Myoung v Northern Land Council

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Myoung v The Northern Land Council [2006] FCA 1130

LAND RIGHTS – Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth) – traditional Aboriginal owners – competing claim groups

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) – decision of Northern Land Council – error of law – ‘no evidence’ ground – no reviewable error

Held: Application dismissed.

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth)
Aboriginal Land Rights Act (Northern Territory) 1976 (Cth)
Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth)

Tapgnuk v Northern Land Council (1996) 5 NTLR 109 discussed
R v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; Ex parte Hardiman (1980) 144 CLR 13 referred to
TXU Electricity Ltd v Office of the Regulator-General (2001) 3 VR 93 referred to
Risk v Northern Territory (2002) 210 CLR 392 cited
Northern Land Council v Olney (1992) 34 FCR 470 considered
The Queen v Toohey; Ex parte Meneling Station Proprietary Limited (1983) 158 CLR 327 considered
Foster v Lindsay (Unreported, Supreme Court of the Northern Territory, 16 January 1998) cited
Repatriation Commission v Strickland (1990) 22 ALD 10 cited
Szelagowicz v Stocker (1994) 54 IR 302 cited
Re Toohey; Ex parte Stanton (1982) 44 ALR 94 discussed
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273 referred to
R v Kearney; Ex parte Jurlama (1984) 158 CLR 426 referred to
Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 referred to
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 referred to
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v  Rajamanikkam (2002) 210 CLR 222 cited

ALBERT MYOUNG, HELEN KUWARDA AND EDWIN PURRUL (WHO BRING THESE PROCEEDINGS ON THEIR OWN BEHALF AND AS REPRESENTING THE MALAK MALAK/MADNGELE PEOPLE) v THE NORTHERN LAND COUNCIL AND MARJORIE FOSTER, MICKEY FOSTER AND RHONDA FOSTER (WHO ARE SUED ON THEIR OWN BEHALF AND AS REPRESENTING THE GROUP OF PERSONS WHO IDENTIFY AS KAMU PEOPLE)

NTD 11 OF 2003

MANSFIELD J
24 AUGUST 2006
ADELAIDE (HEARD IN DARWIN)


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NORTHERN TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY

NTD 11 OF 2003

BETWEEN:

ALBERT MYOUNG, HELEN KUWARDA AND EDWIN PURRUL (WHO BRING THESE PROCEEDINGS ON THEIR OWN BEHALF AND AS REPRESENTING THE MALAK MALAK/MADNGELE PEOPLE)
Applicant

AND:

THE NORTHERN LAND COUNCIL
First Respondent

MARJORIE FOSTER, MICKEY FOSTER AND RHONDA FOSTER (WHO ARE SUED ON THEIR OWN BEHALF AND AS REPRESENTING THE GROUP OF PERSONS WHO IDENTIFY AS KAMU PEOPLE)
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MANSFIELD J

DATE OF ORDER:

24 AUGUST 2006

WHERE MADE:

ADELAIDE (HEARD IN DARWIN)

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application be dismissed.

Note:   Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NORTHERN TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY

NTD 11 OF 2003

BETWEEN:

ALBERT MYOUNG, HELEN KUWARDA AND EDWIN PURRUL (WHO BRING THESE PROCEEDINGS ON THEIR OWN BEHALF AND AS REPRESENTING THE MALAK MALAK/MADNGELE PEOPLE)
Applicant

AND:

THE NORTHERN LAND COUNCIL
First Respondent

MARJORIE FOSTER, MICKEY FOSTER AND RHONDA FOSTER (WHO ARE SUED ON THEIR…

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Details
Case
[2006] FCA 1130
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Myoung v Northern Land Council, the dispute centred on the determination of traditional Aboriginal ownership of certain land areas. The Malak Malak sought to challenge the findings of the Committee, adopted by the Northern Land Council (NLC), regarding the spiritual affiliations and responsibilities of the Kamu and the Malak Malak concerning specific sites within the land area in question. The Malak Malak argued that the findings were made without sufficient evidence and that the NLC improperly exercised its power in reaching its conclusions. The court examined the Malak Malak's contentions, which included the claim that there was no evidence to support the findings of sole primary spiritual responsibility for certain sites and that the NLC had improperly exercised its power.

