Nalbandian v Commonwealth of Australia

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Nalbandian v Commonwealth of Australia [2017] FCA 45

Appeal from:

Nalbandian v Commonwealth of Australia (Australian Bureau of Statistics) [2016] FCCA 1605

Nalbandian v Commonwealth of Australia (Australian Bureau of Statistics) (No. 2) [2016] FCCA 1606

File number: NSD 1094 of 2016
Judge: BURLEY J
Date of judgment: 3 February 2017
Catchwords:

INDUSTRIAL LAW – whether deed of agreement is binding – whether applicant was under a special disability or economic duress – whether applicant was a false witness, was willing to manufacture evidence and exaggerated his state of mind

COSTS – whether costs order under Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 570 is appropriate – whether institution and conduct of proceedings was vexatious and without reasonable cause

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – whether application for leave to appeal necessary where orders of primary judge dispositive of substantive rights of the parties – appeal by way of rehearing – position of appellate court in deciding questions of fact and credibility

Legislation:

Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth)

Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth)

DisabilityDiscrimination Act 1992 (Cth)

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 340, 570

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24

Work, Health and Safety Act 2011 (Cth) s 19

Cases cited:

Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited v Karam [2005] NSWCA 344; (2005) 64 NSWLR 149

Blomley v Ryan [1956] HCA 81; (1956) 99 CLR 362

CDJ v VAJ [1998] HCA 67; (1998) 197 CLR 172

Crescendo Management Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1988) 19 NSWLR 40

Cubillo v Commonwealth of Australia [2001] FCA 1213; (2001) 112 FCR 455

Biogen Inc v Medeva PLC [1996] UKHL 18; [1997] RPC 1

Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio [1983] HCA 14; (1983) 151 CLR 447

Fox v Percy [2003] HCA 22; (2003) 214 CLR 118

Kakavas v Crown Melbourne Limited [2013] HCA 25; (2013) 250 CLR 392

Nalbandian v Commonwealth of Australia (Australian Bureau of Statistics) [2015] FCCA 2094

Nalbandian v Commonwealth of Australia (Australian Bureau of Statistics) [2016] FCCA 1605

Nalbandian v Commonwealth of Australia (Australian Bureau of Statistics) (No. 2) [2016] FCCA 1606

Trustee for the MTGI Trust v Johnston (No 2) [2016] FCAFC 190

Warren v Coombes [1979] HCA 9; (1979) 142 CLR 531

Western Australia v Ward [2002] HCA 28; (2002) 213 CLR 1

Date of hearing: 9 December 2016
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Employment and Industrial Relations
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 100
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr A Duc
Solicitor for the Applicant: Duc Legal
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr Y Shariff with Mr T Kane
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitors

ORDERS

NSD 1094 of 2016
BETWEEN:

ANTHONY NALBANDIAN

Applicant

AND:

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
(AUSTRALIAN BUREAU OF STATISTICS)

Respondent

JUDGE:

BURLEY J

DATE OF ORDER:

3 FEBRUARY 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.

Note:   Entry of orders is…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 45
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, Mr Nalbandian, sought to appeal decisions of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia concerning the binding nature of a Deed of Release entered into with the Commonwealth of Australia. The Deed was executed following a conciliation process under the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth). The primary issues in the appeal were whether the applicant was under a special disability or economic duress at the time he executed the Deed, and whether he was a false witness who was willing to manufacture evidence. Additionally, the court considered whether an order for costs under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) was appropriate given the institution and conduct of the proceedings.

The Federal Circuit Court held that the applicant's claims concerning special disability and economic duress were unfounded. The court found that it was open to the primary judge to conclude that the applicant was not a credible witness and that he grossly exaggerated his state of mind. The appellate court observed that the primary judge had before him the evidence forming the basis for the chronology of events, as well as the applicant's cross-examination. Given these matters, the court found no basis to conclude that the primary judge's findings were "glaringly improbable." Furthermore, the court found that the applicant's case concerning the costs order was not substantiated. The court held that the applicant's proceedings were vexatious and without reasonable cause.

