MZZCB v Minister for Immigration - [2013] FCCA 199

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

MZZCB v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR

[2013] FCCA 199

Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Judicial review – whether applicant credible – whether delay in filing application for a protection visa is relevant – non-admission of new material – whether rejection of evidence is “information” within s.424A(i)(a).

Legislation:
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.36(2)(aa), 422B, 424A, 477, 474

Cases cited:
Abebe v Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510
Chen Xin He v the Minister of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1995] FCA 1682
Kopalapillai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 86 FCR 547
Lee v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 464
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs & Anor v Peko-Wallsend Ltd & Ors (1986) 162 CLR 24
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v NAMW (2004) 140 FCR 572
NAHI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2008) 168 ALR 407
Selvadurai v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs & Anor (1994) 34 ALD 347
Subramaniam, Anadaraj v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1998] FCA 305
SZJMG v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 11
SZJTQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 1938
Tefonu Pty Ltd v Insurance & Superannuation Commissioner (1993) 44 FCR 361
VJAF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 178
VQAB v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 104
W148/00A v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 185 ALR 703

Applicant:

MZZCB

First Respondent:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP

Second Respondent:

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

File Number:

MLG 1366 of 2012

Judgment of:

Judge F. Turner

Hearing date:

24 April 2013

Date of Last Submission:

24 April 2013

Delivered at:

Melbourne

Delivered on:

17 May 2013

REPRESENTATION

The Applicant appeared In Person with the assistance of a Telegu interpreter

Solicitors for the Respondents:

Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

The application for judicial review filed 29 October 2012 and further amended application filed 8 April 2013 are dismissed.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT MELBOURNE

