Morgan v McMillan Investment Holdings Pty Ltd

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GAGELER CJ,
EDELMAN, STEWARD, GLEESON AND BEECH‑JONES JJ

JOHN MAXWELL MORGAN & ORS  APPELLANTS

AND

McMILLAN INVESTMENT HOLDINGS
PTY LTD & ANOR  RESPONDENTS

Morgan v McMillan Investment Holdings Pty Ltd

[2024] HCA 33

Date of Hearing: 12 June 2024
Date of Judgment: 11 September 2024

S119/2023

ORDER

Appeal dismissed with costs.

On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia

Representation

M R Pesman SC with M L Rose for the appellants (instructed by ERA Legal)

B W Walker SC with J T Svehla for the first respondent (instructed by Somerset Ryckmans)

Submitting appearance for the second respondent

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. A "pooling order" is an order made by a court under s 579E(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) which permits the assets and liabilities of a group of companies in liquidation to be pooled for the general benefit of the companies' unsecured creditors, instead of the ordinary application of separate entity principles to the simultaneous liquidation of companies within the group. The order is made in relation to two or more companies where all companies are being wound up, a gateway requirement is established, the court is satisfied that the pooling order is "just and equitable", and no prohibition exists on making the order. The effects of a pooling order include each company in the pooled group being taken to be jointly and severally liable for the debts of each other company and intercompany debts within the pooled group being extinguished.[1]

    [1]Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 579E(2).

  2. The primary judge in the Federal Court of Australia (Rares J) treated two companies as a group (having reinstated one of them), and made a pooling order under s 579E(1) of the Corporations Act. The primary judge was satisfied that a gateway requirement for a pooling order had been established. The affairs of the two companies were significantly intermingled and his Honour concluded that it was "just and equitable" that a pooling order be made and that the order was not prohibited, as it would be if, for example, there were a material disadvantage to any eligible unsecured creditor of either company.[2]

    [2]Corporations Act, ss 579E(1), 579E(10)(a)(i), see also s 579E(10)(b)(ii).

  3. Section 579E(1) provides for a number of alternative gateways before a court can consider whether it is satisfied that it is just and equitable to make a pooling order. This appeal concerns one of them. The gateway found by the primary judge to have been satisfied, and with which this appeal is concerned, is contained in s 579E(1)(b)(iv), which requires that "one or more companies in the group own particular property that is or was used, or for use, by any or all of the companies in the group in connection with a business, a scheme, or an undertaking, carried on jointly by the companies in the group".

  4. A majority of the Full Court…

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Details
Case
[2024] HCA 33
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal concerned a pooling order made under section 579E(1) of the *Corporations Act 2001* (Cth). The parties were Mr Morgan, the liquidator of Sydney Allen Printers Pty Ltd (SAP) and Sydney Allen Manufacturing Pty Ltd (SAM), and McMillan Investment Holdings Pty Ltd (MIH), a secured creditor of SAP and SAM. The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) was also a respondent, submitting to the Court's order. The dispute arose from Mr Morgan's assertion that a pooling order should be made to wind up SAP and SAM as if they were a single company, which MIH opposed.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the "gateway requirement" in section 579E(1)(b)(iv) of the *Corporations Act* was satisfied. This required the Court to determine if an alleged chose in action, arising from a sale agreement for the disposal of the companies' joint business, constituted "particular property used, or for use, in connection with a joint business, scheme or undertaking" of SAP and SAM. The Court also considered whether this chose in action was "used or available for use by two or more companies" and whether it had a "sufficient connection" to the undertaking or carrying out of their joint business. A further question was whether the reinstatement of SAM after its deregistration, under section 601AH(5) of the *Corporations Act*, deemed it to have undertaken activities during the period of its deregistration.

The High Court reasoned that the purpose of pooling orders is to improve outcomes for unsecured creditors by consolidating the assets and liabilities of related companies wound up in insolvency. However, the gateway requirement in section 579E(1)(b)(iv) imposes a condition that the property in question must have a sufficient connection to the joint business, scheme, or undertaking. The Court found that while SAP and SAM had conducted a joint business, they did not incur joint liability for debt or have joint ownership or operation of property in that business. The alleged chose in action, arising from the disposal of the business, was merely a potential future enforcement right and did not possess the required connection to the previously conducted joint business. Furthermore, the Court held that the retrospective effect of section 601AH(5) upon SAM's reinstatement did not deem it to have held property or carried on a joint business during its deregistration period.

Consequently, the High Court dismissed the appeal. The Court ordered that Mr Morgan pay the costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

