Nguyen v Minister for Immigration & Anor

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FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NGUYEN v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2006] FMCA 1495
MIGRATION – MRT decision – application for judicial review made outside the time limit – whether time limit applies to void decisions – whether inconsistency with required lawyer’s certificate – whether proper notification on solicitor – application dismissed as incompetent.

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)
Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 (Cth), r.44.15(1), Sch.1 Pt 2 item 1(c)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.5, 5E, 351, 368(1), 368B, 368B(5), 368B(6), 379A(1), 379A(2), 379A(4), 379G(1), 379G(2), 474(1), 476, 476(1), 477, 477(1), 477(2), 483A, 486E, 486F, 486I

Migration Litigation Reform Act 2005 (Cth), Sch.1 cll.28, 41, 42(a)
Migration Litigation Reform Bill 2005
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), reg.1.15A

Doukmak v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2001) 114 FCR 432
Makhu v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 221
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476
SZBVC v Minister for Immigration [2006] FMCA 834
SZEKC v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCA 1065
SZICV v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2006] FMCA 1063
SZIVA v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2006] FMCA 1494
VEAN of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) 133 FCR 570
WACB v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs(2004) 210 ALR 190, (2004) 79 ALJR 94

Applicant: THI PHUONG ANH NGUYEN
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Second Respondent: MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File Number: SYG1841 of 2006
Judgment of: Smith FM
Hearing date: 18 September 2006
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 19 October 2006

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Dr J A Scutt
Solicitors for the Applicant: Scanlans Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms L Gazi
Solicitors for the Respondents: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

  1. The application is dismissed as incompetent. 

  2. The applicant must pay the first respondent’s costs in the sum of $5,000. 

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT
SYDNEY

SYG1841 of 2006

THI PHUONG ANH NGUYEN

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an application filed on 30 June 2006 seeking to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction under s.476(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Migration Act”).  It seeks orders by way of judicial review of a decision of the Migration Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) made on 15 April 2005.  The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate made on 6 March 2003, refusing to grant to the applicant temporary and permanent residence visas sought on spouse grounds. 

  2. The applicant entered Australia in 1999, and applied for the spouse visas on 14 May 2001.  She relied upon her marriage on 4 February 2001 to an Australian citizen, and claimed that their relationship had begun in…

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Details
Case
[2006] FMCA 1495
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case involves Nguyen, the applicant, who seeks judicial review of a decision made by the Migration Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) on 15 April 2005, which affirmed a delegate's decision to refuse her application for temporary and permanent residence visas on spouse grounds. The Tribunal's decision was based on the applicant's failure to meet the requirement of mutual commitment to a shared life as husband and wife. Nguyen filed an application for judicial review under s.476(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) on 30 June 2006, but the application was deemed incompetent by the Court.

The primary legal issue in this case is whether the Federal Court has jurisdiction to review the Tribunal's decision, given the time limit imposed by s.477 of the Migration Act. The applicant argued that there was an inconsistency between the time limit provided by s.477 and the provisions of s.486I, which requires a certificate of reasonable prospects of success for an initiating application for judicial review. The Court held that the definition of "migration decision" under s.5 of the Act includes a decision affected by jurisdictional error, and therefore, the present decision of the Tribunal was a "migration decision" within s.477. The Court also found that the time limit in s.477 was not inconsistent with s.486I, and there was no basis to read down or give no effect to s.477.

The Court dismissed the application as incompetent, as it was filed outside the 84-day limit for seeking an extension under s.477(2) of the Migration Act. The Court ordered that the applicant must pay the first respondent's costs in the sum of $5,000.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

The application is dismissed as incompetent.

2.

