Northern Land Council v Quall

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Northern Land Council v Quall [2019] FCAFC 77

Appeal from: Quall v Northern Land Council [2018] FCA 989
File number: NTD 30 of 2018
Judges: GRIFFITHS, MORTIMER AND WHITE JJ
Date of judgment: 20 May 2019
Catchwords:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – delegation of statutory functions and powers – distinction between authorisation and delegation – the Carltona principle – principles for determining whether a power or function is delegable – effect of delegation

NATIVE TITLE – whether a representative body under the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) is able to delegate its power and function to certify an application for an area Indigenous Land Use Agreement (ILUA) under s 201BE(1)(b) – the process and alternative pathways for registration of an area ILUA – position of representative bodies under the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) – importance of representative body’s duty to promote and protect broad community interests of Aboriginal people who hold or may hold native title and not merely sectional interests – certification function under s 201BE(1)(b) is not delegable

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – interpretation of “necessary and convenient” powers such as s 201BK of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) – such powers strictly ancillary and supplementary to other functions conferred on the statutory repository – scope and operation of a “necessary and convenient” power in a particular context depends on the primary power or function being supplemented

Legislation:

Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 (NSW) ss 36, 243

Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth) ss 4, 21, 21C, 22, 23, 28, 29

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Preservation Act 1984 (Cth) s 31

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) ss 13, 34A, 34AB

Australian Securities Commission Act 1989 (Cth) ss 11, 102

Australian Sports Anti-Doping Authority Act 2006 (Cth) s 20

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)

Corporations Law (NSW) s 597

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 27

Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) ss 24AA, 24AB, 24CA, 24CB, 24CD, 24CE, 24CG, 24CH, 24CL, 24CI, 24CJ, 24CK, 24CL, 24EA, 24EB, 190C, s 199C, 201A, 201B, 202, 203AA, 203AB, 203AD, 203AI, 203B, 203BA, 203BB, 203BD, 203BE, 203BG, 203BH, 203BI, 203BJ, 203BK, 227, 233, 251A, 251B

Native Title Amendment Act 1998 (Cth)

Native Title Amendment Act 2007 (Cth)

Social Services Act 1947 (Cth) ss 12, 14

Housing Act 1980 (UK) s 33

Cases cited:

Anthony Horden & Sons Ltd v Amalgamated Clothing and Allied Trades Union of Australia (1932) 47 CLR 1

Anthony Lagoon Station Pty Ltd v Aboriginal Land Commissioner (1987) 15 FCR 565

Bayly v Municipal Council of Sydney (1927) 28 SR (NSW) 149

Blackpool Corporation v Locker [1948] 1 KB 349

Byrnes v R (1999) 199 CLR 1

Carltona Ltd v Commissioner of Works [1943] 2 All ER 560

Edwards v Santos Limited [2011] HCA 8; 242 CLR 421

Ellis v Central Land Council [2019] FCAFC 1

Ex parte Forster; Re University of Sydney [1963] SR (NSW) 723

George Wimpey & Co Ltd v British Overseas Airways Corp [1955] AC 169

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Details
Case
[2019] FCAFC 77
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Northern Land Council v Quall, the Northern Land Council (NLC) challenged the decision of the Federal Court to dismiss their appeal and allow the cross-appeal by the Northern Territory and the Attorney-General for the Northern Territory. The NLC argued that the Federal Court had erred in concluding that the NLC could not delegate its statutory function to certify an application for registration of an Indigenous Land Use Agreement (ILUA) under section 201BE(1)(b) of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth). The primary issue before the court was whether the NLC could delegate the function of certifying an application for registration of an ILUA to its CEO. The court needed to determine the principles for determining whether a power or function is delegable and whether the certification function under section 201BE(1)(b) of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) was delegable.

The court held that the certification function under section 201BE(1)(b) of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) was not delegable. The court noted that the duty of the representative body is to promote and protect the broad community interests of Aboriginal people who hold or may hold native title, and not merely sectional interests. The court further held that the statutory powers conferred using the language of "necessary or convenient" are generally construed as conferring ancillary powers on a repository, in circumstances where there is a principal function or power (but often a function) whose performance and exercise might need to be supplemented or assisted. The court held that if that is the correct construction of section 203BK(1), then there is no basis to imply a power of delegation, because the nature of an implied power of delegation goes well beyond the ancillary. The court also held that the effect of delegation is to transfer the function to the delegate, and the representative body would no longer be responsible for performing the function.

The court dismissed the appeal and allowed the cross-appeal. The court further held that even if the fresh evidence were admitted as sought in the interlocutory application, an alternative instrument of delegation would be immaterial in providing a basis for the CEO’s action in performing the certification functions where there is no power to delegate in the first place. The court made declaratory orders along the lines of those sought in the notice of cross-appeal. The court noted that although the cross-appellants did not seek costs in the notice of cross-appeal, the respondents sought their costs in the appeal as well as below. The court ordered that there be no costs order in the proceedings in favour of or against the Northern Territory. The court directed the parties to seek to agree the terms of final orders which give effect to these reasons for judgment, as well as costs. If the parties were unable to agree, each should, within four weeks, file and serve an outline of written submissions not to exceed five pages in length in support of their individual position. The terms of the final orders would then be determined on the papers and without a further oral hearing.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Within four weeks hereof, the parties are to file and serve short minutes of final orders, including as to costs, to give effect to these reasons for judgment.

