MZZMG v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

MZZMG v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 134

Citation: MZZMG v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 134
Appeal from: MZZMG v Minister for Immigration [2015] FCCA 607
Parties: MZZMG v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File number: VID 203 of 2015
Judges: TRACEY, MURPHY AND MORTIMER JJ
Date of judgment: 16 September 2015
Catchwords: MIGRATION – conduct of joint hearing by Tribunal – joint hearing of the applications of the applicant and his brother – whether Tribunal erred by excluding the applicant from the joint hearing while his brother gave evidence – Tribunal has discretion to obtain evidence in the absence of an applicant subject to requirements of procedural fairness – exercise of discretion not legally unreasonable  
Legislation:

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 35
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5, 414, 415, 420, 422B, 424AA, 424A, 424A(3)(c), 425, 427(1)(d), 428, 429, 431, Pt 7

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 4.12, 4.19(3), 36.03(a)
Explanatory Memorandum, Migration Reform Bill 1992 (Cth)

Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. Opened for signature 28 July 1951. 189 UNTS 137 (entered into force 22 April 1954)

Cases cited: Al Rawi v Security Service [2011] UKSC 34; [2012] 1 AC 531
Applicant VEALof 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] HCA 72; 225 CLR 88
Assistant Commissioner Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd [2013] HCA 7; 252 CLR 38
Gypsy Jokers Motorcycle Club Inc v Commissioner of Police (WA) [2008] HCA 4; 234 CLR 532
K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court [2009] HCA 4; 237 CLR 501
Liu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1362; 113 FCR 541
London Chartered Bank v Lavers (1855) 2 Legge 884
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; 308 ALR 280
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; 249 CLR 332
MZZZW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 133
R (B) v Westminster Magistrates’ Court [2014] UKSC 59; [2015] AC 1195
R (British Sky Broadcasting Ltd) v Central Criminal Court [2014] UKSC 17; [2014] AC 885
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30; 198 ALR 59
Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala [2000] HCA 57; 204 CLR 82
SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] HCA 24; 228 CLR 294
Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] HCA 23; 241 CLR 252
Selfe v Isaacson (1859) 1 F & F 194; 175 ER 688
SZAYW v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] HCA 49; 230 CLR 486
SZBYRv Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 26; 235 ALR 609
Date of hearing: 10 August 2015
Date of last submissions: 17 August 2015
Place: Melbourne
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number…
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Details
Case
[2015] FCAFC 134
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of MZZMG v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved the appellant, a Sri Lankan national, who, along with his brother, sought a review of decisions to refuse them protection visas. The appellant contested the conduct of a joint hearing of his and his brother's visa applications by the Refugee Review Tribunal, now a division of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. The primary contention was that the Tribunal erred by excluding the appellant from the hearing while his brother gave evidence. The appellant argued this exclusion was both a breach of procedural fairness and an improper exercise of discretion by the Tribunal.

The legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal had the power to exclude the appellant from the hearing and, if it did, whether this exclusion was reasonable. The appellant argued that the Act did not confer an express power of exclusion and that any implied power would contravene principles of open justice. The Minister countered that the Tribunal's discretion to obtain evidence in the absence of an applicant, subject to procedural fairness, supported the exclusion. The court had to determine whether the Tribunal's decision to exclude the appellant was legally unreasonable.

The court held that the Migration Act did not confer an express power to exclude an applicant from a hearing. However, the court recognised that the Tribunal has an implied discretion to obtain evidence in the absence of an applicant, provided it adheres to procedural fairness. The court found that the Tribunal's decision to exclude the appellant was not legally unreasonable. The Tribunal's discretion to conduct the hearing in a manner that ensures procedural fairness to both applicants justified the exclusion, as long as the appellant's rights were not prejudiced. The court emphasised that the exclusion did not contravene open justice principles because the private nature of the hearing is intended to protect the applicant's identity and claims.

Consequently, the appeal was dismissed. The court found that the Tribunal's exercise of its discretion to exclude the appellant from part of the hearing was not legally unreasonable, and the Tribunal's decision was affirmed. The appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The name of the second respondent be amended from Refugee Review Tribunal to Administrative Appeals Tribunal and the title to the proceeding be amended accordingly.

2. The time in which an appeal from the orders and decision of the Federal Circuit Court may be filed is extended to 17 April 2015.