MLG 1366 of 2012

MZZCB

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

This is an application for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) dated 28 September 2012. That decision affirmed a decision of a delegate to the Minister not to grant the applicant a Protection (Class XA) visa.
The grounds for judicial review are set out in the Further Amended Application filed 8 April 2013 as follows:
(1)The decision was made in breach of essential pre-condition to the exercise of the power conferred by sections 414 and 414 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (as amended) (“the Act”) because the Tribunal filed to determine whether the Applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution as required by s.36(2) and 91R(1) of the Act and sub-clause 866.211 of part 866 of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (“the Regulations”).
Particulars
(a)The Tribunal imposed an impermissible burden of proof on the Applicant by discounting the medical evidence he produced in relation to him being physically harmed by his political opponents who forced him to fall off his motorbike and have his injuries treated in hospital.
(b)The Tribunal’s failure to put to the Applicant at the hearing that it that did not accept his medical evidence meant that the Applicant was denied an opportunity to fully present his claims as required under 425 of the Migration Act.
(c)In the absence of medical qualifications of its own, the Tribunal was not in a position to legally discount the medical evidence produced by the Applicant.
(2)The decision was made in breach of an essential pre-condition to the exercise of the power conferred by sections 414 and 415 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (as amended) (“the Act”) because the Tribunal failed to properly determine whether there was a real risk that the Applicant would suffer significant harm as required by 36(2A) and (2B) of the Act.
Particulars
The Tribunal erroneously assumed that such a risk did not exist if it found that Australia did not have protection obligations towards the Applicant and subsequently failed to properly exercise its own jurisdiction.
(3)The Tribunal failed to determine whether it was reasonably practicable for the Applicant to avoid serious or significant harm by relocation elsewhere in India.
Particulars
The Tribunal failed to take into account the inability of the police and other State authorities to provide protection against politically motivated violence or legal redress in relation thereto due to widespread corruption and ineptitude.
The applicant applies for an extension of time pursuant to s.477 of the Migration Act 1958 (the “Act”) which provides:
Time limits on applications to the Federal Magistrates Court
(1)An application to the Federal Magistrates Court for a remedy to be granted in exercise of the court's original jurisdiction under section 476 in relation to a migration decision must be made to the court within 35 days of the date of the migration decision.
(2)The Federal Magistrates Court may, by order, extend that 35 day period as the Federal Magistrates Court considers appropriate if:
(a)an application for that order has been made in writing to the Federal Magistrates Court specifying why the applicant considers that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make the order; and
(b)the Federal Magistrates Court is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make the order.
(3)In this section:
“date of the migration decision” means:
(a) in the case of a migration decision made under subsection 43(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 --the date of the written decision under that subsection; or
(b)in the case of a written migration decision made by the Migration Review Tribunal or the Refugee Review Tribunal--the date of the written statement under subsection 368(1) or 430(1); or
(c)in the case of an oral migration decision made by the Migration Review Tribunal or the Refugee Review Tribunal--the date of the oral decision; or
(d)in any other case--the date of the written notice of the decision or, if no such notice exists, the date that the Court considers appropriate.
(4)For the purposes of subsection (1), the 35 day period begins to run despite a failure to comply with the requirements of any of the provisions mentioned in the definition of date of the migration decision in subsection (3).
(5)To avoid doubt, for the purposes of subsection (1), the 35 day period begins to run irrespective of the validity of the migration decision.
The decision of the Tribunal is dated 28 September 2012. By s.477(1) of the Act, the applicant had until 9 November 2012 to apply to the Court for judicial review. He applied on 29 October 2012. An extension of time is not necessary.
The applicant is a 25 year old citizen of India, of Hindu religion and Telugu ethnicity. He arrived in Australia on 8 June 2009 as the holder of subclass 572 student visa (Court Book (“CB”) p.195).
The applicant complains that the Tribunal rejected his medical evidence (CB pp.179 – 186). At the hearing on 24 April 2013 the applicant stated that he had information from the United States of America that hospitals in India will not provide treatment to persons who have been injured through fighting or other forms of aggression. The applicant said this explains why the medical reports from the hospital did not describe how his injuries occurred. The Court explained to the applicant that it could not accept new material that was not put before the Tribunal, as an application for judicial review is confined to the material put before the Tribunal.
In SZJMG v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 1145 per McKerracher J at [27]:
“An appeal from the Tribunal to the Federal Magistrates Court or an appeal to this Court is limited to review of jurisdictional error. Fresh evidence is not admissible unless it bears on some jurisdictional error. In MZXHY v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 622, Nicholson J stated at [8]:
It is not open for an appellant to ask the Court to admit new evidence for the purpose of inviting the Court to disagree with a factual conclusion reached by the Tribunal. Spender J in Servos v Repatriation Commission(1995) 56 FCR 377 at 380 determined the question of ‘... whether, and to what extent, an appellant for review pursuant to s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act1975 (Cth) can adduce evidence which was not before the tribunal at the time of its decision’. At 381 Spender J observed that appeals to the Court from the Administrative Appeals Tribunal ‘... are only on questions of law’. His Honour further held at 382 that the Court had no power to receive the fresh evidence: see also at 385. Marshall J in Ozberk v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs(1998) 79 FCR 249 at 254 approved Servos 56 FCR 377 in a migration law framework.”