2. If the parties are unable to agree on the short minutes of final orders, each should within that time file and serve an outline of written submissions, not exceeding five pages in length, in support of their individual position.

3. The terms of the final orders will be determined on the papers and without a further oral hearing.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Necessarily, therefore, the appeal must be dismissed. That is because, even if the fresh evidence were admitted as sought in the interlocutory application, an alternative instrument of delegation would be immaterial in providing a basis for the CEO’s action in performing the certification functions where there is no power to delegate in the first place. Conclusion For these reasons, the cross-appeal should be allowed and the appeal dismissed. The appellants’ interlocutory application dated 27 September 2018 seeking leave to adduce further evidence should also be dismissed. Declaratory orders should be made along the lines of those sought in the notice of cross-appeal. It is noted that, although the cross-appellants did not seek costs in the notice of cross-appeal, the respondents sought their costs in the appeal as well as below. It should further be noted that, as a condition of the Territory’s intervention, it was ordered that there be no costs order in the proceedings in favour of or against it. Within four weeks hereof, the parties should seek to agree the terms of final orders which give effect to these reasons for judgment, as well as costs. If they are unable to agree, each should, within that time, file and serve an outline of written submissions not to exceed five pages in length in support of their individual position. The terms of the final orders will then be determined on the papers and without a further oral hearing. I have had the considerable advantage of reading the comprehensive joint reasons of Griffiths and White JJ. I agree with the conclusions their Honours have reached on both the appeal and the cross-appeal, and I agree generally with the reasoning their Honours have adopted, including their Honours’ reasons as to why it is not necessary to determine the issues on the appeal, given the conclusion the Court has reached on the cross-appeal. I wish to emphasise some particular matters which have led me to agree with their Honours’ conclusions regarding the construction of ss 203BK(1) and 203BE(1)(b) of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth).Section 203BK(1) Both the NLC and the Northern Territory relied on s 203BK(1) as the source of the implied power of delegation of the certification function in s 203BE(1)(b). I respectfully agree with the joint reasons at [107] that statutory powers which are conferred using the language of “necessary or convenient” are generally construed as conferring ancillary powers on a repository, in circumstances where there is a principal function or power (but often a function) whose performance and exercise might need to be supplemented or assisted. In context, that is precisely the purpose of s 203BK(1). The provision sits at the end of Pt 11, Div 3 of the NT Act, after all of the specific provisions dealing with each of the functions conferred on a representative body. It sits immediately after s 203BJ, which confers additional functions on representative bodies. The language within the provision is that of “assistance”: see, for example, ss 203BK(2) and 203BK(3). As I note below, the cross-reference to s 203BK in s 203B(3) supports this construction, with a focus on ancillary arrangements and assistance, albeit that the circumstances in which the need for such ancillary and supplemental assistance might arise should be broadly construed. If that be the correct construction of s 203BK(1), then there is no basis to imply a power of delegation, because the nature of an implied power of delegation goes well beyond the ancillary.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

On 13 March 2017, Mr Morrison, in his capacity as CEO of the NLC, signed a certificate to be used in the making of the application for registration of the Kenbi ILUA. The certificate provided (relevantly):Certification of Application for RegistrationThis document is the certification by the Northern Land Council (NLC) of the attached application for registration of the Kenbi Indigenous Land Use Agreement as amended by the Deed of Variation dated 2 February 2017 (the Agreement) relating to areas of land and waters within the area for which the NLC is the representative Aboriginal/Torres Strait Islander body under the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) (the NTA). Certification (s.203BE(1)(b)) NTA (1)Pursuant to paragraph 203BE(1)(b) of the NTA, the NLC hereby certifies the attached application for registration of the Agreement as an indigenous land use agreement. Statement of Opinion (s.203BE(6)(a)) NTA(2)The NLC is of the opinion that the requirements of paragraphs 203BE(5)(a) and (b) of the NTA have been met, namely that:(a)all reasonable efforts have been made to ensure that all persons who hold or may hold native title in relation to land or waters in the area covered by the Agreement have been identified; and(b)all the persons so identified have authorised the making of the Agreement.Reasons for Opinion (s.203BE(6)(b)) NTA(3)The NLC is of the opinion set out in paragraph (2) above for the following reasons:(a)The NLC has undertaken extensive anthropological, archival, historical, archaeological and field research over a period exceeding forty years.(b)This anthropological research has included detailed consideration of the system of traditional laws and customs which operates on the Cox Peninsula encompassing the land and waters in the area covered by the Agreement, including the composition of the traditional land‑owning groups, and the identification of traditional and adopted decision making processes.(c)The NLC has conducted meetings with all identified persons who hold or may hold native title in relation to land or waters in the area covered by the Agreement.(d)All identified persons have authorised the making of the agreement and the execution of the Agreement by the NLC as the native title group pursuant to paragraph 24CD(3)(b) of the NTA. This authorisation was in accordance with a decision‑making process agreed to and adopted by all persons who hold or may hold the common or group rights comprising the native title, in relation to authorising the making of the Agreement or of things of that kind.(Signed)Joe MorrisonCHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICERNorthern Land CouncilDate: [13.3.17](Emphasis in original)Some relevant features of the certificate The following relevant features of the certificate should be noted at this juncture. First, although it is expressly stated in the paragraph numbered (1) that the NLC itself certified the Kenbi ILUA, the certification was in fact done by Mr Morrison in his capacity as CEO and purporting to act as the NLC’s delegate.