FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
MZZLD v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 2) [2017] FCA 31
Review of: MZZLD v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCCA 2368 File number: VID 1084 of 2016 Judge: MORTIMER J Date of judgment: 31 January 2017 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for review under section 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) – where Federal Circuit Court refused an extension of time application under s 477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether Federal Circuit Court took into account an irrelevant consideration – whether Federal Circuit Court failed to take into account relevant considerations – whether Federal Circuit Court decision was legally unreasonable Legislation: Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 417, 476, 477, 477(2)
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, done at Geneva on 28 July 1951 (as amended by the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, done at New York on 31 January 1967)
Cases cited: Craig v South Australia [1995] HCA 58; 184 CLR 163
Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 26; 77 ALJR 1088
Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW) [2010] HCA 1; 239 CLR 531
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko- Wallsend Ltd [1986] HCA 40; 162 CLR 24
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; 249 CLR 332
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; 240 CLR 611
MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391
MZZLD v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCCA 2368
MZZLD v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1201
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex Parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30; 77 ALJR 1165
Date of hearing: 12 December 2016 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 50 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr A McBeth Solicitor for the Applicant: Asylum Seeker Resource Centre Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr A Yuile Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent did not appear Counsel for the Third Respondent: The Third Respondent did not appear ORDERS
VID 1084 of 2016 BETWEEN: MZZLD
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
Third Respondent
JUDGE:
MORTIMER J
DATE OF ORDER:
31 JANUARY 2017
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application be dismissed.
2.The injunction granted on 7 October 2016 be discharged.
3.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the proceeding, to be taxed in default of agreement.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
MORTIMER J:
This is an application under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) for judicial review of the decision and orders made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 9…
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- Case
- [2017] FCA 31
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application be dismissed.
2. The injunction granted on 7 October 2016 be discharged.
3. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the proceeding, to be taxed in default of agreement.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
At the hearing, counsel for the applicant indicated ground 1 was no longer pressed. I do not consider it further.Ground 2: Did the Federal Circuit Court take account of an irrelevant consideration? The applicant submitted that the matters to which the Federal Circuit Court referred to at [37] of its reasons, which I have extracted at [16] above, constituted an irrelevant consideration. He contended that the additional costs and delay of permitting the application to proceed were irrelevant, in circumstances where the Court could have heard and determined the underlying application and the extension of time in the same hearing. In oral submissions, this ground was put as one particular to this case and dependent on the Federal Circuit Court’s own choice to proceed to hear the extension of time application separately from the substantive judicial review application. Having made that decision, it was submitted, the Court had created an “administrative obstacle”, but that did not entitle the Court to take into account the matters set out at [37] as part of the exercise of the discretion under s 477. According to the transcript, which was before me, the Federal Circuit Court hearing took approximately an hour. As I have noted, the matter had initially been listed as a matter of urgency to deal with the injunction application to prevent removal. The Court then heard the extension of time application shortly thereafter. The applicant accepted it was open to the Federal Circuit Court to separate the hearings because of the time it had available, and accepted that it may have been a legitimate choice for the Court’s own case-management. However, the applicant submitted, having made that choice, the fact of a later hearing could not be weighed against the exercise of the discretion in s 477 to extend time. The principal answer to the applicant’s contentions is that [37] of the Federal Circuit Court’s reasons is about more than the consequence of a case-management decision and the existence of a separate, later hearing. In its terms, the paragraph draws in the views her Honour had already expressed about the “inordinate” delay in bringing judicial review proceedings. It is in that context her Honour speaks of “finality”. Having made a decision about the most appropriate use of judicial time and resources, and having decided to hear the two matters separately, her Honour was not precluded from taking into account the additional delays, on top of the already significant delays, which would occur before the judicial review would be finalised. Her Honour did this having already found there were little or no prospects of success, and in my opinion it was open to her Honour to take that approach. In MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391, I indicated (see [53]-[56]) that such matters are relevant to the exercise of the discretion to extend time. They are relevant in the sense of being permissible considerations under s 477(2). They are not mandatory, but nor are they prohibited: see Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko- Wallsend Ltd [1986] HCA 40; 162 CLR 24 at 40 (Mason J). Judicial review litigation, like other litigation, does not occur in a vacuum, or in some sort of private space especially reserved for parties in a particular case. It occurs in the ongoing and busy exercise of a Court’s several jurisdictions. Finite amounts of judicial time are available. Other litigants are affected, directly and indirectly, each time an adjournment or extension of time is granted. By themselves these considerations are highly unlikely to be determinative of judicial exercises of procedural discretions. However these factors are capable of being weighed in the balance of determining where the interests of justice lie. Although each case turns on its own facts, where there are reasonable prospects of success, no relevant prejudice to the other party and a material disadvantage to a litigant without the discretion being exercised, it might be expected that the demands on a court’s resources, and effects on other litigants, would not result in an exercise of a procedural discretion in a way unfavourable to the litigant. Nevertheless, these are permissible and important considerations.