A majority of the Full Court of the Federal Court (Yates J and Beach J; Markovic J dissenting) allowed an appeal by a creditor company. The majority held that the gateway in s 579E(1)(b)(iv) was not satisfied and that the pooling order should not have been made. For the reasons below, the majority was correct and the appeal should be dismissed.BackgroundThe parties The first appellant, Mr Morgan, is the liquidator of the second and third appellants, Sydney Allen Printers Pty Ltd (In Liquidation) and Sydney Allen Manufacturing Pty Ltd (In Liquidation), described respectively as "SAP" and "SAM". The first respondent, McMillan Investment Holdings Pty Ltd ("MIH"), was a secured creditor of both SAP and SAM. The second respondent, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission ("ASIC"), submits to any order made by this Court, save as to costs. The principals of MIH were Mr McMillan and his daughter Ms McMillan. The McMillans are not parties to this litigation but they are alleged by Mr Morgan to have become involved in the management of SAP and SAM following MIH becoming a secured creditor of the companies. Mr Morgan alleges that the involvement of the McMillans was such as to render them shadow directors of SAP and SAM. The business: administration, liquidation and deregistration SAP and SAM operated a colour printing business. SAP ordered supplies for the business and did all the printing work. In about late 2013, SAP employed about 80 staff. SAM owned, or had rights over, the equipment used in the business including expensive printing presses. SAM created credit facilities which SAP used to order supplies. SAP paid creditors in the course of operating the business. However, entries in the internal accounts between SAP and SAM indicated that SAP paid the creditors on behalf of SAM. On 7 April 2016, administrators were appointed to SAP and, as part of a creditors' voluntary winding up, liquidators were appointed to SAM. On 13 May 2016, liquidators were appointed to SAP. In each case, the joint administrators or liquidators of SAP and SAM were Mr Morgan and Mr Davis. On 5 April 2018, Mr Davis sought the deregistration of SAM by ASIC on the basis that no funds were left in the creditors' voluntary liquidation and that the affairs of SAM had been fully wound up. On 10 June 2018, ASIC deregistered SAM with the effect that SAM ceased to exist and its property (other than any property held on trust) vested in ASIC.[3][3]Corporations Act, s 601AD(1) and (2). On 14 February 2020, Mr Davis retired as a liquidator of SAP. Mr Morgan became the sole liquidator of SAP.The transactions relevant to this appeal On 27 March 2015, MIH entered into a finance facility with SAP and SAM (which were described together as "the borrower"). Clause 3.6 of the finance facility made SAP and SAM jointly liable for all amounts due in respect of the principal sum and uncapitalised interest. On 7 April 2016, when SAM was placed into liquidation, the records of SAP and SAM showed that SAM owed SAP more than $1 million. The primary judge observed that this debt had been recorded in spite of the fact that SAM did not appear to have received any, or any sufficient, remuneration from SAP for the provision of SAM's machinery and credit facilities.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

GAGELER CJ, EDELMAN, STEWARD, GLEESON AND BEECH-JONES JJ (dissent)
On 2 December 2021, when the primary judge ordered the reinstatement of SAM, the first sentence of s 601AH(5) had the effect that SAM was deemed to have continued in existence as if it had not been deregistered by ASIC from 10 June 2018. At the time of deregistration, SAM was in a creditors' voluntary winding up. The effect, therefore, was that SAM must be taken to have continued in a creditors' voluntary winding up for that period of more than three years until 2 December 2021. The first sentence of s 601AH(5) had no greater retrospective effect than that. As the second sentence confirms, the first sentence of s 601AH(5) did not deem persons to be directors of SAM during the period in which SAM was deregistered. As the third and fourth sentences confirm in addressing the revesting of property and its terms, the first sentence of s 601AH(5) also did not deem SAM to have held any property during that period.Conclusion There was no dispute on this appeal that in the conduct of their joint business, SAP and SAM did not incur any joint liability for a debt and did not have any joint ownership or operation of property. The mere availability to SAP and SAM of an alleged chose in action, arising from the disposal of the business of the companies, and which might be enforced in the future, does not have the required connection with the previously existing business that they carried on jointly to satisfy the gateway requirement in s 579E(1)(b)(iv). The appeal should be dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by:

By special leave to appeal, Mr Morgan appealed to this Court. Mr Morgan's grounds of appeal and submissions asserted: that the majority of the Full Court should have held that the gateway in s 579E(1)(b)(iv) was satisfied; that Beach J erred by treating Mr Morgan's alleged chose in action as only coming into existence at settlement of the contract on 1 July 2016, when it arose on 5 May 2016; and that s 601AH(5) of the Corporations Act deemed SAM to have been carrying on a joint business or undertaking with SAP of getting in their debts during the period that SAM was deregistered.Pooling orders and the gateways in the Corporations ActThe history and purpose of pooling In 1988, the Law Reform Commission ("the Commission") considered whether companies that have engaged in a common business enterprise might be "wound up together as if they were the one company". This would usually create one pool of property and one set of creditors.[9] At a high level, the intended aim of pooling was to improve outcomes for unsecured creditors. Other perceived advantages of pooling were to minimise the costs of insolvency and contribute to market efficiency.[10][9]Australia, Law Reform Commission, General Insolvency Inquiry, Report No 45 (1988), vol 1 at 343 [854]. [10]Tran, "A framework for analysing the joint carrying out of 'a business, a scheme or an undertaking'" (2014) 22 Insolvency Law Journal 131 at 138. The Commission proposed the introduction of legislation to provide that where there were two or more "related companies"[11] being wound up in insolvency, the court could, on application of a liquidator, make an order that the companies be wound up as if they were one company. The proposed legislation did not contain any gateway for the making of a pooling order apart from the requirement that the group companies be related, but included the condition that the court be satisfied that it was "just" to make the order.[12] The draft legislation proposed by the Commission identified some of the matters to be considered when deciding whether the order was "just". In addition to the extent to which creditors of any of the companies in liquidation may be advantaged or disadvantaged by a pooling order, the Commission identified four further matters to be considered, concerned with the past conduct of the related companies: (i) the extent to which any of the companies took part in the management of any of the other companies; (ii) the conduct of any of the companies towards the creditors of any of the other companies; (iii) the extent to which the circumstances that gave rise to the winding up of one of the companies are attributable to the actions of any of the other companies; and (iv) the extent to which the business of the companies has been intermingled.[13] [11]See Companies Act 1981 (Cth), s 7(5). [12]Australia, Law Reform Commission, General Insolvency Inquiry, Report No 45 (1988), vol 2, Appendix A at 164-165.[13]Australia, Law Reform Commission, General Insolvency Inquiry, Report No 45 (1988), vol 2, Appendix A at 164-165. See also vol 1 at 344 [855], [857].