SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: Muir v Franklins Limited [2001] QCA 173 PARTIES: CHRISTINE ANNE MUIR
(plaintiff/respondent/respondent)
v
FRANKLINS LIMITED ACN 000 929 902
(defendant/applicant/appellant)FILE NO: Appeal No 9504 of 2000
DC No 347 of 1999DIVISION: Court of Appeal PROCEEDING: Application for leave s 118 DCA (Civil) ORIGINATING COURT: District Court at Brisbane
DELIVERED ON: 11 May 2001 DELIVERED AT: Brisbane HEARING DATE: 31 January 2001 JUDGES: McMurdo P, Thomas JA and Mullins J
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the orders madeORDER: 1. The application for leave to appeal is granted.
2. The appeal is dismissed.
3. The applicant is to pay the respondent's costs of the application and the appeal to be assessed.CATCHWORDS: LIMITATION OF ACTIONS – POSTPONEMENT OF THE BAR – PERSONAL INJURIES ACTION – respondent successful in the District Court in extending the period of limitation in an action for personal injuries against the applicant – applicant sought leave to appeal – whether error in fact finding and evaluation of evidence – whether the onus misapplied as to the question of prejudice to the applicant – time at which prejudice considered.
Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld), s30, s31
Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541, followed
Carlowe v Frigmobile Pty Ltd [1999] QCA 527; Appeal No 1512 of 1999, 22 December 1999, considered
Dick v University of Queensland [1999] QCA 474; Appeal No 3204 of 1999, 12 November 1999, considered
Pizer v Ansett Australia Ltd [1998] QCA 298; Appeal No 6807 of 1998, 29 September 1998, considered
Sugden v Crawford [1989] 1 QdR 683, considered
Woodman v Maher [1999] QCA 233; [2001] 1 QdR106, consideredCOUNSEL: RJ Douglas SC with RM Treston for the applicant
T Matthews with PB de Plater for the respondentSOLICITORS:
McInnes Wilson for the applicant
Boyce Garrick for the respondent
McMURDO P: I am satisfied the primary judge's finding, that a material fact of a decisive character relating to the right of action, was not within the means of knowledge of the claimant[1] by 22 October 1997, was open on the evidence for the reasons given by Thomas JA and Mullins J.
[1]S 31(2), Limitation of Actions Act 1974.
The discretion under s 31(2) Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) must be exercised afresh because of the primary judge's error in exercising that discretion.
I am also satisfied that, for the reasons given by Mullins J, the claimant has shown that grounds exist for exercising that discretion in her favour; the applicant will not be materially prejudiced by the extension of time under s 31(2) Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) and the justice of the case requires the extension: see Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor.[2]
[2](1996) 186 CLR 541, 544, 547, 554, 568.
I agree with the orders proposed by Mullins J.
THOMAS JA: I have the advantage of having read the proposed…
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- AGLC
- Muir v Franklins Ltd [2001] QCA 173
- Case
- [2001] QCA 173
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the court were whether the District Court had made errors in its assessment of the evidence and its application of the law regarding the limitation of actions. Specifically, the court needed to determine if the District Court had correctly assessed the prejudice to the applicant and whether the onus of proof had been misapplied in this context. The applicant argued that the court had failed to properly consider the prejudice to him at the time when the action was eventually brought rather than at the time of the initial delay.
The court concluded that there were indeed errors in the District Court's approach to assessing prejudice and the application of the onus of proof. The court found that the District Court had not adequately considered the prejudice to the applicant at the relevant time, which was when the action was ultimately brought. Despite this, the court decided that the errors did not warrant a departure from the general rule against allowing appeals from interlocutory orders. Consequently, the application for leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal itself was dismissed. The applicant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the application and the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for leave to appeal is granted.
2. The appeal is dismissed.
3. The applicant is to pay the respondent's costs of the application and the appeal to be assessed.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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