3. The appeal be dismissed.

4. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of and incidental to the application for extension of time and appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons set out below, the appeal must be dismissed.BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The appellant is a young man who, it is accepted, is a Sri Lankan national of Tamil ethnicity. He and his younger brother W arrived in Australia together by boat on or about 21 May 2012 and applied for protection visas on 20 September 2012. The same delegate of the first respondent refused to grant each of them protection visas in separate decisions on 14 December 2012. Both brothers sought review of those decisions by the Refugee Review Tribunal (now a division of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal). As we have noted in MZZZW [2015] FCAFC 133, the Tribunal for the review was constituted by Member Corrigan. Member Corrigan conducted a review hearing for both G and W under s 425 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) on two occasions, namely 25 February 2013 and on 8 May 2013. It is the conduct of a joint hearing with both brothers which forms the factual substratum of the appellant’s contentions on judicial review.The Tribunal decision Like his brother W, G’s claims stemmed from his account of the 2002 kidnapping of his father by Sri Lankan authorities, and his father’s disappearance. G then described harassment and threats by the Sri Lankan authorities, centred on attempts to prevent his father’s disappearance becoming the subject of any complaints or investigations. He also claimed his family’s home was attacked by those people called “grease devils” by Sri Lankans. After he and W fled Sri Lanka, he claimed his mother had been harassed at their home by Sri Lankan authorities who were looking for him and his brother. He claimed to fear persecution in Sri Lanka by reason of his Tamil ethnicity and what had happened to his father, including the harassment and threats which followed. In this context he also relied on the fact that his uncle’s family was suspected of having LTTE connections and had been granted asylum in the United Kingdom. Finally, he claimed to fear persecution on return as a failed asylum seeker who had left Sri Lanka unlawfully. Shortly after the second review hearing, the Tribunal gave a decision on each of the brothers’ applications, in which it affirmed each of the delegate’s decisions. As it did in his brother’s application, the Tribunal accepted G’s father had been kidnapped because he was suspected of involvement with the LTTE and that G’s uncle and his family fled Sri Lanka nine to ten years ago also after being suspected of links to the LTTE. While generally accepting there were reported incidents of violence towards Tamils, and ongoing discrimination, and kidnappings, the Tribunal did not accept that G remained of any particular interest to Sri Lankan authorities, whether on the basis of connections with the LTTE or otherwise. It found he would be treated no differently to other returning asylum seekers, and may face a short term of imprisonment that did not amount to serious or significant harm, that the situation for Tamils in Sri Lanka was generally improving and that there was no basis to believe G or his family would be of “adverse interest” to the Sri Lankan authorities. The Tribunal did not believe G’s claims that his family’s home was attacked by a “grease devil”.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The second review hearing on 8 May 2013 was considerably shorter, and consisted mostly of the brothers’ migration agent making some submissions, although there was, it appears, some short evidence given by the brothers. Neither appeared to have been excluded from the hearing room at any stage during this second hearing. The Federal Circuit Court decision The appellant filed an application in the Federal Circuit Court for judicial review of the Tribunal decision on 14 June 2013, the same date as W’s judicial review application was filed. W’s application was shortly thereafter the subject of consent orders for remitter on the basis that W was a minor at the time of the Tribunal’s decision and the Tribunal had not taken this matter into account. Unlike W, Member Corrigan’s decision in respect of G was not set aside by the Federal Circuit Court. It appears that while W’s Tribunal decision was set aside, remitted back to the Tribunal and determined again by Member Boddison, G’s application for judicial review remained undetermined in the Federal Circuit Court. By the time of the hearing of his judicial review application some nineteen months later on 30 January 2015, the appellant was represented by the same solicitor who later acted in February 2015 for his brother W in his judicial review proceedings, also on a pro bono basis. Leave was sought and granted to rely on seven amended grounds of review, which we need not set out given the course of events on the appeal. Suffice to say the points now raised were not raised in the Federal Circuit Court. On 19 March 2015, the Federal Circuit Court dismissed the application for judicial review. The appeal to this Court The appellant sought to appeal the Federal Circuit Court’s decision, but failed to do so within the 21 days prescribed by r 36.03(a) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth). Following a referral pursuant to r 4.12 of the Federal Court Rules, affidavit evidence was filed explaining the delay in seeking to appeal, and an amended proposed notice of appeal dated 20 July 2015 was filed. In that notice of appeal, three proposed grounds were raised:1. The Tribunal erred by excluding the Appellant from part of the hearing.ParticularsThe Tribunal conducted a hearing on 25 February 2013. Part way through thehearing, the Tribunal directed the Appellant to absent himself from the hearing. While the Appellant was absent in accordance with the Tribunal’s direction, the Tribunal received evidence from the Appellant’s brother, MZZZW (the Brother).By directing the Appellant to absent himself from the hearing, the Tribunal contravened s 425 of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act) and thereby failed to afford procedural fairness to