Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs & Anor

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[2021] HCATrans 170

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Melbourne  No M115 of 2020

B e t w e e n -

NARADA NATHANSON

Applicant

and

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

Application for special leave to appeal

KEANE J
GORDON J
EDELMAN J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA BY VIDEO CONNECTION TO BRISBANE AND MELBOURNE

ON FRIDAY, 15 OCTOBER 2021, AT 3.29 PM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

KEANE J:    In accordance with the Court’s protocol when sitting remotely, I will announce the appearances for the parties.

MR C.J. HORAN, QC appears with MR A.ALEKSOV for the applicant.  (instructed by Lawson Bayly)

MR G.R. KENNETT, SC appears with MR A.P.YUILE for the first respondent.(instructed by Sparke Helmore)

KEANE J:   The second respondent has entered a submitting appearance.  Yes, Mr Horan.

MR HORAN:   If your Honours please, this application raises issues about the application of materiality principles to a breach of procedural fairness consisting of a denial of an opportunity to be heard.  The key features of the procedural unfairness are as follows.  First, the delegate had applied a previous ministerial direction and the delegate’s reasons for decision did not address or consider any alleged incidence of family violence.

Secondly, when the matter came to the Tribunal, the Tribunal drew the applicant’s attention to the new ministerial direction but specifically told him that the changes had only minor relevance to his case.  That was principally because the applicant had not been charged, let alone convicted of any crimes against women and children, which was the subject of the relevant addition to the direction.

Thirdly, without prior notice to the applicant, the Tribunal proceeded to rely upon the new provision in Direction No 79 adversely to the applicant.  It did so by considering that the domestic violence incidents could be taken into account as other conduct and that the new direction informed its consideration of how seriously such…..would be regarded.

I should note the Minister had introduced that matter for the first time in closing submissions by submitting that the domestic violence complaints and the interim restraining order should be regarded as serious conduct under the new direction, but it is common ground that that is the first time that the applicant was put on notice that that material might be used in that manner.

Two things are common ground from the proceedings below.  The first is that the Tribunal would not necessarily have reached the same decision if it did not view the domestic violence incidents as very serious conduct.  That was addressed in the court below, at paragraph 47 by Justice Wigney and – I am sorry, I do not have the paragraphs in the majority at hand, but the primary judge made that conclusion at paragraph 28 at application book page 74.

The second thing that was common ground is that it was found by the primary judge, and not challenged before the Full Court, that the…

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Details
Case
[2021] HCATrans 170
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerns an application for special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia, brought by the applicant, Mr Nathanson, against the Minister for Home Affairs. The dispute centres on whether a breach of procedural fairness by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) was material to its decision. The applicant contends that the Tribunal failed to afford him procedural fairness by relying on allegations of domestic violence in its decision without providing him with adequate notice or an opportunity to respond.

The core legal issue before the High Court is the application of materiality principles to a breach of procedural fairness, specifically where the breach consists of a denial of an opportunity to be heard on critical issues. The applicant argues that the Tribunal, after initially downplaying the relevance of new ministerial directions concerning family violence, ultimately relied on these directions and the alleged domestic violence incidents adversely to him, without affording him a proper chance to make submissions or adduce evidence. A key point of contention is whether the applicant was required to demonstrate specific evidence or submissions that might have altered the outcome, or if the denial of the opportunity itself, in the context of the Tribunal's misleading assurances, established materiality.

The applicant's argument posits that the majority of the Full Court erred in finding the breach of procedural fairness to be immaterial. This error, it is submitted, arose from an impermissible speculative counterfactual analysis, requiring the applicant to identify specific evidence or submissions that might have led to a different result. The applicant contends that in cases involving a denial of an opportunity to be heard, particularly where the applicant was misled about the significance of the issue, materiality should be established by ready inference from the fact of the lost opportunity, unless rebutted by other facts. The applicant draws parallels to cases like *Stead v State Government Insurance Commission* and *Degning*, arguing that the Tribunal's conduct, including its initial reassurances and the late introduction of the domestic violence allegations in a new context, meant the applicant was denied a realistic possibility of influencing the decision.

The respondent, the Minister for Home Affairs, submits that the case involves the application of settled principles to a specific set of facts and does not raise a significant issue of principle warranting the High Court's intervention. The respondent argues that the majority in the Full Court correctly applied the principles established in cases such as *SZMTA* and *MZAPC*, which require a determination of whether there was a realistic possibility that the decision would have been different had the breach not occurred. The respondent contends that the specific features of this case, including the applicant's prior awareness of the domestic violence allegations and his cross-examination on the matter, constrained the scope for reasonable conjecture about what might have been said or done differently, necessitating a specific identification of evidence or submissions that could have altered the outcome.

Orders

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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