Sandhu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

Link copied
Case Copied 16 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Sandhu v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 83

MIGRATION – Refugee Review Tribunal refused protection visa without hearing oral evidence of applicant – applicant had expressed desire to give oral evidence but request was overlooked – Tribunal of its own motion reheard application – whether Tribunal empowered to rehear application once determined – whether Tribunal functus officio – Refugee Review Tribunal refused protection visa without hearing oral evidence of applicant – applicant had expressed desire to give evidence but request was overlooked – Tribunal of its own motion reheard application and again refused visa – Tribunal constituted by same person for both decisions – whether in circumstances second decision of Tribunal induced or affected by actual bias.

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 36

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj [1999] FCA 1806 followed
Sun Zhan Qui v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 81 FCR 71 considered
Baljit Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1542
considered

HARPREET KAUR SANDHU v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND
MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

S 65 OF 1999

MANSFIELD J
10 FEBRUARY 2000
ADELAIDE

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

S 65 OF 1999

BETWEEN:

HARPREET KAUR SANDHU
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent

JUDGE:

MANSFIELD J

DATE OF ORDER:

10 FEBRUARY 2000

WHERE MADE:

ADELAIDE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The application is dismissed.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

S 65 OF 1999

BETWEEN:

HARPREET KAUR SANDHU
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent

JUDGE:

MANSFIELD J

DATE:

10 FEBRUARY 2000

PLACE:

ADELAIDE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. This is an application for review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) of 16 July 1999 (“the second Tribunal decision”) affirming a decision of a delegate of the respondent made on 1 May 1997 not to grant to the applicant a protection visa.

  2. It is a criterion for the grant of a protection visa under s 36 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) that she satisfies the respondent, and on review the Tribunal, that she is a person to whom Australia owes protection obligations under the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees done at Geneva on 28 July 1951 as amended by the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees done at New York on 31 January 1967 (“the Convention”).

  3. If the applicant is to be entitled to the visa sought he must qualify as a refugee under Article 1A(2) of the Convention.  She must be a person who:

    “… owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Sandhu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2000] FCA 83
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Sandhu sought review of the second decision of the Migration Review Tribunal, which affirmed the respondent’s decision not to grant her a protection visa. Sandhu claimed she was owed a well-founded fear of persecution if she returned to India because she had been a supporter of the Shiromani Akali Dal, a Sikh political party. The primary issue was whether the Tribunal’s decision was affected by actual bias. The Tribunal had heard the applicant’s case twice, and in the second hearing, it was constituted by the same member who had made the first decision. Sandhu argued that this was a ground for actual bias.

The court held that the Tribunal’s decision was not affected by actual bias. It found that the Tribunal had given detailed reasons for its conclusions and that it had carefully considered the evidence. The court also found that the Tribunal had not acted in a way that would lead a fair-minded observer to conclude that the Tribunal was biased. The court noted that the Tribunal had given the applicant an opportunity to give evidence and that it had considered her claims carefully. The court also found that the Tribunal had not acted in a way that would lead a fair-minded observer to conclude that the Tribunal was biased.

The court dismissed the application for judicial review. The decision of the Tribunal was affirmed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application is dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

