NAPE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NAPE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs

[2003] FCA 1124

MIGRATION – protection visa – application for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal – whether logicality a ground of review – whether failure to give reasons a jurisdictional error – whether the Refugee Review Tribunal failed to afford to the applicants natural justice by failing to draw to their attention adverse country information – whether the Refugee Review Tribunal took into consideration a wrong issue or failed to take into account a relevant consideration – whether the Refugee Review Tribunal did not permit the applicants to explain their case and thereby deny to them natural justice.

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 36(2), s 48A, s 420, s 474(2), s 476

Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 109 FCR 397 cited
High Court in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 applied
Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 followed
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 195 ALR 24 referred to
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2003 [2003] HCA 30 applied
SDAV v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 129 referred to
VAAC v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 74 applied
WACO v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 171 applied
WAEJ v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 188 applied

NAPE & ORS v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
N 557 of 2003

HILL J
21 OCTOBER 2003
SYDNEY

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 557 OF 2003

BETWEEN:

NAPE
FIRST APPLICANT

NAPQ
SECOND APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

HILL J

DATE OF ORDER:

21 OCTOBER 2003

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

  1. The application be dismissed.
  2. The applicants pay the respondent Minister’s costs.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 557 OF 2003

BETWEEN:

NAPE
FIRST APPLICANT

NAPQ
SECOND APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

HILL J

DATE:

21 OCTOBER 2003

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. Before the Court is an application for judicial review under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) made relevant to review of decisions inter alia of the Refugee Review Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’) by the provisions of s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (‘the Act’).

  2. The decision under review is a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal which affirmed the decision of the respondent Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (‘the Minister’) refusing to grant to the female applicant (‘the wife’) a protection visa.  To understand the issues which arise it is necessary to…

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Details
Case
[2003] FCA 1124
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of NAPE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs involved the wife and husband who applied for a review of a decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT). The applicants, originally from Fiji, argued that they faced persecution upon return due to threats and harassment from indigenous Fijians, primarily because of their Indian ethnicity. The wife alleged personal threats and harassment, while the husband claimed business-related threats and interference by local authorities. The central legal issue was whether the wife had a well-founded fear of persecution if returned to Fiji, particularly due to racial reasons, and if this fear was substantiated by the evidence provided.

The court examined the submissions and evidence presented to the RRT. It noted that the RRT seemed to have focused on the husband's business issues, which were not based on race, rather than the wife's claims of racial persecution. The court concluded that while the RRT's approach might have been flawed, the applicants had not demonstrated any jurisdictional error by the Tribunal. The court also found that the RRT appropriately considered the forced sale of the husband’s father’s business, concluding it was not a free and voluntary transaction, but this was not a relevant consideration for the wife’s refugee claim as it pertained to business issues, not racial persecution.

The court ultimately determined that the applicants failed to prove any jurisdictional error by the RRT. Since both applicants had admitted in their respective applications that they had no legitimate refugee claims, the court upheld the RRT's decision. The application for judicial review was dismissed, and the applicants were ordered to pay the Minister's costs. This decision underscores the importance of the evidence and its relevance to the specific grounds of fear of persecution, as articulated in refugee law.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicants pay the respondent Minister’s costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

HILL J
It was the wife’s case, in the application she made in her own right in August 2001, that since the time of the coup in Fiji she had received many threatening calls from indigenous Fijians. She had been ‘physically (sic) sworn and pushed around at together with my husband in towns’ and that the door of her home had been forced while she was alone but those who did that had been frightened away by a neighbour and that her husband had been nearly killed and harassed by the military after the coup. The fear of persecution she claimed to have was said to have been for racial reasons because she and her husband were Indian. She claimed that the police made a mockery of the threatening calls and that because she and her husband were Indians they were not taken seriously. She claimed that she feared for her life and that of her husband and son if she were to be returned to Fiji. Indeed she claimed that it was the authorities of Fiji who were encouraging or promoting violence and persecution against her and for that reason they would not come to her assistance. She claimed that she had to flee Fiji leaving a young child behind and presumably still in Fiji. The Tribunal’s decision The Tribunal set out in its reasons the claims not only which the wife had made in her application but those which the husband had made in his. It set out also in some detail the evidence which the husband had given. No doubt it was only possible to understand the wife’s claim in the context of the facts which the husband recounted. On one view of the matter the wife’s admission in the husband’s application that she had no claim of her own to be a refugee when coupled with the husband’s admission in the wife’s application that he had no claim to be a refugee might be thought to be determinative in a practical, if not a legal sense. However, the admissions were not referred to at all by the Tribunal. Be that as it may one thing is clear. The issue before the Tribunal was not whether the husband was a refugee. It was solely whether the wife was. The only relevance any persecution of the husband might have could be if that persecution created fear of persecution in the wife or objectively contributed to a well-founded fear of persecution in the wife. It is far from clear to me that the Tribunal understood this. Indeed it appears to have proceeded largely on a consideration of whether the husband had a well-founded fear of persecution. The problem was not raised before me by either party and in the circumstance I would not place weight upon the apparent failure of the Tribunal to consider the real issue before it. It was the husband’s evidence that he had been manager and director of a fishing company. His father had the fishing licence and many local investors had contributed the funds to finance the operation. He claimed that local chiefs wanted a share of the business and in particular that one of the chiefs, Ratu Mara, had intervened to stop the company from operating in order, presumably, to cause the company’s business to be transferred to him.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: HILL J

With respect to what is thereafter said on behalf of the applicants in a written submission this does not at all signify that the race issue did not emerge in the hearing. Nor does it signify that the Tribunal failed to give any consideration to the question whether any fear of persecution the applicants might have arose because of race. The problem for the applicants is that the Tribunal formed the view, and on the oral evidence which the husband gave, that the husband’s problems were commercial and did not arise on grounds of race. That was a conclusion open to the Tribunal on the evidence. The Tribunal’s conclusions are stated in the passage set out in paragraph [32] above. Submission 8 – Failure to take into account a relevant consideration. The submission made is that the Tribunal failed to take into account as a relevant consideration, namely, the fact that the husband’s father was forced to sell the business or his share in it and that this was not a free and voluntary sale. Reference has already been made to the significance of the sale as the Tribunal saw it. In that context the fact that the sale was forced was not a directly relevant matter. What the Tribunal saw as relevant was that the business no longer was owned by the applicants and their family and in the result there was no longer any reason for the husband and through him, the wife, to fear persecution. In my view there was no failure on the part of the Tribunal to take into account the forced sale by the father.Submission 9 – Misapplication of the test or misinformation about the test. In the course of the proceedings the Tribunal said:‘The question is whether that is a conventional motivation in relation to meet yourself. That is to say, they are not saying well there’s Mr (husband’s name) I want to harm him because I don’t like Mr (husband’s name), they are saying this is something I want to get for myself, and if Mr (husband’s name) gets in the way then we are going to deal with him. It’s a question of motivation and I have to go away and think about that and see how that hangs together… This passage, which can’t be read in isolation, was part of the musings of the Tribunal member as to the issue he had to resolve, namely whether the harm the husband feared arose for a Convention reason, that is to say, on account of race, or whether it was business motivated. Reading the transcript as a whole there can be no case advanced either that the Tribunal failed to apply the correct test as to who was a refugee, or misinformed the applicants as to what the test he was required to apply really was. No jurisdictional error is demonstrated.Conclusion. The applicants have not succeeded in showing any jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal. As each had admitted in the other’s application that he or she had no claim to be a refugee it is perhaps not surprising that the Tribunal reached the same result. The application must be dismissed with costs.