The applicant must pay the first respondent’s costs in the sum of $5,000.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The difficulty with the argument is that the new s.477 applies to “an application … in relation to a migration decision …”. As a result of amendments made in the Migration Litigation Reform Act 2005 (Cth), the term “migration decision” is now defined in s.5 to include “a purported privative clause decision”, which is itself defined in s.5E: 5E Meaning of purported privative clause decision (1)In this Act, purported privative clause decision means a decision purportedly made, proposed to be made, or required to be made, under this Act or under a regulation or other instrument made under this Act (whether in purported exercise of a discretion or not), that would be a privative clause decision if there were not: (a)a failure to exercise jurisdiction; or (b)an excess of jurisdiction; in the making of the decision. (2)In this section, decision includes anything listed in subsection 474(3). I have in previous cases, held that this definitional structure has the effect that a decision of the Tribunal which is affected by jurisdictional error is a “migration decision” for the purposes of s.477 (e.g. SZBVC v Minister for Immigration [2006] FMCA 834). The same interpretation has also been taken in the Federal Court, where Cowdroy J concluded: “under the Migration Act as amended, the time limits affect all migration decisions, whether or not affected by jurisdictional error” (see SZEKC v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCA 1065 at [6]). I shall follow my previous opinions. Moreover, this argument cannot help the applicant. If the present decision is not a “migration decision”, then the Court would lack jurisdiction for the more direct reason that the decision would fall outside the statutory jurisdiction defined by s.476(1). I therefore reject the argument that the present decision of the Tribunal was not a decision falling within s.477. As I understood counsel’s argument, it was that there was inconsistency between the time limit provided by s.477 and the provisions of s.486I, which were also introduced by the 2005 amendments. The latter section requires an initiating application for judicial review which is filed by a lawyer to be accompanied by a certificate that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the migration litigation has a reasonable prospect of success. She did not argue that s.477 was inconsistent with any provision of the Commonwealth Constitution. Counsel argued that, as a result of this inconsistency, s.477 should be read down or given no effect. She did not formulate the extent of the reading down, or the circumstances in which the time limit was to be given no effect. At one point in her submissions, I understood her to argue that s.477 should be read with an implicit qualification that the time limit would not apply to any application which was filed with a lawyer’s certificate. At other times, her submissions suggested that the implication of s.486I was that the time limit in s.477(1), or the period for which an extension could be sought and allowed under s.477(2), should expand to permit an applicant’s lawyer such time as was needed to give the certificate as to prospects. Thus it should take into account a reasonable time required in the particular circumstances to obtain documents and transcripts, seek counsel’s opinion, employ interpreters, obtain instructions from non‑English speaking clients, and save funds for the litigation.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

This is an application filed on 30 June 2006 seeking to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction under s.476(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Migration Act”). It seeks orders by way of judicial review of a decision of the Migration Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) made on 15 April 2005. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate made on 6 March 2003, refusing to grant to the applicant temporary and permanent residence visas sought on spouse grounds. The applicant entered Australia in 1999, and applied for the spouse visas on 14 May 2001. She relied upon her marriage on 4 February 2001 to an Australian citizen, and claimed that their relationship had begun in June 2000. She claimed that she had separated from her spouse in September 2002, and that a son had been born on 21 August 2002. The Tribunal affirmed the decision, inter alia, because it was not satisfied that at the date of visa application the applicant and her nominating spouse “have a mutual commitment to a shared life as husband and wife to the exclusion of all others”, as was required by reg.1.15A of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (“the Regulations”). It relied upon evidence that the marriage had been bigamous on the part of the nominator, and that he had pleaded guilty to that offence. He also had made statements that the marriage was fake, that he had not lived with the applicant, and that he had been paid $10,000 by the applicant to sponsor her. Since I have decided that the Court lacks jurisdiction to review the Tribunal’s decision, it is unnecessary for me to give more details of the Tribunal’s reasons. Nor is it necessary for me to examine the numerous grounds of jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal which are asserted in the application which was filed in the Court. Under s.476(1) the Court has “the same original jurisdiction in relation to migration decisions as the High Court has under paragraph 75(v) of the Constitution”, but its powers are confined by s.474(1) if the Tribunal’s decision is a “privative clause decision”. It is such a decision unless I am satisfied that it was affected by jurisdictional error (see Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476). The Court’s jurisdiction is also subject to a time limit under s.477(1), which provides that an application “must be made to the court within 28 days of the actual (as opposed to deemed) notification of the decision”. The Court has under s.477(2) the power to “extend that 28 day period by up to 56 days” if the application for an extension of time is made within 84 days of the actual notification of the decision, and the Court is “satisfied that it is in the interests of the administration of justice to do so”. The Court has no other power to overlook or extend the time limit, and in my opinion all applications which come within s.477, and are brought outside the 84 day limit, are clearly incompetent. There are now numerous decisions in this Court which have so held, including my decisions in SZBVC v Minister for Immigration [2006] FMCA 834 and SZICV v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2006] FMCA 1063. In a reserved judgment which I am delivering at the same time as this judgment, I have further examined the effect of s.477 (see SZIVA v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2006] FMCA 1494 (“SZIVA”)). I propose to apply the opinions I explained in those cases, and shall not repeat my reasoning except where this is required to address specific contentions made by the applicant’s counsel.