NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL
CITATION: O'LEARY v OOLONG ABORIGINAL CORPORATION INC [2004] NSWCA 7
FILE NUMBER(S):
41090/02
HEARING DATE(S): 29 September 2003
JUDGMENT DATE: 14/05/2004
PARTIES:
Barry James O'Leary - Appellant
Oolong Aboriginal Corporation Inc - Respondent
JUDGMENT OF: Spigelman CJ Sheller JA McColl JA
LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: District Court
LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S): 68/01 (Nowra)
LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER: Garling DCJ
COUNSEL:
K P Rewell SC/A R Beardow - Appellant
P J O'Connor - Respondent
SOLICITORS:
Nagle & McGuire - Appellant
A O Ellison & Co - Respondent
CATCHWORDS:
EMPLOYEE - psychiatric illness - conduct of employer resulting in workplace stress - distinction between stress and a recognised psychiatric illness - where employees existing mental disorder known to employer - foreseeability of psychiatric illness - whether far-fetched and fanciful
LEGISLATION CITED:
N/A
DECISION:
Appeal dismissed with costs.
JUDGMENT:
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COURT OF APPEAL
CA 41090/02
DC 68/01 (Nowra)SPIGELMAN CJ
SHELLER JA
McCOLL JA
O’LEARY v OOLONG ABORIGINAL CORPORATION INCORPORATED
The respondent is a residential drug and rehabilitation centre which specialises in treating members of the Aboriginal community. The appellant was employed as a bookkeeper by the respondent from 31 December 1983 until January 1999. In October 1998, the appellant went on leave and a number of changes occurred during, and immediately after, this period. All books of account were removed from the appellant’s office, his workspace was moved to a verandah area, his computer was taken away and he was no longer allowed to sign cheques. The respondent offered no explanation for what was happening. Other employees were aware that the appellant was suspected of misappropriating funds. The appellant was never confronted by the respondent with this suspicion nor asked for an explanation. By January 1999, the appellant was no longer able to cope with the situation and resigned.
These events took place in circumstances where the appellant in September 1998, had been diagnosed as suffering from an adult adjustment disorder, required some time off work and had presented the respondent with a medical certificate to this effect.
The appellant commenced proceedings claiming negligence on the part of the respondent in failing to take adequate precautions for his safety at work, resulting in the appellant suffering psychological injury, namely adjustment disorder with depression.
The trial Judge found that the respondent employer owed to the appellant a duty to take reasonable care to avoid injury to the appellant as its employee. Further, evidence accepted by his Honour demonstrated a breach of that duty. The central issue was therefore whether damages were recoverable for the harm, namely a major depressive disorder, resulting from the breach. In fact, the trial Judge held that this injury was “far too remote” and that the respondent could not have reasonably foreseen that a possible consequence of its conduct was that the plaintiff would suffer a recognised psychiatric illness. The trial Judge entered a verdict for the defendant.
The appellant challenged the findings of the trial judge…
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- Case
- [2004] NSWCA 7
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the court was whether the trial judge's conclusion that the risk of the appellant developing a psychiatric condition was foreseeable could be sustained. Specifically, the court considered whether it was necessary for the respondent to have foreseen the *particular* psychiatric disorder that ultimately manifested, or if it was sufficient that a class of injury, namely psychiatric injury, was reasonably foreseeable as a consequence of the respondent's conduct.
The court reasoned that the employer owed a duty of care to the employee to avoid injury. Evidence accepted at trial demonstrated a breach of this duty, and the appellant had indeed suffered a recognised psychiatric illness, initially diagnosed as Adjustment Disorder with Depression and later as Major Depressive Disorder. The court held that the trial judge's approach of seeking to determine whether the respondent ought to have foreseen the *particular* psychiatric condition was erroneous. Applying established principles, the court affirmed that it was sufficient for the respondent to have foreseen the general class of injury, psychiatric injury, as a consequence of its conduct. The court noted that the respondent's conduct was such as to create a foreseeable risk of psychological injury, and that there were reasonably practicable means of avoiding this risk.
The appeal was dismissed with costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
Appeal dismissed with costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: SPIGELMAN CJ
The appellant submitted in reply that the trial judge’s findings of fact had the invincibility required by Abalos v Australian Postal Commission (1990) 171 CLR 167 and Devries v Australian National Railways Commission (1993) 177 CLR 472. He further contended that the manner in which he was treated by the respondent after many years in which he enjoyed its unqualified trust was clearly sufficient to support the trial judge’s finding that there was a “foreseeable risk of psychological injury to the plaintiff.” He submitted that the evidence supported the trial judge’s findings that the respondent harboured the suspicions communicated to Mr Jessup and Ms Diebert while the appellant was still working and believed he was under suspicion.Consideration As Sheller JA says in his judgment there was no doubt that as a result of his experience in the respondent’s workplace the appellant suffered a recognised psychiatric illness. It was first diagnosed in May 2000 as Adjustment Disorder with Depression as defined in DSM IV Classification of Mental Disorders. By 2002 it had become a Major Depressive Disorder precipitated by his experiences at the workplace. The only issue which arises between the parties, as I understand the respondent’s submissions, is whether the trial judge’s conclusion that, in the circumstances, the risk of the appellant developing a psychiatric condition was foreseeable could be sustained. As I have already observed, I do not understand how, absent a cross-appeal, it is open to the respondent to challenge that finding of the trial judge. Had the trial judge’s reasons for judgment ended at his conclusion that “the conduct of the defendant was such as to create a foreseeable risk of psychological injury to the plaintiff” and that there was a reasonably practicable means of avoiding the foreseeable risk of psychological injury, namely the process of discussion referred to in Mr Hughes’ expert evidence, logically a finding for the plaintiff on breach of the employer’s duty of care to the plaintiff employee should have followed. After he reached his conclusion that the conduct of the defendant was such as to create a foreseeable risk of psychological injury to the plaintiff, the trial judge, in my view, embarked upon an entirely irrelevant area of inquiry. He sought to determine whether the respondent ought to have foreseen that the appellant would develop the particular psychiatric condition which was ultimately diagnosed. That was an erroneous approach. It was not necessary that the particular type of disorder that eventuated be reasonably foreseeable. It was sufficient that the class of injury, psychiatric injury, was reasonably foreseeable as a consequence of the defendant’s conduct: Mt Isa Mines Pty Limited v Pusey (1970) 125 CLR 383 per Barwick CJ at 390; at 402 per Windeyer J, at 412-414 per Walsh J; Tame v State of New South Wales, above, at 386 [203] per Gummow and Kirby JJ; New South Wales v Seedsman [2000] NSWCA 119 at [22], [29] per Spigelman CJ (with whom Mason P and Meagher JA agreed); Mannall v State of New South Wales [2001] NSWCA 327 at [60], [66] per Sperling J (with whom Heydon and Ipp JJA agreed).