Moreton Bay Regional Council v Caseldan Pty Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Moreton Bay Regional Council v Caseldan Pty Ltd [2017] QCA 72

PARTIES:

MORETON BAY REGIONAL COUNCIL
v
CASELDAN PTY LTD
(applicant)

ACN 100 589 571(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 7925 of 2016
LAC No 1 of 2015

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Appeal from the Land Appeal Court

ORIGINATING COURT:


Land Appeal Court at Brisbane – [2016] QLAC 1

DELIVERED ON:

24 April 2017

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

17 February 2017

JUDGES:

Gotterson and McMurdo JJA and Bond J
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the orders made

ORDERS:

1.   The application for leave to appeal is refused.

2.   The applicant is to pay the respondent’s costs of the application on the standard basis.

CATCHWORDS:

REAL PROPERTY – COMPULSORY ACQUISITION OF LAND – PROCEEDINGS FOR COMPENSATION – QUEENSLAND – APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT – where the applicant compulsorily acquired land from the respondent “for recreation ground purposes” – where the Land Court ordered the value of the resumed land be assessed for compensation purposes at $1.8 million – where the Land Appeal Court allowed the respondent’s appeal and determined the value of the resumed land to be $4.1 million – where the applicant seeks reinstatement of the assessment ordered by the Land Court of $1.8 million – whether the Land Appeal Court erred in law in its determination – whether the application for leave to appeal should be granted

ENVIRONMENT AND PLANNING – DEVELOPMENT CONTROL – CONTROL OF PARTICULAR MATTERS – ROADS – where the resumed land was surrounded by land owned by the applicant within a Sports and Recreation Zone – where the applicant made a material change of use application to itself in relation to this land for development purposes – where the application included the construction of an internal road which would provide access to the resumed land – where the Land Appeal Court found that the Land Court member erred in holding the concurrence agency could not impose an access condition on the applicant’s development application under the Sustainable Planning Act 2009 (“SPA”) – where the Land Appeal Court adopted by analogy the decision in Intrapac Parkridge Pty Ltd v Logan City Council (“Intrapac”) – where the applicant contends that the decision in Intrapac would suggest to a prudent purchaser that the prospect of an access condition being imposed on the applicant was “highly likely” – where the applicant contends that the facts in Intrapac are materially different to the current matter – where the applicant contends that the Land Appeal Court thereby erred in reaching a view of what a hypothetical purchaser would think – whether the Land Appeal Court erred in adopting Intrapac by analogy – whether the alleged error amounts to an error of law

ENVIRONMENT AND PLANNING – ENVIRONMENT AND PLANNING – DEVELOPMENT CONTROL – MATTERS FOR CONSIDERATION OF CONSENT AUTHORITY – GENERALLY – CONSIDERATION OF PLANNING SCHEMES – where the resumed land was…

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Details
Case
[2017] QCA 72
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Moreton Bay Regional Council sought to appeal against the decision of the Land Appeal Court in relation to the compulsory acquisition of land from Caseldan Pty Ltd for recreation purposes. The Land Court had initially assessed the value of the resumed land at $1.8 million, but the Land Appeal Court subsequently overturned this decision, determining the value to be $4.1 million. The primary legal issues centred around whether the Land Appeal Court erred in its assessment of the value of the land, particularly regarding the acceptance of unaccepted offers and the applicability of certain legal principles in the context of the compulsory acquisition. The Supreme Court had to determine if the Land Appeal Court's approach and methodology in evaluating the offers and the value of the land were legally sound.

The Supreme Court found that the Land Appeal Court did not treat the appeal as a de novo hearing but rather as a rehearing, considering whether there were factual, legal, or discretionary errors in the Land Court's decision. The Court examined the Land Appeal Court's handling of the unaccepted offers, its interpretation of relevant legal principles, and its overall valuation process. The Court held that the Land Appeal Court appropriately considered the offers and correctly applied the principles relevant to the admissibility of unaccepted offers in determining the land's value. The Court concluded that the Land Appeal Court's methodology and assessment were legally sound and that there was no basis to grant leave to appeal.

The Supreme Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal and ordered that the applicant pay the respondent's costs of the application on the standard basis. This decision affirms the Land Appeal Court's valuation of the resumed land at $4.1 million and rejects the Council's contentions that the Land Appeal Court erred in its determination.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave to appeal is refused.