In any event, the new material could not show jurisdictional error as all it could possibly do on a re-hearing, is bear on the question as to whether or not the Tribunal would accept the medical reports (CB p.205 [84]).
The Tribunal had a number of other concerns about the applicant’s evidence which led it to find that:
“the applicant is not a credible witness and had not been truthful in relation to his experiences in India, his reasons for leaving India and his fears about returning to India”.
The Tribunal found the applicant’s evidence to be “vague and lacking in detail” (CB p.204 [80]).
As stated by the Federal Court of Australia in Lee v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 464 at [27]:
“The Tribunal is entitled to accept or reject or give such weight to the evidence proffered as it thinks appropriate in all the circumstances.”
The Tribunal did not accept that the applicant was deliberately targeted by Telegana Rashtra Samithi (“TRS”) members as claimed (CB p.205.4). The Tribunal found the applicant’s claims to be “vague and non-specific” and that he had to be prompted to provide meaningful answers (CB p205.10).
The Tribunal did not accept the applicant’s evidence “as credible that that he knew that his attackers were members of the TRS because after they knocked him from his motorbike they made him sign the TRS anthem” (CB p.205.7).
The Tribunal did not accept the applicant’s evidence “that the TRS members were able to identify him because he was wearing TNFS official clothing when he was travelling the opposite direction on a public road” (CB p.205.6).
The Tribunal did not accept the applicant’s evidence “of his claimed abduction and torture when he returned to India in May 2010.” The Tribunal found it “implausible that the applicant would be targeted by TRS supports (sic “supporters”) on the first day he arrived in India.” The Tribunal did not accept that the applicant “has a political profile that would be so potent as to prompt such an attack in circumstances where the applicant has been away from India since June 2009” (CB p.205.8).
The Court refers to the following decisions:
·Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2008) 168 ALR 407 per McHugh J at [67]:
“If the primary decision-maker has stated that he or she does not believe a particular witness, no detailed reasons need to be given as to why that particular witness was not believed. The tribunal must give the reasons for its decision, not the sub-set of reasons why it accepted or rejected individual pieces of evidence. In any event, the reason for the disbelief is apparent in this case from the use of the word “implausible”. The disbelief arose from the tribunal’s view that it was inherently unlikely that the events had occurred as alleged.”
The Tribunal’s conclusion that the applicant was not credible and his claims untrue are findings of fact par excellence: see W148/00A v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 185 ALR 703 and Durairajasingham (supra) at [67].
·So long as the Tribunal’s findings were open to it, no error is demonstrated: see Kopalapillai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 86 FCR 547 at pp.558 to 559 and W148/00A (supra) at [64]-[69] per Tamberlin and R D Nicholson JJ.
·The Tribunal’s findings were open for the reasons it gives. The Court cannot review the merits of the Tribunal’s decision: see Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at p.272.
·Abebe v Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510 at [137]:
“… there is no error of law… in making a wrong finding of fact…”.
In Kopalapillai (supra) at pp.558 to 559 the Full Federal Court said:
“Whilst a decision maker concerned to evaluate the credibility of the testimony of a person who claims to be a refugee in Australia will need to consider, and in many cases consider sympathetically, possible explanations for any delay in the making of claims, and for any evidentiary inconsistencies, there is not a rule that a decision maker may not reject an applicant’s testimony on credibility grounds unless there are no possible explanations for the delay or inconsistency (Taylor, “Informational Deficiencies Affecting Refugee Status Determinations”). Nor is there a rule that a decision maker must hold a “positive state of disbelief” before making an adverse credibility assessment in a refugee case. The reference by Foster J, sitting as a member of the Full Federal Court in Guo’s case at 191, to a requirement for a “positive state of disbelief” was not directed to this issue of the determination of credibility, but rather to the question of when an adverse credibility finding will logically found a positive finding that a particular fact asserted by the witness does not exist.”
The Tribunal found the applicant’s answers “to be vague and non-specific and he frequently had to be prompted to provide a meaningful answer” (CB p.205.10).
The Tribunal found the applicant’s “explanation of the torture to be unconvincing” (CB p.206.1).
The Tribunal found the applicant’s “explanation regarding having his toe-nail ripped off and chilli rubbed into the wound to be vague and unconvincing” (CB p.206.3).
The Tribunal noted that the applicant had stated that “he was blindfolded and it was dark and he was unable to reconsider (sic “recognise”) the attackers” but later said he was able to recognise the attackers (CB p.206.4).
The Tribunal did not accept that “in the reasonably foreseeable future there is a real chance that the applicant would face treatment of a kind which could amount to persecution for a Convention reason” (CB P.207.1).
The medical reports (CB p.200 [48] and p.205 [83]) were only one part of the evidence that the Tribunal did not accept.
The Tribunal rejected the applicant’s claims that “he fears harm on account of his Hindu religion and account (sic “on account”) of his political activity” (CB p.206.8).
Having considered the country information and the applicant’s lack of political profile, the Tribunal made a finding of fact that there is no real chance that the applicant would be caught up in such violence (“in Andhra Pradesh between Hindus and Muslims and between political parties”) (CB p.206.10).
The Tribunal found that the applicant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason now or in the reasonably foreseeable future (CB p.207.2).

