplace caused him to suffer a recognised psychiatric illness. The appellant alleged that the respondent's actions created a foreseeable risk of psychological injury, and that the respondent breached its duty of care by failing to take reasonable steps to avoid this risk.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the trial judge's conclusion that the risk of the appellant developing a psychiatric condition was foreseeable could be sustained. Specifically, the court considered whether it was necessary for the respondent to have foreseen the *particular* psychiatric disorder that ultimately manifested, or if it was sufficient that a class of injury, namely psychiatric injury, was reasonably foreseeable as a consequence of the respondent's conduct.

The court reasoned that the employer owed a duty of care to the employee to avoid injury. Evidence accepted at trial demonstrated a breach of this duty, and the appellant had indeed suffered a recognised psychiatric illness, initially diagnosed as Adjustment Disorder with Depression and later as Major Depressive Disorder. The court held that the trial judge's approach of seeking to determine whether the respondent ought to have foreseen the *particular* psychiatric condition was erroneous. Applying established principles, the court affirmed that it was sufficient for the respondent to have foreseen the general class of injury, psychiatric injury, as a consequence of its conduct. The court noted that the respondent's conduct was such as to create a foreseeable risk of psychological injury, and that there were reasonably practicable means of avoiding this risk.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

SPIGELMAN CJ
In his oral evidence, Dr McMurdo agreed that in his view the circumstances of the plaintiff’s employment as outlined to him and of which he was aware, “created a foreseeable risk that some form of workplace stress might occur”. He said that there was a strong probability that workplace stress might go on to develop into a form of psychological or psychiatric illness or disorder. Dr McMurdo thought there was little doubt that the circumstances of his employment would be stressful and that given his situation, “the incredible change of his work employment [scil environment] was very likely to precipitate a psychiatric order”. He was saying that as a doctor. Later he was asked:“Doctor, do you believe that the employer, in the circumstances which confronted Mr O’Leary, ought to have foreseen that he would suffer some form of workplace stress”He answered in the affirmative.Reasons for judgment at trial Before examining the reasons for judgment it is important to remember that undeniably the defendant as employer owed to the plaintiff as its employee a duty to take reasonable care to avoid injury to the plaintiff. Judge Garling referred to Mannall v State of New South Wales (2001) NSWCA 327 as authority for that proposition. Further, evidence accepted by his Honour, demonstrated a breach of that duty. The question remained whether damages were recoverable for the harm resulting from that breach diagnosed as a major depressive disorder. The answer to that question depended upon whether such harm was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s breach of duty. Judge Garling said of the medical evidence:“The medical evidence reveals that the plaintiff saw Dr Dipold [in fact it was probably Dr Jameson] on 14 September 1998 regarding his increasing stress at work and his difficulty in coping. He felt depressed and worried, and that is when there was the certificate issued and the diagnosis of adult adjustment reaction.On 4 December 1998 the plaintiff saw the doctor and again says he is having difficulty at work, he cannot cope with the hostile work environment. On 2 January 1999 he was very stressed. 16 January 1999 he cannot face work; he has insomnia and anxiety, some suicidal thoughts.The doctor said that the plaintiff was well adjusted at his work at Oolong House between 1985 and 1998. During 1998 internal problems were increasing and in spite of all his efforts he gradually lost his ability to cope with the pressures of his workplace. This led to an adult adjustment reaction, finally displaying symptoms of depression and preventing him from continuing to work.All those matters are really matters of fact and one then has to turn to the real arguments in this case. It is alleged on behalf of the plaintiff that the defendant knew that the plaintiff was vulnerable to workplace stress. It is alleged that they knew or should have known this because he was a man who had worked for them as a bookkeeper for many years, who when Mr Jessup retired was placed under additional stress because he had to do additional work.They knew that he had seen a doctor in September 1998 and they had the medical certificate. They knew or should have known that by dealing with this matter in the manner they did that they were liable to cause psychological damage to the plaintiff. The way they dealt with it was negligent and there are a lot of other ways it could have been dealt with which would not have resulted in the plaintiff sustaining psychological injury.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: SPIGELMAN CJ

The appellant submitted in reply that the trial judge’s findings of fact had the invincibility required by Abalos v Australian Postal Commission (1990) 171 CLR 167 and Devries v Australian National Railways Commission (1993) 177 CLR 472. He further contended that the manner in which he was treated by the respondent after many years in which he enjoyed its unqualified trust was clearly sufficient to support the trial judge’s finding that there was a “foreseeable risk of psychological injury to the plaintiff.” He submitted that the evidence supported the trial judge’s findings that the respondent harboured the suspicions communicated to Mr Jessup and Ms Diebert while the appellant was still working and believed he was under suspicion.Consideration As Sheller JA says in his judgment there was no doubt that as a result of his experience in the respondent’s workplace the appellant suffered a recognised psychiatric illness. It was first diagnosed in May 2000 as Adjustment Disorder with Depression as defined in DSM IV Classification of Mental Disorders. By 2002 it had become a Major Depressive Disorder precipitated by his experiences at the workplace. The only issue which arises between the parties, as I understand the respondent’s submissions, is whether the trial judge’s conclusion that, in the circumstances, the risk of the appellant developing a psychiatric condition was foreseeable could be sustained. As I have already observed, I do not understand how, absent a cross-appeal, it is open to the respondent to challenge that finding of the trial judge. Had the trial judge’s reasons for judgment ended at his conclusion that “the conduct of the defendant was such as to create a foreseeable risk of psychological injury to the plaintiff” and that there was a reasonably practicable means of avoiding the foreseeable risk of psychological injury, namely the process of discussion referred to in Mr Hughes’ expert evidence, logically a finding for the plaintiff on breach of the employer’s duty of care to the plaintiff employee should have followed. After he reached his conclusion that the conduct of the defendant was such as to create a foreseeable risk of psychological injury to the plaintiff, the trial judge, in my view, embarked upon an entirely irrelevant area of inquiry. He sought to determine whether the respondent ought to have foreseen that the appellant would develop the particular psychiatric condition which was ultimately diagnosed. That was an erroneous approach. It was not necessary that the particular type of disorder that eventuated be reasonably foreseeable. It was sufficient that the class of injury, psychiatric injury, was reasonably foreseeable as a consequence of the defendant’s conduct: Mt Isa Mines Pty Limited v Pusey (1970) 125 CLR 383 per Barwick CJ at 390; at 402 per Windeyer J, at 412-414 per Walsh J; Tame v State of New South Wales, above, at 386 [203] per Gummow and Kirby JJ; New South Wales v Seedsman [2000] NSWCA 119 at [22], [29] per Spigelman CJ (with whom Mason P and Meagher JA agreed); Mannall v State of New South Wales [2001] NSWCA 327 at [60], [66] per Sperling J (with whom Heydon and Ipp JJA agreed).