The court addressed the Malak Malak's argument that the findings were unsupported by evidence, particularly in relation to the site Jigirij. The court noted that the Committee had given weight to contemporary oral evidence and that it was entitled to do so. The court found that the Committee had rationally relied on evidence that supported its findings and that it was not necessary for the Committee to expressly refer to every piece of evidence it considered. The court concluded that the Committee had not made any reviewable errors in its findings and that the NLC's decision, which adopted the Committee's findings, was valid.

The court also considered the contention that the NLC had improperly exercised its power by failing to follow the correct legal principles. The court found that the NLC had correctly identified the question it needed to address under the Aboriginal Land Rights Act and had appropriately considered the evidence before it. The court held that the NLC's approach was not infected by any misplaced preconceptions and that it had reached a valid conclusion based on the evidence.

Based on the above findings, the court dismissed the application by the Malak Malak. The court ordered that the application be dismissed and directed the parties to address the issue of costs, particularly in relation to the costs incurred by the NLC.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case revolves around the Malak Malak people's challenge to the findings and decisions of the Committee and the Northern Land Council (NLC) regarding the identification of traditional Aboriginal owners of certain lands. The Committee had determined that the Kamu people have sole primary spiritual responsibility for the site Jigirij and the land nearby, as well as common spiritual affiliations to other shared sites, which gives rise to a primary spiritual responsibility for those sites. The Malak Malak argue that these findings were made without proper evidence and that the Committee and NLC erred in their approach. The Malak Malak also challenge the Committee's failure to expressly refer to particular evidence given by certain individuals, and that the findings substantially differed from those in the Toohey Report.

This matter came before the court as an application for judicial review under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (ADJR Act). The Malak Malak sought to challenge the decisions of the Committee and the NLC on the grounds of errors in law and fact. The court considered the arguments presented by both parties, including the contentions made by the Malak Malak regarding the 'no evidence' grounds and the Committee's approach to the inquiry. The court also examined the Committee's findings and whether they involved any reviewable error.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The second part of the Malak Malak contentions referred to above, regarding the identification of a ‘shared area’ or zone, was described in their written submissions as ‘dependent upon’ those concerning the matter I have first addressed. For the same reasons, I do not accept the contentions. The conclusion that the Malak Malak and the Kamu have shared common spiritual affiliations with a primary responsibility for certain sites is simply the practical consequence of its consideration of the respective claims of each of them in the terms required by the relevant definition.CONSIDERATION OF ‘NO EVIDENCE’ GROUNDS & IMPROPER EXERCISE OF POWER The balance of the Malak Malak contentions involve a more immediate attack upon factual findings of the Committee adopted by the NLC, including in some respects adopting the ‘no evidence’ ground of review available under s 5(1)(h) of the ADJR Act. In approaching these grounds, I have borne in mind the explanation of Mason CJ in Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 at 358-359 as to the interaction of subs 5(1)(e), (f) and (h) of the ADJR Act. I have also borne in mind that the High Court said in Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 per Mason J at 39-41 about the scope of the grounds of review under subs 5(1)(e) and (2)(a) and (b) of the ADJR Act. These contentions challenge the findings that the Kamu have:·sole primary spiritual responsibility for the site Jigirij and the land nearby, and·common spiritual affiliations to the shared sites which affiliations give rise to a primary spiritual responsibility for those sites.(a) The Committee’s findings as to primary spiritual responsibility for the site Jigirij The Malak Malak as a starting point refer to the facts, as the Committee found, that they have continued to reside upon and interrelate with the Land Trust land whereas for many years the Kamu did not do so and more recently have done so but in a less intense way. Justice Gray in the Kenbi (Cox Peninsula) Land Claim Report (referred to above) at [5.3.10] pointed out that applying the definition of ‘traditional Aboriginal owners’ to a particular claimant group is more readily done in the case of persons who are:‘… embedded within a society in which substantial bodies of knowledge are held by senior people, in which knowledge is held by others to an extent commensurate with age and status, and in which such knowledge is reinforced regularly by practices such as the conduct of ceremonies.’ The Committee’s findings concerning the site Jigirij were stated at [60]. The Malak Malak submissions emphasise that there was only evidence from one Kamu person, Francis Storer, about a willy wagtail dreaming which might support a spiritual affiliation with that site, and that the Committee did not have regard to the facts that the site Jigirij was not mentioned by name during the hearing before Justice Toohey (including that it was not referred to by Dr Rose, the anthropologist retained by the Kamu for the Committee hearing, in her first report); and that during the hearing before Justice Toohey, Mrs Pan Quee referred to the willy wagtail dreaming as also having a Malak Malak name; and that two other Malak Malak persons identified a wagtail dreaming as related to another place.