Complementary Protection Provisions

The Tribunal considered the complementary protection provisions in s.36(2)(aa) of the Act which are as follows:
(aa)a non-citizen in Australia (other than a non-citizen mentioned in paragraph (a)) in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm; or
The Tribunal made the following findings of fact that are not amenable to review:
“The evidence before the Tribunal does not indicate that what the applicant might face on account of being a supporter of the TDP/TNFS, being anti Telenga and because he does not support the claims for a separate state or for any other reason, will involve a real risk of him being arbitrarily deprived of his life; having the death penalty carried out on him; or being subjected to torture; or to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or to degrading treatment or punishment.” (CB p.207.6).
The Tribunal found that the applicant does not satisfy the complimentary protection criterion for the grant of a protection visa (CB p.207.8).

Delay

The Tribunal found that the applicant’s claim that “he had to escape from India in June 2009 inconsistent with him returning to India in May 2010 and the subsequent delay in applying for a protection”. The Tribunal found this evidence “relevant in assessing the seriousness with which the applicant viewed risk (sic “the risk”) of persecution in India and the credibility of his claims” (CB p.206.6).
In Subramaniam, Anadaraj v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1998] FCA 305, Carr J held that even a three month delay in lodging a protection visa application is a legitimate matter to take into account when assessing the genuineness or depth of an applicant’s fear of persecution.
Here the applicant returned from India in May 2010 and delayed lodging his application for a visa until 9 February 2012. The Tribunal was entitled to take that delay into account.
The Tribunal found that having considered the claims individually and cumulatively, that the applicant does not have a well-founded fear for a Convention reason upon return to India now or in the reasonably foreseeable future (CB p.207.2). That finding of fact was open to the Tribunal and is not amenable to review.
In NAHI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10, the Full Court decided at [10]:
“In their written submissions, the appellants took exception to a number of findings of the Tribunal. In many cases, those exceptions were purely on the basis that the appellants disagree with the findings. In effect, the appellants sought to have the Court take a different view of various issues of fact from that taken by the Tribunal. To engage in fact-finding about the merits of the appellants’ case is no part of the function of the Court, whether at first instance or on appeal, in dealing with an application for relief under s 39B of the Judiciary Act. As Stone J said, Plaintiff S157 establishes that it is necessary for the appellants to show jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal, if they are to succeed. Whatever be the boundaries of jurisdictional error, they do not comprehend errors of fact as to the merits of the case put to the Tribunal.”
And at [11]:
“By s 420(2)(a) of the Migration Act, the Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence. By s 424(1), in conducting a review, the Tribunal may get any information that it considers relevant. There can be no objection in principle to the Tribunal relying on ‘country information’. The weight that it gives to such information is a matter for the Tribunal itself, as part of its fact-finding function. Such information as the Tribunal obtains for itself is not restricted to ‘guidance’, as the appellants submitted. It may be used to assess the credibility of a claim of a well-founded fear of persecution. It is not, as the first appellant submitted, an error of law, or a jurisdictional error, for the Tribunal to base a decision on ‘country information’ that is not true. The question of the accuracy of the ‘country information’ is one for the Tribunal, not for the Court. If the Court were to make its own assessment of the truth of ‘country information’, it would be engaging in merits review. The Court does not have power to do that.”

