MZZLD v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 2)

Link copied
Case Copied 27 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

MZZLD v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 2) [2017] FCA 31

Review of: MZZLD v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCCA 2368
File number: VID 1084 of 2016
Judge: MORTIMER J
Date of judgment: 31 January 2017
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for review under section 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) ­– where Federal Circuit Court refused an extension of time application under s 477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether Federal Circuit Court took into account an irrelevant consideration – whether Federal Circuit Court failed to take into account relevant considerations – whether Federal Circuit Court decision was legally unreasonable
Legislation:

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 417, 476, 477, 477(2)

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, done at Geneva on 28 July 1951 (as amended by the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, done at New York on 31 January 1967)

Cases cited:

Craig v South Australia [1995] HCA 58; 184 CLR 163

Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 26; 77 ALJR 1088

Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW) [2010] HCA 1; 239 CLR 531

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko- Wallsend Ltd [1986] HCA 40; 162 CLR 24

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; 240 CLR 611

MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391

MZZLD v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCCA 2368

MZZLD v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1201

Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex Parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30; 77 ALJR 1165

Date of hearing: 12 December 2016
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 50
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr A McBeth
Solicitor for the Applicant: Asylum Seeker Resource Centre
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr A Yuile
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent did not appear
Counsel for the Third Respondent: The Third Respondent did not appear

ORDERS

VID 1084 of 2016
BETWEEN:

MZZLD

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT

Third Respondent

JUDGE:

MORTIMER J

DATE OF ORDER:

31 JANUARY 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application be dismissed.

2.The injunction granted on 7 October 2016 be discharged.

3.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the proceeding, to be taxed in default of agreement.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MORTIMER J:

  1. This is an application under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) for judicial review of the decision and orders made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 9…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read MZZLD v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 2... and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2017] FCA 31
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, an Iraqi citizen of Bedoon origin, sought judicial review of a decision by the Federal Circuit Court to refuse his application for an extension of time to bring his judicial review application. The Federal Circuit Court had previously refused the applicant's application for an injunction to prevent his removal from Australia. The court was required to determine whether the Federal Circuit Court took into account an irrelevant consideration, failed to take into account a relevant consideration, or whether its decision was otherwise legally unreasonable. The court found that the Federal Circuit Court's decision was not legally unreasonable, and that the matters the court considered in denying the extension of time application were relevant and permissible considerations. The court also found that there were no reasonable prospects of success on the merits of the applicant's claims. Therefore, the application for judicial review was dismissed, the injunction was discharged, and the applicant was ordered to pay the Minister's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The injunction granted on 7 October 2016 be discharged.

3. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the proceeding, to be taxed in default of agreement.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons that follow, the application for judicial review must be dismissed.BACKGROUND The history of the applicant’s arrival in Australia, the making of his claims for protection and the fate of these claims are set out in the Federal Circuit Court reasons (at [7]-[13]) and need not be repeated here. The applicant has been in Australia for some time: since May 2012. He fled from Iraq, although he claims to have been born in Kuwait. He claims to have been deported, with his family and extended family, from Kuwait to Iraq in 1993, after the Gulf war. He has always claimed to be a Bedoon (there are various spellings of this word), and to be stateless. As I note below, the accurate description of this attribute is not without significance in the consideration of the applicant’s claims before the Tribunal, and his judicial review application. On each occasion during the decision-making process (delegate level, first merits review – subsequently set aside by consent, second merits review), his claim to statelessness was not accepted and he was found to be a citizen of Iraq. Different approaches have been taken by each decision-maker to the credibility of some of the applicant’s claims, and indeed to his claims themselves. It is fair to say that the second Tribunal took a dim view of the applicant, essentially finding him not credible at all, and appearing to criticise him and his brother for leaving their families behind in Iraq when they left illegally, on a journey that eventually brought them to Australia. One of the Tribunal’s findings, relevant to the judicial review application before the Federal Circuit Court and in this Court was:I do not accept that the applicant is a stateless Bidoon, but rather find that he was born in Kuwait and was expelled to Iraq and has subsequently been granted Iraqi citizenship. I accept that the applicant was born in Kuwait and served in the Kuwaiti military. Country information indicates that many Bidoons who were expelled from Kuwait from 1991 were granted Iraqi citizenship, although they were not allowed to own property inside the cities. While this process is discriminatory, I note that some were able to purchase houses through tribal connections but that their living conditions are similar to the host community. Regardless, Bidoons who were not granted citizenship do not hold Iraqi ID cards, nationality certificates or PDS (ration) cards, nor do they register their marriages.Given the fact that the applicant has admitted to having a ration and ID card, and has provided evidence of an Iraqi marriage certificate (folio 120) I am satisfied that he would not have been able to possess these unless he was an Iraqi citizen and hence the applicant is one of those former Bidoons from Kuwait who were expelled to Iraq and were granted Iraqi citizenship. His claim will therefore be assessed as such. (Footnote omitted; emphasis added.) After the second Tribunal decision, there appears to be a significant gap in the chronology. There is no evidence of what occurred between a Departmental decision not to refer his application to the Minister for consideration under s 417 of the Migration Act on 29 November 2013, and the applicant’s detention on 30 June 2015. The applicant also remained in immigration detention for a year without anything happening, apparently.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

