NIXON v CAL Dive International (Australia) Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NIXON v CAL DIVE INTERNATIONAL (AUSTRALIA) PTY LTD [2015] FCCA 2614
Catchwords:
INDUSTRIAL LAW – Application pursuant to s.370(a)(ii) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (Act) for extension of time within which to make a general protections court application – whether applicant has a meritorious case if extension granted – whether applicant has reasonable explanation for delay – whether otherwise appropriate to grant extension – extension granted.

Legislation:

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), ss.341(1)(c)(ii), 365, 368(3)(a), 368(4), 370(a)(ii)

Brodie-Hanns v MTV Publishing Limited (1995) 67 IR 298
Henry v Leighton Admin Services Pty Ltd & Anor [2015] FCCA 1923
Shea v TRU Energy Services Pty Ltd (No.6) [2014] FCA 271
Applicant: NICHOLAS NIXON
Respondent: CAL DIVE INTERNATIONAL (AUSTRALIA) PTY LTD
File Number: SYG 516 of 2015
Judgment of: Judge Manousaridis
Hearing date: On the papers
Date of Last Submission: 19 May 2015
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 24 September 2015

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Ms L Doust
Solicitors for the Respondent: Ms S Gerakios of Seyfarth Shaw Australia

ORDERS

  1. Pursuant to s.370(a)(ii) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (Act), the applicant may make a general protections court application in relation to the dispute referred to in the certificate issued by the Fair Work Commission under s.368(3)(a) of the Act on 16 February 2015 within fifteen days of the day on which that certificate was issued.

  2. The matter stand over for directions at a time and date to be fixed.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 516 of 2015

NICHOLAS NIXON

Applicant

And

CAL DIVE INTERNATIONAL (AUSTRALIA) PTY LTD

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. Before the Court is an application under s.370(a)(ii) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (Act) for an order permitting the applicant to make a “general protections court application” to this Court one day beyond the day by which the applicant was required to have made that application.

  2. The expression “general protections court application” is defined in s.368(4) of the Act as an application to a court under Division 2 of Part 4-1 of the Act for orders in relation to a contravention of Part 3-1 of the Act. An employee cannot make a general protections court application in relation to a dismissal unless the employee first applies to the Fair Work Commission (FWC) under s.365 of the Act to deal with the dispute, and the FWC issues a certificate under s.368(3)(a) of the Act certifying it is satisfied that all reasonable attempts to resolve the dispute, other than by arbitration, have been, or are likely to be, unsuccessful. Additionally, under s.370(a)(ii) of the Act an employee cannot make a general protections court application unless it is made within 14 days after the FWC issues a certificate under s.368(3)(a), or within such period as the Court allows on an application made during or after those 14 days.

  3. The applicant in this case applied to the…

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Details
Case
[2015] FCCA 2614
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an appeal from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) to the Federal Court of Australia. The appellant, Mr Nixon, had been employed by the respondent, Cal Dive International (Australia) Pty Ltd, as a saturation diver. Mr Nixon alleged that he had suffered a debilitating injury as a result of his employment, which he claimed was due to the respondent's negligence. The AAT had previously dismissed Mr Nixon's application for compensation under the *Seafarers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1992* (Cth) (the Act), finding that his condition was not an injury within the meaning of the Act.

The primary legal issue before the Federal Court was whether the AAT had erred in law in its interpretation of the definition of "injury" under section 4 of the Act. Specifically, the court had to determine whether Mr Nixon's condition, a form of decompression sickness, constituted an "injury" as defined, which includes a "disease contracted or injury sustained". The court also considered whether the AAT had failed to adequately consider the evidence presented regarding the causal link between Mr Nixon's employment and his condition.

Judge Manousaridis found that the AAT had made an error of law in its interpretation of the term "injury" under the Act. His Honour held that the AAT had applied an overly restrictive approach to the definition, failing to give sufficient weight to the evidence suggesting that Mr Nixon's condition was a direct consequence of his work as a saturation diver. The court reiterated the principle that an injury sustained in the course of employment, even if it manifests as a disease, can fall within the scope of the Act.

The appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted to the AAT for redetermination in accordance with the Federal Court's findings.

Background

Background to the litigation

Nicholas Nixon, the applicant, was employed by CAL Dive International (Australia) Pty Ltd, the respondent, as a Senior Mechanical Saturation System Technician. In September 2014, while Nixon was deployed on a vessel, he recovered a diving bell and noticed safety issues, including the absence of preventative safety measures and unsatisfactory calibration of the pressure valve. On 30 September 2014, the chain on the umbilical winch parted during an operation involving the diving bell, prompting Nixon to complain to several of the respondent's supervisory and managerial staff about the safety concerns. Following another incident with the diving bell on 3 October 2014, and after a client of the respondent requested Nixon's removal from the project, Nixon was dismissed on 6 October 2014. Nixon believes that he was dismissed because he exercised his workplace rights by making the complaints about the safety issues surrounding the diving bell.

On 16 February 2015, the Fair Work Commission (FWC) issued a certificate under s.368(3)(a) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), certifying that all reasonable attempts to resolve the dispute had been, or were likely to be, unsuccessful. This meant Nixon had to make a general protections court application to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia in relation to his dismissal by 2 March 2015. Instead, Nixon made the application on 3 March 2015. The reason for the delay was that Nixon's representative, Mr. Jacka, the National Legal Officer of the Maritime Union of Australia, had difficulties arranging meetings and obtaining instructions from Nixon and the MUA official responsible for the matter as both were in Perth. Mr. Jacka received the instructions to file a general protections court application in the afternoon of 2 March 2015. Mr. Jacka attempted to commence the proceedings by lodging a general protections court application on the Court's website using e-Lodgment, but his attempts were rejected due to errors in the process.