the Appellant. Alternatively, insofar as a visa applicant’s appearance at a hearing is not a ‘matter’ dealt with by Part 7 Division 4 of the Act, then directing the Appellant to absent himself from the hearing involved a breach of common law procedural fairness.Further or alternatively, the Tribunal had no power to direct the Appellant toabsent himself from the hearing.2.The Tribunal erred by giving no weight to the Brother’s corroborative evidence.ParticularsThe Tribunal conducted a joint hearing of the Appellant’s application for review, together with the Brother’s application for review. The Brother gave evidence that was corroborative of the Appellant’s claims and evidence.The Tribunal chose to give the Brother’s evidence weight in relation to the Brother’s own application for review. However, on the basis that the Tribunal had ‘problems’ with the Appellant’s credibility, the Tribunal chose to give the Brother’s evidence no weight in relation to the Appellant’s application for review.The Tribunal’s approach was legally unreasonable or, alternatively, irrational or illogical.3.There was a constructive failure by the Tribunal to perform its functions on review.ParticularsOn 17 May 2013, the Tribunal purported to make a decision under s 415(2) of the Act to affirm a previous decision of a delegate of the First Respondent (Minister) to refuse to grant the Appellant a Protection (Class XA) Visa. The Tribunal also prepared a written statement under s 430 in relation to the purported decision.On the same day, the Tribunal purported to make a decision under s 415(2) of the Act to affirm a previous decision of a delegate of the Minister to grant the Appellant’s brother, MZZZW (the Brother), a Protection (Class XA) visa. The Tribunal also prepared a written statement under s 430 in relation to this purported decision.On 19 June 2013, the Brother applied to the Federal Circuit Court for judicial review of the decision of the Tribunal in his review. On 21 August 2013, the Court granted certain relief including a writ of certiorari quashing the purported decision of the Tribunal, and a writ of mandamus requiring a differently constituted Tribunal to re-determine the Brother’s application of review.Many passages in the written statement prepared by the Tribunal in respect of the Appellant’s review correspond to, and were copied from, passages in the written statement prepared by the Tribunal in respect of the Brother’s review. The extent and the nature of the corresponding passages are probative of a failure on the part of the Tribunal to bring an independent mind to the disposition of the Applicant’s review and/or a failure to give separate consideration to the Applicant’s review on its own merits.Accordingly, the Court should conclude that there has been a constructive failure of the Tribunal to perform its function on review.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The basis for the Minister’s opposition can, we consider, be more conveniently dealt with as part of the Court’s consideration of the merits of the grounds of appeal themselves, and that is the course we propose to take.CONSIDERATION It is fair to say the emphasis in oral submissions on behalf of the appellant was on the first ground, with the remaining two grounds being presented as somewhat supplementary to it.Ground One The appellant described the issues arising in relation to the first ground in the following terms:Having excluded the applicant from his own review, two questions arise:(1)Did the Act authorise the Tribunal to exclude the applicant from the hearing of his own review application?(2) If so, did the Tribunal exercise that power reasonably? The parties agreed that the Tribunal’s obligation in s 429 of the Migration Act to hold a review hearing in private does not preclude the Tribunal conducting a joint hearing, if it does so in order to pursue the objectives set out in s 420 and does so in a way which affords procedural fairness to the applicants concerned: SZAYW v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] HCA 49; 230 CLR 486 at [27]. The appellant’s complaint is not the Tribunal’s decision to hold a joint hearing, but its decision to exclude G from his own review hearing while it took evidence from his brother W, as a witness in G’s review. As is clear from the way the appellant framed the issues, the appellant challenged the exclusion as both a matter of power, and of discretion. As to the power argument, there was no debate between the parties there was no express power of exclusion, unlike s 35 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth). The Minister contended this difference was explicable because generally Administrative Appeals Tribunal hearings are required to be conducted in public (s 35(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act) and thus an express power of that nature is required. The appellant contended that the absence of such an express power tells against any implication. The appellant correctly contends that s 425 of the Migration Act, read with s 414, confers on an applicant for review a substantive right to a hearing before the Tribunal as an important and central right in the merits review system established by Pt 7 of the Act: Liu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1362; 113 FCR 541 at [44], [47] (Black CJ, Hill and Weinberg JJ). Although the review hearing is required to be held “in private” pursuant to s 429, the appellant is also correct to contend that the benefit of the privacy required by s 429 is for the benefit of an applicant, and this requirement is not one which the scheme intends can be used as a basis for excluding him, or justifying his exclusion because principles of open justice do not apply. The privacy requirement has a protective function. Like other provisions in the Migration Act (such as s 431), it is designed to ensure that an applicant’s identity and the details of his or her claims (and those she or he may identify as part of articulating her or his claims) are not publicly available in order that the protections which the 1951 Refugees Convention enshrines for those seeking asylum and for those found to be refugees are not frustrated by the domestic assessment process undertaken pursuant to the Act.