I accept the Minister’s submissions that her Honour was also likely referring to ground 6 in [36] where she refers to findings of race or ethnicity being “subsumed” in the broader or more general findings. While “subsumed” might not be the most appropriate description, there is certainly no jurisdictional error apparent in the reasoning in [36]. Prospects of success were but one factor in the exercise of the s 477 discretion and the Federal Circuit Court clearly took the view the prospects, on all grounds, were minimal. It cannot be said that was an unreasonable view, on the evidence before the Court in this proceeding. Ground 5: Was the Federal Circuit Court’s decision legally unreasonable? This ground of review relied on what was said by the Federal Circuit Court at [36] of its reasons, which I have extracted at [15] above. The applicant submitted the Federal Circuit Court had not appreciated the distinction between the applicant’s claim regarding his status as a stateless person and a returning failed asylum seeker, and his claim based on race as a Bedoon. The applicant submitted:The finding of the Federal Circuit Court on that point was irrational, in that it was a finding that was so plainly wrong that no decision maker could properly reach it, as distinct from a finding on which reasonable minds could differ. It was not clear whether this ground was being put as one of legal unreasonableness (as to outcome) or irrationality (in terms of lack of logic and rationality in a reasoning process). They are distinct grounds: cf. Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; 249 CLR 332 and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; 240 CLR 611. In oral argument, counsel for the applicant clarified that he intended to put this argument as an irrationality ground. He relied also on Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex Parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30; 77 ALJR 1165 at [9] (Gleeson CJ). He submitted this paragraph in S20 supported the proposition that any exercise of judicial power must be undertaken on a rational basis. At a general level, that last proposition is unremarkable. What kind of irrationality could lead to an exercise of judicial power being found to have exceeded jurisdiction, or to be an actual or constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction, is quite a different question and one I do not propose to answer in this proceeding. Similarly, as the Minister’s submissions noted, in MZABP at [72]-[76], I expressed the view that the role of legal unreasonableness in the context of judicial review of an exercise of judicial power was yet to be fully explored. This case is no more the occasion to engage in that analysis than was MZABP. That is because there is plainly no irrationality attending the Federal Circuit Court’s reasons. Given that the Minister put his submissions to her Honour in the same way they were put to this Court – that is, by reference to the material before the Tribunal about what Bedoon meant – it seems to me clear enough that her Honour did not accept the irrationality attack on the Tribunal’s reasons, just as I have also not accepted it in working through the applicant’s arguments in this proceeding. Her Honour expressed herself more briefly, but that is not inappropriate on an extension of time application where the merits of the grounds are but one consideration.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

At the hearing, counsel for the applicant indicated ground 1 was no longer pressed. I do not consider it further.Ground 2: Did the Federal Circuit Court take account of an irrelevant consideration? The applicant submitted that the matters to which the Federal Circuit Court referred to at [37] of its reasons, which I have extracted at [16] above, constituted an irrelevant consideration. He contended that the additional costs and delay of permitting the application to proceed were irrelevant, in circumstances where the Court could have heard and determined the underlying application and the extension of time in the same hearing. In oral submissions, this ground was put as one particular to this case and dependent on the Federal Circuit Court’s own choice to proceed to hear the extension of time application separately from the substantive judicial review application. Having made that decision, it was submitted, the Court had created an “administrative obstacle”, but that did not entitle the Court to take into account the matters set out at [37] as part of the exercise of the discretion under s 477. According to the transcript, which was before me, the Federal Circuit Court hearing took approximately an hour. As I have noted, the matter had initially been listed as a matter of urgency to deal with the injunction application to prevent removal. The Court then heard the extension of time application shortly thereafter. The applicant accepted it was open to the Federal Circuit Court to separate the hearings because of the time it had available, and accepted that it may have been a legitimate choice for the Court’s own case-management. However, the applicant submitted, having made that choice, the fact of a later hearing could not be weighed against the exercise of the discretion in s 477 to extend time. The principal answer to the applicant’s contentions is that [37] of the Federal Circuit Court’s reasons is about more than the consequence of a case-management decision and the existence of a separate, later hearing. In its terms, the paragraph draws in the views her Honour had already expressed about the “inordinate” delay in bringing judicial review proceedings. It is in that context her Honour speaks of “finality”. Having made a decision about the most appropriate use of judicial time and resources, and having decided to hear the two matters separately, her Honour was not precluded from taking into account the additional delays, on top of the already significant delays, which would occur before the judicial review would be finalised. Her Honour did this having already found there were little or no prospects of success, and in my opinion it was open to her Honour to take that approach. In MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391, I indicated (see [53]-[56]) that such matters are relevant to the exercise of the discretion to extend time. They are relevant in the sense of being permissible considerations under s 477(2). They are not mandatory, but nor are they prohibited: see Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko- Wallsend Ltd [1986] HCA 40; 162 CLR 24 at 40 (Mason J). Judicial review litigation, like other litigation, does not occur in a vacuum, or in some sort of private space especially reserved for parties in a particular case. It occurs in the ongoing and busy exercise of a Court’s several jurisdictions. Finite amounts of judicial time are available. Other litigants are affected, directly and indirectly, each time an adjournment or extension of time is granted. By themselves these considerations are highly unlikely to be determinative of judicial exercises of procedural discretions. However these factors are capable of being weighed in the balance of determining where the interests of justice lie. Although each case turns on its own facts, where there are reasonable prospects of success, no relevant prejudice to the other party and a material disadvantage to a litigant without the discretion being exercised, it might be expected that the demands on a court’s resources, and effects on other litigants, would not result in an exercise of a procedural discretion in a way unfavourable to the litigant. Nevertheless, these are permissible and important considerations.