Nowra Radiology Pty Ltd v Macintosh (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Nowra Radiology Pty Ltd v Macintosh (No 2) [2020] FCA 1743

File number: NSD 2178 of 2018
Judgment of: STEWART J
Date of judgment: 2 December 2020
Catchwords:

EVIDENCE – whether evidence of Calderbank offer inadmissible under s 53B of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – whether offer made by email to the mediator constitutes evidence of anything “said … at a conference conducted by a mediator” – offer held inadmissible

COSTS – where respondent acceded to part of the relief sought without admission of liability and the balance of the relief was subsequently dismissed by consent save as to costs – whether (different) Calderbank offer can be a foundation for indemnity costs when proceeding terminated without a determination on the merits – whether accession to part of the relief amounted to capitulation – whether it can be said that either side would inevitably have succeeded – whether subsequent dismissal of the proceeding by consent should be treated the same as discontinuance with regard to costs – where both parties have incurred substantial sums in costs – no discernible reason why one party or the other should pay costs – each party to bear its own costs

Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 53A, 53B

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 131(2)(h)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 25.14(1)-(2), 26.12(7)

Cases cited:

Bashour v Australian and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2017] FCA 163

Calderbank v Calderbank [1975] 3 All ER 333

Chapman v Luminis Pty Ltd [2003] FCAFC 162

Elevate Brandpartners Ltd v Hammond (No 4) [2020] FCA 421

Forsyth v Sinclair (No 2) [2010] VSCA 195; 28 VR 635

Harcourts WA Pty Ltd v Roy Weston Nominees Pty Ltd (No 6) [2016] FCA 1492

King v Flowers [2014] NSWSC 1266

Nowra Radiology Pty Ltd v Macintosh [2020] FCA 731

Pinot Nominees Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2009] FCA 1508; 181 FCR 392

Re Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs; Ex parte Lai Qin [1997] HCA 6; 186 CLR 622

Rickus v Motor Trades Assn of Australia Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd [2010] FCAFC 16; 265 ALR 112

Taleb v GM Holden Ltd [2011] FCAFC 168; 286 ALR 309

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Corporations and Corporate Insolvency
Number of paragraphs: 54
Date of hearing: 2 December 2020
Counsel for the Applicants: J C Conde
Solicitor for the Applicants: Access Law Group
Counsel for the Respondent: J Mee
Solicitor for the Respondent: Cullen Macleod

ORDERS

NSD 2178 of 2018
BETWEEN:

NOWRA RADIOLOGY PTY LTD (ACN 166 387 980)

First Applicant

NOWRA RADIOLOGY OPERATIONS PTY LTD (ACN 603 000 675)

Second Applicant

JANET ELIZABETH MACINTOSH

Third Applicant

AND:

PETER DOUGLAS MACINTOSH

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

STEWART J

DATE OF ORDER:

2 DECEMBER 2020

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Subject to any previous costs orders, the parties are to bear their own costs in the proceeding.

