Nasib Baik Pty Ltd v Sydney Ridelender Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Nasib Baik Pty Ltd v Sydney Ridelender Pty Ltd [2022] FCA 301  

File number: NSD 379 of 2021
Judgment of: MARKOVIC J
Date of judgment: 30 March 2022
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for default judgment pursuant to r 5.23(2)(c) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) – where applicant sought declarations, injunctions and damages for alleged infringement of its trade mark pursuant to s 120 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) (TM Act); misleading or deceptive conduct under the Australian Consumer Law (Sch 2 to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)); and passing off – where respondents took no meaningful part in the proceeding – where respondents in default – where respondents are taken to have admitted infringing conduct – application allowed

DAMAGES – where applicant awarded nominal damages – whether applicant entitled to additional damages pursuant to s 126(2) of the TM Act – where respondents are taken to have admitted they flagrantly engaged in the infringing conduct – where additional damages appropriate – application allowed

Legislation:

Australian Consumer Law (Sch 2 to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)) ss 18, 232, 236

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 21, 23

Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) ss 120, 126

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 5.2, 5.23

Cases cited:

Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (2017) 254 FCR 68

Chamberlain Group Inc v Giant Alarm System Co, Ltd (No 2) [2019] FCA 160

De Brett Seafood Pty Ltd v Qantas Airways Ltd (No 7) [2015] FCA 979

Derrimut Health & Fitness Pty Ltd v Revival 24:7 Gym Pty Ltd (No 2) [2020] FCA 1581

Geneva Laboratories Ltd v Prestige Premium Deals Pty Ltd (No 4) [2016] FCA 867; 120 IPR 133

Hells Angels Motorcycle Corporation (Australia) Pty Ltd v Redbubble Ltd (2019) 140 IPR 172; FCA 355

Take Two Interactive Software, Inc v Anderson [2021] FCA 1024

The Owners of the Steamship “Mediana” v The Owners, Master and Crew of the Lightship “Comet” [1900] AC 113 at 116

Truong Giang Corporation v Quach (2015) 114 IPR 498; [2015] FCA 1097

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Intellectual Property
Sub-area: Trade Marks
Number of paragraphs: 78
Date of hearing: 3 February 2022
Counsel for the Applicant: Angela McDonald
Solicitor for the Applicant: Progressive Legal
Counsel for the Third Respondent: The third respondent appeared in person
Counsel for the Fifth Respondent: The fifth respondent appeared in person

ORDERS

NSD 379 of 2021
BETWEEN:

NASIB BAIK PTY LTD

Applicant

AND:

SYDNEY RIDELENDER PTY LTD

First Respondent

SYDNEY TOWING SERVICE PTY LTD

Second Respondent

GHANZAFAR ALI (and others named in the Schedule)

Third Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

MARKOVIC J

DATE OF ORDER:

30 MARCH 2022

THE COURT DECLARES THAT:

1.By using the sign SYDNEY RIDELENDER in relation to car rental services in the course of trade in Australia without the permission or authority of the applicant, the…

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Details
Case
[2022] FCA 301
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Nasib Baik Pty Ltd v Sydney Ridelender Pty Ltd, the plaintiff sought declarations, injunctions, and damages for alleged infringement of its trade mark, misleading or deceptive conduct under the Australian Consumer Law, and passing off. The defendants, Sydney Ridelender, Sydney Towing, and Mr Ali, failed to engage meaningfully in the proceedings, leading to their default. The primary legal issues before the court were whether Nasib Baik was entitled to default judgment and the quantum of damages and costs to be awarded. The court found that the plaintiff was entitled to default judgment as the defendants had not contested the allegations and had been served with all necessary documents. The court considered the flagrant nature of the infringement and awarded nominal and additional damages, as well as costs. However, the quantum of the costs was referred to a Registrar of the Court for determination to ensure a fair process and to allow the defendants an opportunity to respond.

The court's reasoning was grounded in the discretionary power to enter default judgment, which is exercised cautiously, and the requirement that the applicant be entitled to the relief claimed on the face of the statement of claim. The court noted that the discretion to enter default judgment is not contingent upon intentional or contumelious conduct by the defaulting party, though such factors may influence the decision. The court emphasised that the facts alleged in the statement of claim are taken to have been admitted by the defaulting party. The court also considered the evidence of flagrant infringement in determining the quantum of additional damages. The court concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to the relief sought and ordered nominal and additional damages, as well as costs, with the quantum of the costs to be determined by a Registrar of the Court.

Orders

Orders of the court

6. Pursuant to s 126(1) of the TM Act the first, second, third and fifth respondents, whether by themselves, their directors, employees, servants, agents or others be restrained from infringing Australian Trade Mark Registration No. 1733063.

7. Pursuant to s 232 of the ACL the first, second, third and fifth respondents, whether by themselves, their directors, employees, servants, agents or others be restrained in trade or commerce from using the sign SYDNEY RIDELENDER in relation to car rental services in the course of trade in Australia without the permission or authority of the applicant.

