Russell v State of Queensland

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Russell v State of Qld [2004] QCA 370

PARTIES:

MATTHEW LANSDOWNE RUSSELL
(plaintiff/respondent)
v
STATE OF QUEENSLAND
(defendant/appellant)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 4264 of 2004
SC No 4770 of 1996

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

General Civil Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

8 October 2004

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

6 September 2004

JUDGES:

Williams JA and Cullinane and Holmes JJ
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the orders made

ORDERS:

Allow the appeal only to the extent of varying paragraph 1 of the order of 20 April 2004 so that it reads:“The time for commencing proceedings in respect of the cause of action which accrued in 1992 to recover damages for the injuries alleged in paragraph 18 of the amended statement of claim be extended so that it expires on 11 June 1996.”  1.   

2.   The costs of the appeal of each party as assessed be that party’s costs in the proceeding

CATCHWORDS:

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS – POSTPONEMENT OF THE BAR – EXTENSION OF PERIOD – CAUSE OF ACTION IN RESPECT OF PERSONAL INJURIES – KNOWLEDGE OF MATERIAL FACTS – MATERIAL FACTS OF DECISIVE CHARACTER – where respondent commenced proceedings in 1996 against appellant seeking damages for personal injury – where injuries concerned were psychiatric injuries which were sustained as a result of undercover police work and consumption of illegal drugs in the course of that work which the respondent had performed as employee of respondent up until 1991 – where respondent first diagnosed with psychiatric disorder in 1995 – where learned primary judge found that a material fact of a decisive character was not within respondent’s knowledge until 1995 and so extended limitation period – whether learned primary judge erred in finding that respondent did not have actual or deemed knowledge of material fact of a decisive character before 1995

Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld), s 30, s 31, s 33

Healy v Femdale Pty Ltd [1993] QCA 210; Appeal No 37 of 1992, 9 June 1993, considered
Mills v Comalco Aluminium Ltd
Qld Full Court, Appeal No 64 of 1991, 6 November 1991, cited
Muir v Franklins Ltd [2001] QCA 173; Appeal No 9504 of 2000, 11 May 2001, cited
Pizer v Ansett Australia Ltd [1998] QCA 298; Appeal No 6807 of 1998, 29 September 1998, considered

COUNSEL:

R J Douglas SC, with D J Campbell, for the appellant
D B Fraser QC, with G A Mullins, for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Crown Law for the appellant
Gilshenan & Luton for the respondent

  1. WILLIAMS JA: The respondent commenced proceedings by causing a writ to be issued on 11 June 1996 naming the appellant as defendant and seeking damages for personal injury. A statement of claim was delivered on 6 July 1998 and amended on 2 August 2000. In its defence the appellant pleaded the Statute of Limitations contending the cause of action (or causes of action) accrued…

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Details
Case
[2004] QCA 370
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in Russell v State of Queensland concerns the limitation of actions in relation to personal injury claims. The respondent commenced proceedings against the appellant in 1996, seeking damages for psychiatric injuries sustained as a result of undercover police work and the consumption of illegal drugs during that work. The injuries were first diagnosed in 1995, and the respondent argued that the limitation period should be extended as they were not aware of the material facts of a decisive character until that time. The primary judge found in favour of the respondent, extending the limitation period, and the appellant appealed this decision.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent did not have actual or deemed knowledge of the material facts of a decisive character before 1995. The appellant argued that the respondent was aware of the material facts, or should have been aware, before 1995, and thus the limitation period should not have been extended. The court had to determine whether the primary judge's finding was correct, and if not, what the appropriate limitation period should be.

The court examined the evidence and found that the primary judge had erred in concluding that the respondent did not have knowledge of the material facts before 1995. The court determined that the material facts of a decisive character were within the respondent's knowledge before 1995. However, the court also found that the limitation period should still be extended to a certain extent, given the unique circumstances of the case. The limitation period was varied so that it expired on 11 June 1996, allowing the respondent to commence proceedings within that timeframe.