The appeal was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs. The court found that the primary judge's orders were dispositive of the substantive rights of the parties and, therefore, leave to appeal was unnecessary. The appellate court considered the appeal on its merits and found no merit in the grounds of appeal. The court concluded that the applicant's claims were not supported by the evidence and that the primary judge's findings were properly open to him. The appeal was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Grounds 1 – 8 and 11 concern the first decision and grounds 9 and 10 concern the second decision. Pro bono counsel for the applicant, Mr Duc, accepted during argument that grounds 9 and 10 will stand or fall on the success or failure of grounds 1 through to 8. He abandoned reliance on ground 11.5. BACKGROUND FACTS A significant body of evidence underlay the briefly expressed reasons of the primary judge. In order to address the grounds of appeal, it is convenient to set out a chronology of the relevant facts which were before the primary judge and which were not in dispute on appeal. On 10 April 2010, the applicant commenced working at the Australian Bureau of Statistics. On 31 January 2014, the applicant was issued with a written warning about unsatisfactory work performance. A performance assessment process was then commenced. On 24 March 2014, the applicant filed an application in the Fair Work Commission for an order to stop bullying (first FWC application). The performance assessment process was deferred pending the outcome of the first FWC application. On 31 October 2014, the Fair Work Commission dismissed the first FWC application. The applicant then appealed that decision to the Full Bench of the Fair Work Commission. In the meantime, the performance assessment process resumed. On 11 November 2014, the applicant lodged a complaint to Comcare alleging that the respondent had breached its primary duty of care under s 19 of the Work, Health and Safety Act 2011 (Cth). On 20 January 2015, the Full Bench of the Fair Work Commission heard the appeal lodged by the applicant and reserved its decision. On 2 February 2015, the applicant was informed that an interim report in relation to his performance assessment had been prepared and that the applicant had not attained the required standard of work performance. On 24 February 2015, the respondent informed the applicant that his employment was being considered for termination. On or about 27 February 2015, the applicant was informed by Comcare that it did not consider that the respondent had acted in breach of its duty of care. On 4 March 2015, the applicant lodged a second application with the Fair Work Commission (second FWC application), alleging that the respondent had contravened the general protections provisions of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). On 5 March 2015, the applicant lodged a complaint with the Australian Human Rights Commission alleging that the respondent had contravened the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth), the Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth) and the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth). On 18 March 2015, Ms Annette van Gent, a solicitor working for the Marrickville Legal Centre, began representing the applicant. The applicant discontinued the second FWC application. On 20 March 2015, the respondent informed Ms van Gent that a final decision would be made about what action to take in respect of the applicant’s under performance after 2.00 pm on 25 March 2015.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Accordingly, this ground of appeal should be dismissed.8.4 Ground 6 – error in finding that the applicant was willing to manufacture evidence in the witness box In this ground, the applicant contends that the primary judge fell into error in finding that he was not a witness of truth and that he was willing to manufacture evidence in the witness box if he thought it would assist him. The applicant’s written submission asserts that this conclusion was “not open on the evidence” because the primary judge did not identify where the evidence was manufactured or how the evidence before the court could lead to that conclusion. I am unable to accept that submission. For the reasons advanced in relation to grounds 1, 2, 5 and 8 above in my view it was open to the primary judge to conclude that the applicant was not a witness of truth. This ground of appeal is dismissed. 8.5 Ground 7 – error in finding that the applicant grossly exaggerated his state of mind In ground 7 the applicant contends that the primary judge erred in finding in [8] that he grossly exaggerated his state of mind, the circumstances of his admission and discharge from hospital, and the alleged impact of his medication and otherwise failed to take into account “relevant considerations”. In submissions, the applicant asserted that the primary judge failed to take into account the fact that he had sought medical assistance from his doctor and obtained medical reports on 22 December 2014, 16 January 2015 and 27 February 2015, and again on 7 March 2015. In the last of these the doctor recorded that the applicant was in a heightened state of distress with most prominent symptoms of insomnia, hypertension and depression. It was, the applicant submitted, against that background that the applicant had participated in a telephone conference with the Australian Human Rights Commission on 25 March 2015. The proceedings had deeply distressed the applicant and on 26 March 2016, he had called Beyond Blue, the NSW Police had attended his house, and he was transported to the Royal North Shore Hospital and presented with “suicidal ideation”. The applicant submits that the primary judge made an error of fact and that it was glaringly improbable that the applicant was “grossly exaggerating” his medical condition. A primary factual contest before the primary judge was the applicant’s state of mind at the time that he executed the Deed. The primary judge had before him the evidence which forms the basis for the chronology of events to which I have referred above and he also observed the cross-examination of the applicant. In light of those matters, it was open to the primary judge to make a finding as to the applicant’s state of mind at the time that he executed the Deed. Having considered each of those matters, including the transcript of the cross-examination of Mr Nalbandian, I can see no basis upon which one might draw the conclusion that the findings of the primary judge were “glaringly improbable”. No matters that the applicant draws to the attention to the Court in this application suggest otherwise.8.6 Conclusion in relation to the First Decision