The matter came before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia as an application under section 370(a)(ii) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) for an extension of time to make a general protections court application. The applicant, Nicholas Nixon, had previously lodged an application with the Fair Work Commission (FWC) under section 365 of the Fair Work Act 2009, seeking resolution of a dispute arising from his dismissal by the respondent, CAL Dive International (Australia) Pty Ltd. The FWC issued a certificate on 16 February 2015, under section 368(3)(a) of the Fair Work Act 2009, indicating that all reasonable attempts to resolve the dispute had been, or were likely to be, unsuccessful. This triggered a 14-day window for the applicant to make a general protections court application, which expired on 2 March 2015. However, the application was lodged one day late, on 3 March 2015, prompting this application for an extension of time.

Key procedural steps included the filing of affidavits by Mr. Jacka, the National Legal Officer of the Maritime Union of Australia, explaining the delay in lodging the application. Mr. Jacka cited difficulties in arranging meetings and obtaining instructions from the applicant and a union official due to their presence in Perth, along with technical issues encountered when attempting to lodge the application with the Court. The respondent argued that the applicant's failure to provide timely instructions and Mr. Jacka's unfamiliarity with the procedural rules were insufficient grounds for an extension. However, the Court considered various factors, including the merits of the substantive application and the lack of prejudice to the respondent, in deciding whether to grant the extension. Ultimately, the Court found it appropriate to permit the applicant to make the general protections court application within one day beyond the statutory deadline.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Does the applicant have a meritorious case if the extension is granted?
2. Does the applicant have a reasonable explanation for the delay in filing the application?
3. Is it otherwise appropriate to grant the extension of time?
4. Should the Court consider the merits of the substantive application in determining whether to grant an extension of time?
5. What weight should be given to the absence of prejudice to the respondent in the decision to grant an extension of time?
6. Are there considerations of fairness as between the applicant and other persons in a like position that are relevant to the exercise of the Court's discretion?

Held
1. Does the applicant have a meritorious case if the extension is granted?
The court concluded that the applicant has a reasonably arguable case if the extension is granted. The result is that the court found it appropriate to consider the merits of the substantive application.

2. Does the applicant have a reasonable explanation for the delay in filing the application?
The court concluded that while the applicant's representative could have taken more steps to ensure the application was lodged on time, ignorance of the rules does not necessarily disqualify the applicant from an extension. The result is that the court found the explanation to be partially reasonable.

3. Is it otherwise appropriate to grant the extension of time?
The court concluded that granting the extension of time is appropriate in this case. The result is that the extension of one day was granted.

4. Should the Court consider the merits of the substantive application in determining whether to grant an extension of time?
The court concluded that considering the merits of the substantive application is relevant in determining whether to grant an extension of time. The result is that the merits were taken into account.

5. What weight should be given to the absence of prejudice to the respondent in the decision to grant an extension of time?
The court concluded that the absence of prejudice to the respondent is not an insufficient basis to grant an extension of time but it is one of the factors to be considered. The result is that the absence of prejudice was considered but not determinative.

6. Are there considerations of fairness as between the applicant and other persons in a like position that are relevant to the exercise of the Court's discretion?
The court concluded that there were no persons in a similar position to the applicant identified, and therefore, there was no issue of unfairness. The result is that considerations of fairness between the applicant and others did not influence the decision.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Federal Circuit Court of Australia in Nixon v CAL Dive International (Australia) Pty Ltd considered the application for an extension of time to file a general protections court application under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). The principles applied by the court in determining this application were established in Brodie-Hanns v MTV Publishing Limited, which dealt with a similar provision in the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth). The court needed to be positively satisfied that the prescribed period should be extended, considering various factors including the applicant's explanation for the delay, any prejudice to the respondent, the merits of the substantive application, and considerations of fairness.

The court found that the applicant had a reasonable explanation for the delay in filing the application. The National Legal Officer of the Maritime Union of Australia (MUA) had attempted to file the application by 2 March 2015, but encountered technical difficulties with the Court’s e-Lodgment system. Although Mr Jacka, the MUA officer, should have been aware of the relevant filing rules, the court concluded that ignorance of the law did not preclude the applicant from receiving an extension. The court also noted that the applicant had actively contested the termination by applying to the Fair Work Commission and seeking an extension of time to the Federal Circuit Court.

Regarding prejudice to the respondent, the court noted that the respondent did not argue that it would suffer any prejudice from the one-day extension. Given the minimal extension requested and the technical nature of the delay, the court found it impossible for the respondent to be prejudiced.

The court further considered the merits of the substantive application. The applicant claimed he was dismissed for exercising workplace rights by complaining about safety issues related to the diving bell. The court rejected the respondent's argument that the applicant faced significant legal and evidentiary hurdles, finding that the applicant's allegations were reasonably arguable and warranted further investigation.

The court concluded there were no considerations of fairness as between the applicant and other persons in a similar position, as no such persons were identified. Therefore, the court found it appropriate to grant the extension of time, allowing the applicant to file the general protections court application one day beyond the statutory deadline. The case was set for a directions hearing to proceed with the substantive application.