As stated in Selvadurai v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs & Anor (1994) 34 ALD 347:
“A decision-maker does not have to have rebutting evidence available before he or she can lawfully hold that a particular factual assertion by an applicant is not made out.”
The Court refers to the decisions of Durairajasingham at [67], Kopalapillai at pp.558 to 559, W148/00A at [64]-[69] per Tamberlin and R D Nicholson JJ, Wu Shan Liang at p.272 and Abebe at [137] (supra):
In Chen Xin He v the Minister of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1995] FCA 1682 RD Nicholson J stated at [24]:
“It is not the case, as the submissions for the applicant appear to assume, that the evidence of the applicant should have been believed by the Tribunal unless specifically disproved by the objective evidence before the Tribunal. Rather it was for the Tribunal to decide what facts it found on a consideration of all the evidence, subjective and objective. This required the Tribunal not only to consider inconsistencies but also to determine what evidence it found credible.”
As stated in Tefonu Pty Ltd v Insurance & Superannuation Commissioner (1993) 44 FCR 361 per Beazley J at p.374:
“The weight which is to be given to a relevant factor is a matter for the Tribunal, unless it can be said that the Tribunal’s decision is manifestly unreasonable. (Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 41; Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 at 230, 233-234).”
The decision must be “so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have come to it”: see Minister for Aboriginal Affairs & Anor v Peko-Wallsend Ltd & Ors (1986) 162 CLR 24 at p.41.
At the hearing before the Court in 24 April 2013 the applicant represented himself with the aid of Telegu interpreter and Ms Randall-Smith represented the first respondent. The applicant alleged that he was not given a proper opportunity to put his submissions to the Tribunal. The Court finds that the applicant appeared before the Tribunal with the assistance of a Telegu interpreter (CB p.197.3).
The applicant stated to the Court that when he sought clarification from the Tribunal about what was being asked, the Tribunal rephrased the questions for him. The applicant stated that after he had finished putting his submissions, his migration agent put submissions for him.
The Court does not accept that the applicant was not denied a proper opportunity to put his submissions to the Tribunal.
Section 422B of the Act provides that:
(1)This Division is taken to be an exhaustive statement of the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule in relation to matters it deals with.
The Court finds no breach of the provisions of Division 4 of Part 7 of the Act.
The applicant did not ask the Tribunal for a further hearing and cannot now complain that a further hearing was not granted. Indeed, he told the Court that he only felt the need for a further hearing after he read the decision of the Tribunal.
The applicant complained that the Tribunal relied on current country information and not on that which he provided which related to past events.
In NAHI (supra) the Full Court stated at [11]:
“By s 420(2)(a) of the Migration Act, the Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence. By s 424(1), in conducting a review, the Tribunal may get any information that it considers relevant. There can be no objection in principle to the Tribunal relying on ‘country information’. The weight that it gives to such information is a matter for the Tribunal itself, as part of its fact-finding function. Such information as the Tribunal obtains for itself is not restricted to ‘guidance’, as the appellants submitted. It may be used to assess the credibility of a claim of a well-founded fear of persecution. It is not, as the first appellant submitted, an error of law, or a jurisdictional error, for the Tribunal to base a decision on ‘country information’ that is not true. The question of the accuracy of the ‘country information’ is one for the Tribunal, not for the Court. If the Court were to make its own assessment of the truth of ‘country information’, it would be engaging in merits review. The Court does not have power to do that.”
It is settled law that s.424A(3)(a) of the Act excludes country information from the requirements of s.424A(1): see Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v NAMW (2004) 140 FCR 572 at [64]-[74] and [112]-[138] and VJAF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 178 at [11]-[16]. Accordingly, the Tribunal was not obliged to provide independent country information to the applicant for comment.
As stated in NAHI (supra) at [13]:
“Both the choice and the assessment of the weight of… (country information)… were matters for the Tribunal. The Court cannot substitute its own view of the material, even if it had a different view from that reached by the Tribunal.”
The decision continued at [14]:
“The Tribunal was not obliged to comment on every item of material before it, to the extent of saying why it rejected a particular item, or attributed less weight to it than to another item.”
The Tribunal does not commit jurisdictional error when it prefers one body of country information over another: see NAHI (supra) at [13]-[14] and VQAB v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 104 at [26].
A decision-maker must take into account the most current information available to it: see Peko-Wallsend Ltd (supra) at pp.44 to 45. A failure to act upon the most current information available is a denial of natural justice: see SZJTQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 1938 at [32]-[33].
All complaints raised at the hearing on 24 April 2013 are dismissed.

Ground One

Ground 1(a) of the Further Amended Application is dismissed. The Tribunal was entitled to make the findings it made about the medical reports. The new material is not admissible.
The Court accepts the submissions for the first respondent that:
“… the Tribunal has not breached its obligations pursuant to s 424A(1)(a) in failing to put to the applicant that his medical evidence was not accepted. The meaning of ‘information’ as defined in subsection (1)(a) has been considered in SZBYR v MIAC [2007] HCA 26, [15] as relating to the ‘existence of evidentiary material or documentation, not the existence of doubts, inconsistencies or the absence of evidence.’ The Tribunal was therefore not in breach of its obligations under s424A in not telling the applicant that his evidence was not accepted.”
Ground 1(b) alleges a failure by the Tribunal to put to the applicant at the hearing that it did not accept his medical evidence. That evidence was provided to the Tribunal by the applicant and is excluded from s.424A of the Act by s.424A(3)(b). In any event, the Tribunal put its concerns about the medical reports to the applicant (CB p.199.3).
Ground 1(c) – The Tribunal was entitled to accept or reject the evidence proffered [Lee (supra)], and did so for the reasons it stated. Medical qualifications were not required in order for the Tribunal to reject the reports.
Ground one is dismissed.

Ground Two

The Tribunal considered the provisions of s.36(2A) and decided that the applicant did not come within them (CB p.207 [94]). The Tribunal was not required to consider s.36(2B) as the Tribunal determined that the applicant would not be at real risk (CB p.207.5), and therefore the issue of relocation did not need to be determined.
Ground two is dismissed.

Ground Three

As the Tribunal decided that the applicant would not be at risk on return to India, it was not required to decide the issue of relocation.
Ground three is dismissed.
The Court find’s that the Tribunal’s decision is a privative clause decision that has not been infected with jurisdictional error. In such circumstances, and pursuant to s.474 of the Act, there is no jurisdiction for this Court to interfere.
The Amended Application for judicial review is dismissed.

I certify that the preceding sixty-one (61) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge F. Turner

Date: 17 May 2013