Nguyen v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Nguyen v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCA 1424

File number: NSD 838 of 2024
Judgment of: LEE J
Date of judgment: 6 December 2024
Catchwords: MIGRATION – whether a visa application withdrawal was submitted “by” the applicant – whether the Department of Home Affairs was wrong to accept that the applicant’s visa application was validly withdrawn pursuant to s 49(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where the operation and application of ss 47 and 49 of the Migration Act considered – where the issue of whether the visa application was validly withdrawn approached as an objective fact-finding exercise – where the applicant bore the onus of establishing its case on the balance of probabilities pursuant to s 140(1) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) – where the applicant fell “very short” of establishing the visa application was not submitted by him – application dismissed

Legislation:

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 140

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 47, 49

Cases cited:

Axon v Axon (1937) 59 CLR 395

Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336

Gillera v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 1396

Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298

Mealey v Power [2015] NSWSC 1678

NACO v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 474

Nguyen v Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia [2024] FCA 471

Transport Workers’ Union of Australia v Qantas Airways Ltd [2021] FCA 873; (2021) 308 IR 244

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 28
Date of hearing: 6 December 2024
Counsel for the applicant:  Mr O Jones
Solicitor for the applicant:  Vietaust Lawyers
Counsel for the respondent:  Mr M Cleary
Solicitor for the respondent:  HWL Ebsworth Lawyers

ORDERS

NSD 838 of 2024
BETWEEN:

MR THANH DAM NGUYEN

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

LEE J

DATE OF ORDER:

6 DECEMBER 2024

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The name of the respondent be amended to “Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs”.

2.The application be dismissed with costs.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Delivered ex tempore, revised from the transcript)
LEE J:

A        INTRODUCTION

  1. The background to this matter has been usefully set out by Markovic J in related litigation, being Nguyen v Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia [2024] FCA 471 (at [5]–[11]):

    [5] Mr Nguyen was born in 1995. He was included as a dependent in his mother’s offshore application for the Contributory Parent visa lodged on 24 June 2016.

    [6] On 20 September 2022 Mr Nguyen lodged a Form 1446 Withdrawal of a visa application. By email of the same date addressed to parents@homeaffairs.gov.au Mr Nguyen stated (as written and omitting formal parts):

    My name is Thanh Dam Nguyen, DOB 30/10/1995

    I am writing…

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Details
Case
[2024] FCA 1424
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter of Nguyen v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs involves an applicant who sought to challenge the decision of the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs to refuse a visa application. The central dispute concerns the validity of the applicant's visa application withdrawal under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). Specifically, the applicant argued that his visa application was not validly withdrawn by him and sought to have the decision of the Minister reviewed. The Federal Court was tasked with determining whether the applicant had effectively withdrawn his visa application as a matter of objective fact.

The primary legal issue the court had to address was whether the applicant had validly withdrawn his visa application under section 49(1) of the Migration Act. This involved interpreting the interaction between sections 47 and 49 of the Act, particularly focusing on whether the withdrawal was a subjective or objective fact. The court needed to ascertain whether the applicant had indeed given a written notice of withdrawal to the Department, as required by the Act. Additionally, the court had to consider the onus of proof on the applicant, who needed to establish on the balance of probabilities that the withdrawal was not submitted by him.

The Federal Court held that the applicant failed to establish on the balance of probabilities that his visa application was not validly withdrawn. The court found that the applicant fell "very short" of proving that the withdrawal did not occur as a matter of objective fact. The court emphasised that the withdrawal of a visa application is a binary proposition: either it occurred, or it did not. The court further noted that there was no evidence to suggest any fraudulent activity that could have led to the withdrawal without the applicant's consent. Given the clear statutory framework and the applicant's failure to meet the required standard of proof, the court dismissed the application with costs.

The court made specific orders to amend the name of the respondent to "Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs" and dismissed the application with costs. The dismissal was based on the finding that the applicant had not met the onus of proof required to establish that the visa application was not validly withdrawn. The court's decision underscores the importance of objective fact-finding in such cases and the stringent requirements for applicants to prove their claims under the Migration Act.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The name of the respondent be amended to “Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs”.

2. The application be dismissed with costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

A host of additional submissions were raised by the parties, including a somewhat arcane discussion as to whether the Court’s “jurisdiction” under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) arises because of the possibility that the notice of withdrawal is a “subjective” jurisdictional fact, preliminary to the decision-maker determining whether to grant or refuse a visa. Further, given the history of this matter, an argument concerning issue estoppel arose. It is unnecessary for these issues to be canvassed. I am amply satisfied that the proper construction of the Migration Act and the interplay between ss 47 and 49 is as I have set out, and the foundational issue for determination is whether or not, as a matter of objective fact, the visa application was withdrawn. F CONCLUSION AND ORDERS Everything that could possibly be said on behalf of Mr Nguyen was said by Mr Jones, and I am grateful for the competence and candour with which this application was dealt with by counsel for both parties. In the circumstances, the appropriate order to be made is that the application be dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

This is evident from the text of the relevant provisions, which provide as follows: 47 Consideration of valid visa application (1) The Minister is to consider a valid application for a visa. (2) The requirement to consider an application for a visa continues until:(a) the application is withdrawn; or …(3)To avoid doubt, the Minister is not to consider an application that is not a valid application. (4)To avoid doubt, a decision by the Minister that an application is not valid and cannot be considered is not a decision to refuse to grant the visa. 49 Withdrawal of visa application(1)An applicant for a visa may, by written notice given to the Minister, withdraw the application. (2) An application that is withdrawn is taken to have been disposed of. (3)For the purposes of sections 48 and 48A, the Minister is not taken to have refused to grant the visa if the application is withdrawn before the refusal. (4)Subject to the regulations, fees payable in respect of an application that is withdrawn are not refundable. As can be seen, in accordance with s 49(2), an application that is withdrawn is (to use the awkward statutory phrase) “taken to be disposed of”, and there is no discretion involved on the part of an officer of the Department in assessing whether there was in fact a withdrawal in order for the withdrawal to take effect. As can be seen above, s 47(2)(a) expressly provides that the requirement to consider an application for a visa continues until the application is withdrawn. Adopting the words of Hely J in NACO v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 474 (at [18]), “the outcome arises by the application of the law to the facts, rather than an outcome which evolves from administrative decision”. We are dealing with a binary proposition: the withdrawal either occurred as a matter of objective fact or it did not. Ascertaining this objective fact is decisive to the issue of whether the application was “disposed of”, which would have the effect of removing the obligation on the part of the Minister to consider the application. It is thus necessary to turn to whether the applicant gave a written notice of withdrawal of his visa application to the Department under s 49(1) of the Migration Act. C CHRONOLOGY As with any other exercise in fact-finding, assessing the credit of any relevant witness matters, but what generally matters most is “the proper construction of such contemporaneous notes and documents as may exist, and the probabilities that can be derived from those notes and any other objective facts”: Mealey v Power [2015] NSWSC 1678 (at [4] per Pembroke J); see also Transport Workers’ Union of Australia v Qantas Airways Ltd [2021] FCA 873; (2021) 308 IR 244 (at 251 [16] per Lee J). But at the start, it is worth remarking that this is a case where it is central to the applicant’s claim that some of the contemporaneous materials were the product of what appears to be an elaborate fraud practised upon the applicant; and what is further notable is that there is no indication (pointed to in the evidence) as to the motivation of such nefarious conduct taking place, nor does the applicant suggest the identity of any person who may be responsible for practising such a fraud on the applicant.