8. The first, second, third and fifth respondents be restrained from operating any website at the domain name containing the name RIDELENDER, including the website at www.sydneyridelender.com.au.

9. The first respondent, within 21 days, is to change its company name to remove any reference to the sign RIDELENDER or any substantially identical or deceptively similar signs including the SYDNEY RIDELENDER sign.

10. The second respondent, within 21 days, is to cancel the business name “SYDNEY RIDELENDER”.

11. The first respondent, within 21 days, is to transfer to the applicant the registration of the domain name www.sydneyridelender.com.au.

12. The first and second respondents, within 21 days, are to delete the Sydney Ridelender Facebook account at https://www.facebook.com/sydney.ridelender.7 and any other social media account in their control containing the name RIDELENDER.

13. If the first and second respondents do not comply with Orders 9 to 12 above, a Registrar of the Court be appointed to sign all necessary documents to change, cancel and/or transfer the company name, business name and domain name referred to in those Orders.

14. The first, second, third and fifth respondents, jointly and severally, pay the applicant nominal damages in the amount of $5,000.

15. The first, second, third and fifth respondents, jointly and severally, pay the applicant additional damages in the amount of $75,000.

16. The first, second, third and fifth respondents are to pay the applicant’s costs of the proceeding on a party and party basis and in a lump sum.

17. The amount payable by the first, second, third and fifth respondents pursuant to Order 16 is referred to a Registrar of the Court for determination.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Despite the Respondents having notice of Nasib Baik’s intention to seek an order that its costs be paid in a lump sum, they have only been served with the first of Mr Taylor’s affidavits. While I am conscious that Nasib Baik does not wish to expend additional resources and costs, given the quantum of costs sought, which is more than the amount assessed by Mr Taylor in his affidavit affirmed on 10 September 2021, I will refer the question of quantification of the costs payable by way of lump sum to a Registrar of this Court. To do so will, among other things, ensure that a process can be followed enabling service of the balance of the evidence relied on by Nasib Baik on the Respondents and, subject to the views of the Registrar, to permit a period of time for the Respondents to respond to the Registrar. CONCLUSION I will make orders in accordance with the orders sought by Nasib Baik in the amended interlocutory application subject to the modifications referred to in these reasons in relation to the quantum of additional damages and the referral of the question of the quantification of the costs of the proceeding to be awarded in a lump sum to a Registrar of the Court.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In Chamberlain Group Inc v Giant Alarm System Co, Ltd (No 2) [2019] FCA 1606 at [13]-[14] Yates J summarised the principles applicable to the power to enter default judgment as follows:13The power to give judgment against a defaulting party is undoubtedly discretionary. The discretion must be exercised cautiously. Where the defaulting party is a respondent to a pleaded claim, the giving of judgment for final relief on the application will deliver complete success to the applicant without investigation of the merits of the pleaded claim: ACOHS Pty Ltd v Ucorp Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 577 at [27]. There is no requirement that the act or acts of default be intentional or amount to contumelious conduct. There is no requirement that the act or acts of default result in inordinate or inexcusable delay. That said, such features, if present, will be relevant to the exercise of the Court’s discretion. So too will conduct that persuades the Court that the defaulting party is manifesting an inability or unwillingness to cooperate with the Court and the other party or parties to the proceeding.14Rule 5.23(2)(c) requires the Court to be satisfied that the applicant is entitled to the relief claimed in the statement of claim. This requirement has been interpreted as meaning that the Court must be satisfied that “on the face of the statement of claim” the applicant is entitled to the relief that is claimed. It is not a requirement that the applicant prove its claim by way of evidence. Put another way, the facts alleged in the statement of claim are taken to have been admitted: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Dataline.Net.Au Pty Ltd [2007] FCAFC 146; 161 FCR 513 at [42]. If, on inspection of the statement of claim, the Court is satisfied that the applicant would be entitled to the relief sought then this requirement of r 5.23(2)(c) will be met: CNIP Pty Ltd v Chan & Naylor Norwest Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] FCA 1170 at [18] – [19]; Speedo Holdings B.V. v Evans (No 2) [2011] FCA 1227 at [23]. The Court may permit further evidence to be adduced, but not evidence that would alter the pleaded case: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Dataline.Net.Au Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 1427; 236 ALR 665 at [45], [48] – [50]; United Broadcasting International Pty Ltd v Turkplus Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] FCA 1413 at [42] – [44]; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Yellow Page Marketing BV (No 2) [2011] FCA 352; 195 FCR 1 at [62] – [63].CONSIDERATION As set out at [25] above, the evidence before me establishes that Sydney Ridelender, Sydney Towing and Mr Ali have each been served with the originating application and the statement of claim and that each of the Respondents has been served with the amended originating application, amended statement of claim and the further amended statement of the claim. In addition, the Respondents have been served with orders made at various times by the Court including the 23 September Orders and the 25 November Orders.