Decision

Reasons for decision

MANSFIELD J
It is necessary to refer briefly to two other contentions on behalf of the Malak Malak, simply to indicate that I have not overlooked them. They concern the Committee’s failure to expressly refer to particular evidence given by Mrs Pan Quee, Mrs O’Brien, and two old and knowledgeable Malak Malak men to Justice Toohey, and in the case of the two old men by video taken in about 1993. I do not consider that the fact that the Committee did not expressly refer to that material, or the map prepared by Dr McWilliam in reliance on it, in the Committee Report indicates that it did not consider that material. Although its analysis of the evidence is quite brief, it does not follow that it did not have regard to evidence which it did not expressly mention. It is clear that the Committee gave particular weight to the contemporary oral evidence. It was entitled to do so. The weight it gave to other evidence was a matter for the Committee. There was, as senior counsel for the Kamu pointed out, other evidence which supported the findings of the Committee and upon which it could rationally have relied.CONCLUSION For those reasons, I am not persuaded that the Committee Report, or the NLC decision which adopted it, involved any reviewable error. Accordingly, the application must be dismissed. I will hear the parties as to costs, in particular as to the costs of the NLC.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MANSFIELD J

The second part of the Malak Malak contentions principally relied upon ss 5(1)(h) and 5(3)(a) of the ADJR Act. They submitted that the Committee made important factual conclusions where there was no probative evidence to support the findings. In particular, the Malak Malak submitted that:(a) it was not reasonably open for the Committee to find that the Kamu have sole primary spiritual responsibility for the site Jigirij and the land nearby; and(b) it was not reasonably open for the Committee to find that the Kamu have common spiritual affiliations to the sites Jebenyi, Ngulukmoenet or Kabamal, Wani Alawun or Ngalyuwuy, or Jigirij; and(c) it was not open to the Committee to make findings concerning the traditional Aboriginal ownership of the land that were substantially different from those of the Toohey Report.CONSIDERATION OF ALLEGED ERRORS OF LAW(a) Whether the Committee erred in assuming that the inquiry concerned a ‘dispute among countrymen’ to be resolved upon that understanding The Malak Malak first contended (Ground 1 in the Amended Application) that the Committee, and hence the NLC, erroneously undertook its inquiry on the basis that the dispute concerned a ‘dispute among countrymen’ and that resolution of the dispute ‘must be based upon that understanding’. Those quotes come from the passage cited in [45] above. The contention was not that the Committee could not use its knowledge and expertise to determine the issues before it. They may do so: Repatriation Commission v Strickland (1990) 22 ALD 10; Szelagowicz v Stocker (1994) 54 IR 302 at 306. The contention was (as explained by the Malak Malak reply submissions) that the Committee’s focus on those matters was irrelevant to the task at hand. The Committee’s reference to what it called a ‘principle’ involved firstly an understanding of Aboriginal law and practice concerning country, involving no sharp country definitional lines but sometimes a ‘continuity’ between neighbouring countries where responsibility for country is shared. I do not understand the Malak Malak to contend either that the Committee could not hold that general understanding as a matter of fact, or could not use that general understanding as one starting point for its consideration. It says no more than its general knowledge permits, in appropriate circumstances, areas of shared or overlapping responsibility for country. The next step in the Committee’s consideration was to conclude that the Malak Malak and the Kamu are countrymen. That is an abbreviated way of expressing a conclusion on a complex finding of fact which was contentious. Once it was accepted that the Committee was obliged to address the competing claims of the Malak Malak and the Kamu under the ALRA and was not bound to adopt the conclusions in the Toohey Report (in accordance with the decision of Angel J in Tapgnuk), the Committee had to determine, among other things, whether the Kamu were a ‘local descent group’ who had common spiritual affiliations to a site or sites in the Land Trust area. Its abbreviated expression simply reflects its findings on that matter – a matter required to be addressed by the ALRA – and its findings that, in respect of some sites, within the Land Trust area, the Malak Malak also had common spiritual affiliations to certain of the same sites. I do not consider that its approach to the question posited by the definition of ‘traditional Aboriginal owners’ in the ALRA was infected by some misplaced pre-conception about how that task should be carried out. The Committee has identified the correct question. It has had regard to the evidence. And it has reached a conclusion on the issue it was required to address, and explained how it came to that conclusion.