The final orders of the court were to allow the appeal only to the extent of varying the order of 20 April 2004, so that it read that the time for commencing proceedings in respect of the cause of action which accrued in 1992 be extended so that it expires on 11 June 1996. Additionally, the costs of the appeal for each party were to be as assessed, with each party bearing their own costs in the proceeding.

Orders

Orders of the court

Allow the appeal only to the extent of varying paragraph 1 of the order of 20 April 2004 so that it reads:“The time for commencing proceedings in respect of the cause of action which accrued in 1992 to recover damages for the injuries alleged in paragraph 18 of the amended statement of claim be extended so that it expires on 11 June 1996.” 1.

2. The costs of the appeal of each party as assessed be that party’s costs in the proceeding

Background

Background to the litigation

The respondent in this case commenced proceedings in 1996 against the appellant seeking damages for personal injury. The injuries in question were psychiatric in nature and were sustained by the respondent during the course of undercover police work. The respondent performed this work as an employee of the appellant until 1991. The respondent was first diagnosed with a psychiatric disorder in 1995. The learned primary judge found that a material fact of decisive character was not within the respondent's knowledge until 1995 and, as a result, extended the limitation period. The case revolves around whether the learned primary judge erred in finding that the respondent did not have actual or deemed knowledge of the material fact of decisive character before 1995.

This case has been through several stages in the Queensland courts. The respondent initially filed a claim in 1996 against the appellant for damages resulting from psychiatric injuries sustained during undercover police work. The primary judge found that the respondent did not have knowledge of the material facts of decisive character until 1995, which extended the limitation period. The appellant appealed the decision of the primary judge, leading to the current proceedings. The appeal was heard by a higher court which considered the arguments made by both parties and reviewed the findings of the primary judge.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the learned primary judge erred in finding that the respondent did not have actual or deemed knowledge of the material fact of decisive character before 1995.
2. Whether the limitation period should have been extended by the primary judge based on the respondent's lack of knowledge of the material facts.

Held
1. The court concluded that the learned primary judge did not err in finding that the respondent did not have actual or deemed knowledge of the material fact of decisive character before 1995.
2. The court held that the limitation period should not have been extended by the primary judge based on the respondent's lack of knowledge of the material facts.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court examined the issue of whether the learned primary judge erred in finding that the respondent did not have actual or deemed knowledge of the material fact of decisive character before 1995. The court noted that the respondent was diagnosed with a psychiatric disorder in 1995, which was the material fact of decisive character. The injuries in question were sustained during the respondent's employment with the respondent up until 1991, and the respondent did not have actual or deemed knowledge of the material fact before 1995. The court held that the learned primary judge did not err in this finding.

Next, the court considered whether the limitation period should have been extended by the primary judge based on the respondent's lack of knowledge of the material facts. The court observed that the limitation period for personal injury claims in Queensland is generally three years from the date of accrual of the cause of action. However, the Limitation of Actions Act allows for the extension of the limitation period if the plaintiff did not know, and could not with reasonable diligence have known, of the material facts upon which the cause of action is based.

The court noted that the primary judge extended the limitation period to 11 June 1996, which was six months after the respondent's diagnosis in 1995. The court held that this extension was not justified as the limitation period should not have been extended based on the respondent's lack of knowledge of the material facts. The court found that the cause of action accrued in 1992 when the injuries were sustained, and therefore, the limitation period should have expired on 11 June 1995. The court varied the order to reflect this, extending the limitation period only to 11 June 1996 for the cause of action which accrued in 1992.

The ratio decidendi of this decision is that the limitation period for personal injury claims should not be extended based solely on the plaintiff's lack of knowledge of material facts unless the plaintiff was unaware and could not with reasonable diligence have been aware of the material facts upon which the cause of action is based. The court did not depart from prior authority but applied the principles established in the Limitation of Actions Act and relevant case law.