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 30 June 2016, the primary judge delivered judgment and orders on the cross-claim and in respect of costs; Nalbandian v Commonwealth of Australia (Australian Bureau of Statistics) (No. 2) [2016] FCCA 1606 (second decision). The orders made by the Court on that occasion were as follows:(1) Judgment for the respondent against the applicant on the cross claim.(2) The applicant to pay the respondent $28,541.00.(3)The applicant to pay the costs of the respondent fixed in the amount of $35,000.00.2. THE PRESENT PROCEEDINGS The present proceedings are framed as an application for leave to appeal and, if leave is allowed, an appeal from each decision of the FCCA. Leave is said to be required because the separate question did not determine the entirety of the proceeding. The hearing was conducted on the basis that the application for leave to appeal and the appeal would be heard and determined at the same time. The orders made by the primary judge dispose of the entirety of the applicant’s claim and the respondent’s cross-claim. It was plainly dispositive of the substantive rights of the parties and is not properly characterised as an interlocutory decision; Cubillo v Commonwealth of Australia [2001] FCA 1213; (2001) 112 FCR 455 at [182]. In my view, leave to appeal is unnecessary given the nature of the orders that have been made. Accordingly, I proceed to consider the substantive appeal below.3. THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE FCCA The separate question for determination at the hearing was whether the Deed is binding on the applicant. The pleaded case advanced by the applicant in relation to whether the Deed is binding, was set out in the points of claim as follows:G. Avoidance of the Deed of Release1.The Deed of Release entered into by the Applicant following the Human Rights conciliation should be set aside.2.The Deed was entered into while Mr Nalbandian was suffering from a mental disability, he was in hospital after the Police attended after a call he made to Beyond Blue.3.The Applicant signed the Deed under economic pressure and pressure from the Respondent and the Human Rights conciliator. He felt he had no choice and had to capitulate.4.The state of mind the Applicant was in is demonstrated by him witnessing the Deed in another person’s name.5.The Deed should be avoided and Mr Nalbandian allowed to continue the proceedings. At the hearing before the FCCA, at the request of the respondent, counsel for the applicant provided clarification that he advanced no case to the effect that he was legally incompetent at the time that he entered the Deed. Rather, his case was that it would be unconscionable for the Commonwealth to enforce the terms of the Deed because the applicant had a “special disability” of which the Commonwealth was sufficiently aware such that by entering into the Deed, the Commonwealth was acting unconscionably. The concession concerning legal incompetence was important, because the respondent had medical evidence concerning the applicant that he would have tendered had mental incompetence been an issue.4. THE GROUNDS OF APPEAL

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established