Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj [1999] FCA 1806

IMMIGRATION – Immigration Tribunal decided to cancel respondent’s student visa having accidentally failed to consider correspondence from respondent – on discovery of error Tribunal reconsidered the matter and decided in favour of respondent – application to set aside the Tribunal’s second decision – whether Tribunal is functus officio – whether Tribunal may of its own motion reconsider decision

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s 33(1)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 360, 478(1)(b)

Comptroller-General of Customs v Kawasaki Motors (1991) 32 FCR 219, applied

FAC v Aerolineas Argentinas (1997) 76 FCR 582, applied

Jayasinghe v MIMA (1997) 76 FCR 301, dintinguished

Leung v MIMA (1997) 79 FCR 400, applied

London & Clydeside v Aberdeen (1980) 1 WLR 182, applied

Love v Attorney-General (NSW) (1990) 169 CLR 367, considered

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Capitly [1999] FCA 193, considered
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Kurtovic (1990) 21 FCR 193, considered

Ousley v The Queen (1997) 192 CLR 69, considered

R v Hertfordshire County Council; Ex parte Cheung, 26 March 1986, TLR 4 April 1986, applied

R v Kensington and Chelsea Rent Tribunal; Ex parte MacFarlane [1974] 1 WLR 1486

Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40

Sloane v Minister for Immigration Local Government & Ethnic Affairs (1992) 37 FCR 429, considered

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS v
RAJIV BHARDWAJ
NG 1261 of 1998

MADGWICK J
22 DECEMBER 1999
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NG 1261 OF 1998

BETWEEN:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Applicant

AND:

RAJIV BHARDWAJ
Respondent

JUDGE:

MADGWICK J

DATE OF ORDER:

22 DECEMBER 1999

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application is dismissed.

2.The applicant is to pay the respondent’s costs.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NG 1261 OF 1998

BETWEEN:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Applicant

AND:

RAJIV BHARDWAJ
Respondent

JUDGE:

MADGWICK J

DATE:

22 DECEMBER 1999

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

HIS HONOUR

  1. In this matter the applicant Minister seeks judicial review of a decision by the Immigration Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”), made on 22 October 1998, to revoke the cancellation (by a delegate of the Minister) of the student visa of Mr Rajiv Bhardwaj, the respondent.

    A student immigrant apparently lacks diligence

  2. The respondent entered Australia on 4 July 1997, having been granted a student visa.  He enrolled in a Diploma of Information Technology course at Holmesglen Institute of TAFE.  On 25 February 1998 that Institute notified the applicant’s department that the respondent had “[f]ailed to complete [his] nominated course”.

  3. On 23 March 1998 the Australian International College of Business issued a Confirmation of Enrolment form confirming the respondent’s enrolment in a Diploma of Information Technology course at that institution.  On 20 May 1998 the college advised the applicant’s department that the respondent had “completely failed to attend the college”.

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Details
Case
[1999] FCA 1806
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj, the central dispute involved the cancellation of the respondent's student visa by the Immigration Tribunal. The respondent, Bhardwaj, had his visa initially cancelled by the Tribunal but later reinstated after the Tribunal discovered an oversight in its initial decision-making process. The Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs subsequently applied to set aside the Tribunal's second decision, arguing that the Tribunal had become functus officio by virtue of its first decision and thus lacked the authority to reconsider and reverse the initial cancellation. The case was brought before the court to determine whether the Tribunal's power to revoke the visa cancellation was spent following the initial cancellation, and if the Tribunal was precluded from revisiting the matter.

The primary legal issue the court had to address was whether the Immigration Tribunal was functus officio upon affirming the cancellation of Bhardwaj's visa by its first decision, and therefore incapable of revoking the cancellation in its second decision. This required an examination of the relevant statutory provisions and case law to determine whether the Tribunal's power to revoke the visa cancellation was spent by the initial decision, or if it could still be exercised upon discovering an error. The court also needed to consider whether the absence of a "slip rule" in the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), which establishes the Tribunal, impacted the application of the doctrine of functus officio.

The court held that the doctrine of functus officio does apply to the decisions of the Immigration Tribunal. It found that the Tribunal's power to revoke the visa cancellation was not spent by the initial decision, as there was no indication in the relevant legislation that such power could only be exercised once. The court further reasoned that the absence of a "slip rule" in the Act did not preclude the Tribunal from correcting its oversight. Consequently, the Tribunal was not functus officio and had the authority to revoke the visa cancellation in its second decision. The application to set aside the Tribunal's second decision was dismissed, and the respondent was awarded costs.

The final orders of the court were that the application by the Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs to set aside the Tribunal's second decision was dismissed, and the respondent was to be awarded costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application is dismissed.

2. The applicant is to pay the respondent’s costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

MADGWICK J
On 22 October 1998 the Tribunal, constituted by the same member, gave a further decision in which it revoked the cancellation of the respondent’s visa (“the second decision”). The reasons state that:“The Applicant is presently enrolled at the Kookaburra College at Wentworth Avenue and according to the material provided with his submission to the Tribunal, he has been attending his course and he is now engaged full time in a course at an appropriate level with the aim of achieving a diploma in Business Studies.The Tribunal has considered the explanation of the Applicant and believes that the difficulties that he has encountered have related firstly to his enrolment in a course at too high a standard, and secondly, his reliance on advice by his then agent as to what he should do next. The situation was complicated by the fact that the agent withheld the fees that had been paid to him and brought about the cancellation of his enrolment at the Australian International College of Business.…Having considered the matter, the Tribunal believes that the Applicant should be given a further opportunity to demonstrate his commitment to the studies which first brought him to Australia.DECISION For the reasons set out, the Tribunal revokes the cancellation of the Applicant’s visa which was issued to him for the purpose of engaging in studies in Australia.”Functus officio The applicant submits that upon affirming the cancellation of the respondent’s visa by its first decision the Tribunal became functus officio and therefore incapable of revisiting the matter and arriving at its second decision. The applicant claimed, that unlike provisions which may be found in statutes establishing other courts and tribunals, Part 6 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”), which established the Tribunal, contains no “slip rule” to remedy oversights on the part of the Tribunal. The doctrine of functus officio has been held to apply to decisions of the Tribunal: Jayasinghe v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 76 FCR 301 per Goldberg J. That decision was referred to, seemingly without enthusiasm, although it was not disapproved, by Finklestein J (with whose reasons Beaumont J agreed) in Leung v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 79 FCR 400. Finklestein J (and Beaumont J) adopted an analysis of the functus officio principle in relation to administrative tribunals which parallels, although it did not refer to, the approach taken by Gummow J in Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs v Kurtovic (1990) 21 FCR 193 at 211: “But in any given case, a discretionary power reposed by statute in the decision maker may, on a proper construction, be of such a character that it is not exercisable from time to time and it will be spent by the taking of the steps or the making of statements or representations in question, treating them as a substantive exercise of the power. The result is that when the decision maker attempts to resile from his earlier position, he is prevented from doing so not from any doctrine of estoppel, but because his power to do so is spent and the proposed second decision would be ultra vires. The matter is one of interpretation of the statute conferring the particular power in question.”Further, in considering the precise question of functus officio, his Honour referred to s 33(1) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), which provides that:“Where an Act confers a power or imposes a duty, then, unless the contrary intention appears, the power may be exercised and the duty shall be performed from time to time as occasion requires.”Gummow J (at 218) approached the question in the case before him by asking whether there was anything in the subject Act to “[suggest] an intention contrary to the presumption embodied in s 33(1) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901”.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MADGWICK J

Full text does not contain this section.