NACO v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NACO v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 474

MIGRATION – application for review of a decision of a delegate of the Minister to refuse to consider an application for a Subclass 831 (Prospective Marriage Spouse) visa – Notice of Objection to Competency lodged by Minister – applicant failed to meet requirements of subclause 832.211(3) of Schedule 2 to Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) – proceedings doomed to failure

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Minister’s delegate determined that an application for a Subclass 831 (Prospective Marriage Spouse) visa was invalid and hence could not be considered – whether delegate’s decision was a “decision of an administrative character” – whether the decision was subject to review under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) – whether the decision was a “privative clause decision” under s 474(2) Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – decision was a decision which the delegate was required to reach by operation of law

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 46(1)(d), 47(3), 47(4), 48, 48(1), 76, 474(1), 474(2), 476
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) s 3, 5
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) Reg 2.12, Schedule 2 subclause 832.211(3)

Federal Court Rules Order 20 rule 2

Sandery v Commissionerof Police (1986) 65 ALR 181 referred to
Whim Creek Consolidated NL v Colgan (1991) 103 ALR 204 referred to
R v Hickman; Ex Parte Fox and Clinton (1945) 70 CLR 598 cited

NAAX v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 263 referred to
Ratumaiwai v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 311 referred to

NACO v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

N 1572 OF 2001

HELY J
19 APRIL 2002
SYDNEY

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 1572 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

NACO
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

HELY J

DATE OF ORDER:

19 APRIL 2002

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The application be dismissed with costs.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 1572 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

NACO
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

HELY J

DATE:

19 APRIL 2002

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The applicant was born on 12 March 1968.  He first arrived in Australia on a visitors visa on 12 February 1997, when he was 28 years of age.

  2. On 11 February 1998 the applicant applied for a Family (Residence) Class AO visa.  The application was refused by the Minister’s delegate on 14 August 1998.  On 6 November 1998 the Migration Internal Review Office affirmed the primary decision.

  3. On 19 November 2001 the applicant lodged another application for a Special Eligibility (Residence) Class AO visa.  There are two Subclasses for a Class AO visa, namely Subclass 831 (Prospective Marriage Spouse) and Subclass 832 (Close Ties).  The application was with respect to…

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Details
Case
[2002] FCA 474
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of NACO v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the dispute involved the legal challenge of a decision made under the Migration Act. The applicant, NACO, sought to review the decision of the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, arguing that it was beyond the scope of the statutory authority. The case was heard in the Federal Court of Australia, which had to determine whether the decision was reviewable under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (ADJR Act).

The primary legal issues revolved around the nature of the decision made by the Minister’s delegate and whether it constituted a privative clause decision under s 474(2) of the Migration Act. This section prevents such decisions from being challenged in court, except under specific exceptions. The court needed to decide if the decision was genuinely an exercise of statutory power, related to the subject matter of the legislation, and reasonably capable of being referred to the power given to the body. If the decision was found to be within the exceptions to the privative clause, it would be subject to judicial review under the ADJR Act.

The Federal Court concluded that the decision in question was indeed a privative clause decision, as it was an administrative decision under the Migration Act. However, the court noted that while such decisions are generally not subject to review, they may still be reviewed under the principles established in R v Hickman; Ex Parte Fox and Clinton. The court found that the decision was a bona fide attempt to exercise statutory power, related to the subject matter of the legislation, and was reasonably capable of being referred to the power given to the Minister. Given that the decision was required by law, the court held that any application for mandamus or judicial review would inevitably fail.

The court dismissed the application with costs, reinforcing that the decision was final and conclusive under s 474(1) of the Migration Act, barring any form of challenge, appeal, or review. The judgment emphasized that the decision fell within the scope of the privative clause and was not subject to review under the ADJR Act, barring exceptional circumstances not present in this case.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

HELY J
If I were wrong in the views which I have so far expressed, and the letter of 22 November 2001 incorporated or reflected a decision of an administrative character made under the Migration Act, then the decision is a privative clause decision in terms of s 474(2) of the Migration Act, as it is a decision of an administrative character made under that Act (whether in the exercise of a discretion or not) and the exceptions to that notion are of no current relevance. On this basis ADJR Act review would not be available having regard to the provisions of clause (da) of Schedule 1 to the ADJR Act. Section 474(1) of the Migration Act provides that a private clause decision is final and conclusive and must not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called in question in any court and is not subject to prohibition, mandamus, injunction, declaration or certiorari in any court on any account. However, notwithstanding the provisions of s 474(1) a decision will be reviewable in accordance with what have come to be known as the Hickman principles: R v Hickman; Ex Parte Fox and Clinton (1945) 70 CLR 598, 614-615, 616, ie the decision will not be invalidated on the ground that the body concerned has not conformed to the requirements governing its proceedings or the exercise of its authority, or has not confined its acts within the limits laid down by the instrument giving it authority, provided that:·the decision is a bona fide attempt to exercise the statutory power;·the decision relates to the subject matter of the legislation; and·the decision is reasonably capable of reference to the power given to the body.See generally NAAX v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 263 (Gyles J) and Ratumaiwai v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 311 (Hill J). Accordingly, on this basis the Court would have jurisdiction under s 39B of the Judiciary Act, but only if the challenge to the decision is within one of the exceptions to the operation of a privative clause recognised by the Hickman principles. Some of the grounds on which review is sought attempt to bring the present case within those principles. However, if the Minister’s delegate made a decision, it was a decision which he was required to reach by operation of law. Any application for mandamus or judicial review in those circumstances is bound to failure. The application should be dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: HELY J

Full text does not contain this section.