If the applicant is to be entitled to the visa sought he must qualify as a refugee under Article 1A(2) of the Convention. She must be a person who:“… owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country …”Background and Claims The applicant is an Indian citizen. She was born on 10 November 1976 and is twenty-three years of age. She was born and brought up in Punjab. She has four sisters and a brother. She arrived in Australia on 27 August 1996 to visit her sister and on 12 November 1996 she lodged an application for a protection visa with the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. The Tribunal first made a decision concerning the applicant on 1 April 1999 (“the first Tribunal decision”). It affirmed the respondent’s decision not to grant to the applicant a protection visa. It did so, without the applicant having attended the hearing or given oral evidence although she had expressed the desire to do so. The Tribunal, as constituted, was not made aware of that desire. The error was realised after the decision was made. The Tribunal therefore sought to rectify that error by hearing the applicant’s case for a second time. The Tribunal which heard and decided the applicant’s case on this second occasion was constituted by the same member who made the first Tribunal decision. It is that circumstance which gives rise to the only ground of review argued on this application. In these circumstances, it is necessary to refer to the applicant’s claims only briefly. Both the applicant and the respondent were content to treat the second Tribunal decision as the valid and operative one. In effect, they accepted that the Tribunal was empowered to withdraw the first Tribunal decision notwithstanding its apparent force. That approach appears to be consistent with the decision of Madgwick J in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj [1999] FCA 1806. That decision determined that the Immigration Review Tribunal could further hear, and redetermine, a decision to cancel a student visa under the Act. That Tribunal had first affirmed the decision of a delegate of the respondent to cancel the student visa. In circumstances like the present, namely the decision had been made without the Tribunal as constituted being aware that the visa holder wished to attend the hearing, the Tribunal reopened its consideration, heard further evidence, and made a fresh decision. In that instance, the later decision revoked the cancellation of the student visa. The Minister sought review of the later decision, arguing (unsuccessfully) that the Tribunal in that case was functus officio after the first decision and could not reopen its review and make a later (and different) decision. No relevant point of difference between the position of the Immigration Review Tribunal and the Tribunal emerges from consideration of the statutory framework in which they respectively function. I accordingly follow the decision of Madgwick J, and acquiesce in the approach the parties urged in relation to the first Tribunal decision.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

MANSFIELD J
In some respects, her claims were confirmed by other witnesses.The Tribunal’s second decision: findings and reasons The Tribunal had difficulty accepting many of the applicant’s claims. It concluded:“The Tribunal does not accept that the applicant was arrested and detained in the manner described or that she was in hiding prior to her departure from India. Further as the Tribunal does not accept that the applicant was detained it does not accept that she was raped whilst she was in detention. There were some significant difficulties with the Applicant’s evidence and the Tribunal did not find her to be a satisfactory or reliable witness.” It also concluded that the applicant was never a messenger for the SSF, although it accepted that the applicant may have been a member and a low level supporter of the SSF. It also accepted that the applicant has worked in an administrative capacity for the ISYF in Australia. The Tribunal gave detailed reasons for those conclusions. It took particular notice of the fact that in her initial application the applicant did not state she had been detained, beaten, raped and went into hiding. As this information was critical to her application, the Tribunal found that she would not have omitted it had it occurred. It also did not accept that the applicant did not go to school during the period she claims to have been in hiding, despite having paid school fees. It also had regard to the fact that the applicant’s initial application made no assertion that the applicant delivered messages for the SSF. The Tribunal also rejected the applicant’s evidence that she was tortured by the police. It noted that the applicant had given three conflicting versions as to when she was tortured, and when she was in hiding. The Tribunal also had regard to the applicant having given inconsistent evidence concerning her family members. First, she said that her parents were detained a couple of times but later she said that her father was frequently arrested and held overnight. Her uncle, during his oral evidence, said that the applicant’s grandfather was detained and tortured in 1991-1992 yet the applicant never mentioned this. The Tribunal also found that the applicant had no difficulty leaving India. It did not accept that she had to pay a bribe. It found that she obtained a visa through the normal channels. It also observed that, since the applicant obtained her visa in 1991, she would have left at an earlier time if she had been in danger and in hiding. The Tribunal also referred to information concerning the state of affairs in India, and in particular Punjab. It accepted that some classes of people are still at risk in the Punjab but found that the applicant did not fall into any of those categories. It took into account the applicant’s current involvement with the ISYF when making this finding. Consequently, the Tribunal affirmed the decision not to grant to the applicant a protection visa.The ground of review The applicant relied only upon s 476(1)(f) of the Act in seeking review of the second Tribunal decision. She sought to establish that the decision was induced or affected by actual bias.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MANSFIELD J