Note:   Entry of…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 1743
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Nowra Radiology Pty Ltd v Macintosh (No 2) involved a dispute over domain names between the applicants and the respondent. The applicants sought various forms of relief, including the transfer of domain names and monetary compensation. The relief in relation to the domain names was ultimately resolved, and the balance of the relief was dismissed by consent, subject to costs. The central issues in the case were whether evidence of a Calderbank offer made during mediation was inadmissible and whether the applicants should be liable for indemnity costs due to their rejection of a previous Calderbank offer. The court held that the evidence of the Calderbank offer made during mediation was inadmissible under s 53B of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). The court concluded that the email communication conveying the offer was "said" at a conference conducted by a mediator, and therefore, the offer was protected under the statute. The court also found that the Calderbank offer could not form the basis for indemnity costs, as the court could not determine whether the applicants' rejection of the offer was reasonable or unreasonable without knowing the outcome of the case. Consequently, each party was ordered to bear its own costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Subject to any previous costs orders, the parties are to bear their own costs in the proceeding.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The relief in relation to the domain names was resolved in May 2020 after Peter made an open offer to transfer the domain names to the control of the applicants without admission of any liability to do so. As will be seen, although the proceeding continued for the next four or five months, that resolution of the dispute with regard to the domain names provided the basis for the ultimate resolution of the proceeding being that the balance of the relief was dismissed by consent, subject to costs, on 29 September 2020.Additional background It is necessary to set out more background in order to deal with the parties’ submissions with regard to costs. On 27 October 2017, solicitors on behalf of the applicants wrote to the respondent demanding delivery up and transfer of one of the domain names, and asserting that there had been an interruption in service in relation to that domain. It was asserted that arising out of the settlement by which Janet and Peter parted company in relation to the business, the domain name was the property of the business and should have been given up and control transferred at that time. On 9 November 2017, solicitors on behalf Peter replied. By that reply, Peter denied the applicants’ claims to the domain name and asserted that he had registered the domain name, and rightly retained control of it. On 19 July 2018, Janet wrote to Peter, offering to pay him $2,000 for the domain name, although asserting that it was actually the property of the business. She said that if agreement could not be reached with regard to transferring the domain name to the business then proceedings would be commenced. Peter ultimately replied on 31 August 2018. He said that he was considering the offer, that his original expectation would have been a figure closer to $10,000 but that he was willing to compromise, saying that he would find an offer of about $4,500-$5,000 more satisfactory. He also said that Janet might be interested in the “companion” domain name which, he said, was also available. He said that he would favourably consider a lesser figure of $1,000 in relation to that domain name which was the domain that had not been used by the business but nevertheless incorporated its name. I infer that until that time the applicants were unaware of the registration of that domain name or that Peter had control of it. Thereafter, in November 2018, the proceeding was commenced in which the relief identified above was sought. On 30 September 2019, solicitors acting for Peter made an offer “without prejudice save as to costs” to the applicants. The substance of the offer was that Peter would transfer the domain names within 14 days of the execution of a deed of settlement and that he would pay the applicants $25,000, also within 14 days. The offer was said to have been made in accordance with the principles in Calderbank v Calderbank [1975] 3 All ER 333. On 25 October 2019, solicitors for the applicants rejected the offer. They also put a counteroffer, the terms of which are not presently relevant.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Siopis J held that s 53B of the Federal Court Act can be reconciled with s 131(2)(h) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) – which allows a communication or document that is relevant to determining liability for costs to be admissible as an exception to the exclusion of evidence of settlement negotiations – on the basis that the latter section applies to “without prejudice” communications other than those communications which are made during the course of a mediation conference to which s 53B applies: at [30]. On that basis, evidence of the two offers that were made during the course of the mediation was ruled inadmissible: at [31]. In Forsyth v Sinclair (No 2) [2010] VSCA 195; 28 VR 635 at [13]-[15], Neave and Redlich JJA and Habersberger AJA approved the “reconciliation” by Sipois J in Pinot Nominees in relation to analogous provisions, and the Court emphasised the importance of parties being left free at mediation to explore all avenues of settlement without the fear that something said or done will be referred to later without their agreement. See also Harcourts WA Pty Ltd v Roy Weston Nominees Pty Ltd (No 6) [2016] FCA 1492 at [64]-[65] per McKerracher J. Aside from reconciling s 53B with the provision in the Evidence Act, Pinot Nominees is of little assistance for present purposes because it does not establish whether what is “said” in a mediation conference includes something that is written during the course of the conference as opposed to spoken, and it does not establish the scope of the meaning of “at a conference”. In my view, there is no sensible distinction to be made between something that is spoken and something that is written with reference to the underlying purpose of s 53B – which is clearly to promote settlement through parties being able to be candid with each other and the mediator during the mediation of a dispute without fearing that their candour will be held against them if the mediation fails. For example, there is no reason why something that is written down and passed across the table at a mediation conference should not enjoy protection when if it had instead been spoken it would have been protected. The word “said” does not in ordinary meaning necessarily convey something that was spoken. It is common to speak of what was “said” in a letter or other document, for example. On that basis, I conclude that the contents of the email communication of 17 April 2020 which conveyed an offer to settle was something that was “said”. I note that McKerracher J in Harcourts WA at [65] appears to have accepted that an offer conveyed in writing can enjoy the protection of s 53B. There is also no apparent reason why the phrase “at a conference conducted by a mediator” should be narrowly construed. A mediation may be conducted in various ways which frequently include, for example, the furnishing of position papers in writing in advance of an actual mediation “meeting”, the mediator shuttling between the parties including on the telephone or by some other remote means, and the mediation “meeting” being adjourned from time to time with mediation efforts being undertaken in the meanwhile. In my view, the words in question are apt to include correspondence exchanged between the parties or between a party and the mediator which is exchanged “in the course of mediating” the dispute and otherwise for the purpose of the mediation.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The respondent also makes a submission that sits alongside those two principal submissions that I have identified, namely that the applicants rejected the Calderbank offer that was made in September 2019 and thereafter achieved less than what had been offered. On that basis, the respondent says that the applicants should pay the costs thereafter, and on an indemnity basis in accordance with the principles underlying Calderbank offers.Consideration and disposition It is convenient to deal first with the Calderbank offer. In that regard it is to be noted that under the rules of court (rr 25.14(1) and (2)), an offer of compromise that is made by a respondent and not accepted by an applicant gives rise to an entitlement to indemnity costs only if (1) the applicant subsequently obtains a judgment that is less favourable than the terms of the offer or (2) the applicant unreasonably fails to accept the offer and the applicant’s proceeding is dismissed. It is only the latter circumstance that could be thought to apply, except that the proceeding was dismissed only after an undeniably significant part of the relief had been acceded to. In those circumstances it is doubtful that it does apply. Outside of the rules of court, a Calderbank offer will form a basis for indemnity costs if it was unreasonably rejected by the offeree and the offeree ends up worse off than if the offer had been accepted: Taleb v GM Holden Ltd [2011] FCAFC 168; 286 ALR 309 at [48]-[49] per Finn and Bennett JJ. An initial comparison is thus required of the terms of the offer and the outcome achieved by the offeree, in order to determine whether Calderbank principles are enlivened at all, but the outcome may also be central to the reasonableness inquiry: Bashour v Australian and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2017] FCA 163 at [148] per Tracey J. On that basis I need to know what the applicants’ entitlements would otherwise have been. To put it differently, I would need to know the outcome of the case. That is because maybe they were entitled to not only the domain names but also the monetary sums amounting to approximately $66,000 plus interest and costs. If they were, and in view of the costs that they had already incurred by the time that the Calderbank offer was made – in respect of which there is evidence that need not be detailed here, then their rejection of the Calderbank offer was not unreasonable. If, on the other hand, they had no entitlement even to the domain names, then clearly their rejection of the offer was entirely unreasonable. It seems to me, also, that if their entitlement was only to the domain names, which is what they achieved and no more, then the rejection may have been unreasonable. Given that I do not know what the applicants’ entitlements actually were, and for good reason I will not speculate with regard to that, I am simply not in a position to say that the Calderbank principles are enlivened or to judge the unreasonableness or otherwise of the rejection of the Calderbank offer. In the circumstances, the Calderbank offer cannot be the foundation for an order that the applicants be liable for indemnity costs thereafter.