2. The applicant is to pay the respondent’s costs of the application on the standard basis.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Evidence of offers: Evidence of nine offers for the resumed land was adduced before the Land Court member. It is common ground that five of these were conditional, usually on obtaining a development approval. One of the others, which was made by Flaskas Pty Ltd on 2 June 2005 (“the Flaskas offer”), is the subject of an alleged error on the part of the Land Appeal Court. The error relates to the categorisation of that offer as an unconditional one. The three other offers were two unconditional offers made by the owner of the Comiskey land on 10 and 16 August 2006 respectively and a further unconditional offer made by the same owner in January 2009. The Land Court member concluded that the offers by the owner of the Comiskey land could not be regarded as genuine offers representing a proper indication of value;[41] however, he did observe that if he had regarded them as genuine, then, following Phillipou & Anor v Housing Commission of Victoria,[42] he would have taken them into account as relevant. The member also held that the Flaskas offer was to be given no weight because it was aged, having been made in 2005, and that the other offers ought to be given no weight because they were conditional.[43] These conclusions were challenged in the Land Appeal Court.[41]LC Reasons [205].[42](1969) 18 LGRA 254.[43]LC Reasons [205]. Land Appeal Court’s reasons with respect to offers and valuation: In paragraphs 61 to 65 inclusive of its reasons, and under the heading “Relevance of offers”, the Land Appeal Court discussed statements of principle with respect to the relevance of offers upon which their admissibility depends for the purpose of curial determination of the value of land. Relevantly for present purposes, the court quoted from the judgment of Spigelman CJ in MMAL Rentals Pty Ltd v Bruning,[44] passages in which his Honour repudiated a blanket rule of exclusion of offer evidence and observed that, absent expert evidence to the contrary, an offer “clearly establishes a floor”.[44][2004] NSWCA 451; (2004) 63 NSWLR 167 at [96], [97] (Mason P and Hodgson JA agreeing). Also quoted was a substantial extract from the judgment of Buss JA in Auxil Pty Ltd & Anor v Terranova & Ors[45] in which his Honour set out several propositions in relation to the admissibility of unaccepted offers for proof of the value of land which he had drawn from his survey of the authorities. The extract included the following paragraphs:[45][2009] WASCA 163; (2009) 260 ALR 164 at [45]-[51] (Miller JA agreeing).“[46] First, the general rule of admissibility is that an unaccepted offer to purchase land is not admissible as 'direct evidence' of its value.[47]Secondly, the general rule does not exclude evidence of an unaccepted offer in each and every case.[48]Thirdly, where evidence of an unaccepted offer to purchase land is sought to be tendered, the purpose for which the tender is made should be ascertained and analysed.[49]Fourthly, although an unaccepted offer to purchase land is not admissible as 'direct evidence' of its value, the evidence may be admissible, in a particular case, for limited or general purposes.[50]Fifthly, the limited or general purposes for which evidence of an unaccepted offer may be admissible include establishing:(a)that later sales sought to be relied on in assessing the value of the land were not forced sales;(b)the existence of a person who might be prepared to pay more than the ordinary market value of the land;(c)the demand in the market for the land in the context of evaluating whether a mortgagee of the land breached its duty of good faith in exercising its power of sale;(d)the special potentiality of the land for a specific purchaser where the offer has been made by that purchaser and in respect of that land.Also, an unaccepted offer to purchase land may be admissible for the general purpose of providing some assistance in determining the lower limit of the market value of the land in the case of a purchaser's actual unconditional open offer to purchase at a specific price or for the limited purpose of checking the methodology adopted by an expert valuer in his or her evidence. The illustrations I have given are not, of course, intended to be exhaustive.”I note that no issue is taken on appeal here with respect to the discussion of principle by the Land Appeal Court under the heading “Relevance of offers”.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Having determined not to adopt either valuations, the Land Appeal Court observed that it was necessary for it to make some form of judgment of value, intended to reflect the relative value of the resumed land when compared to other sale properties.[14] The Court reached the following conclusion:“[133] Bearing in mind the matters that have been discussed, it would seem appropriate to determine the value of the land at $4.1 million. This would better reflect the differences between the resumed land and the sale properties, than did either Mr Rabbitt’s valuation or that of Mr Gillespie; and would not be inconsistent with the unconditional offers to purchase the resumed land.”[14]LAC Reasons [129].The appellant’s criticism of the Land Appeal Court’s decision-making technique The first matter addressed by senior counsel for the Council in oral submissions concerned the decision-making technique adopted by the Land Appeal Court. This matter was not the subject of a ground of appeal; nor had it been the subject of written submissions. It is convenient to deal with it at this point. In the course of oral submissions, senior counsel for the Council accepted[15] that the principles as to how the Land Appeal Court may deal with a decision of the Land Court are correctly set out in Mahoney v Department of Transport and Main Roads.[16]There, the observations were made, firstly, that an appeal to the Land Appeal Court is by way of rehearing rather than by way of strict appeal as in House v The King[17] and, secondly, that an appellant to the Land Appeal Court may succeed only by establishing that the decision of the member of the Land Court resulted from factual, legal or discretionary error.[18][15]Appeal Transcript 1-13 ll1-5; 1-14 l22.[16][2014] QCA 356; (2014) 206 LGERA 302 at [24].[17](1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40.[18]Applying De Tourner v Chief Executive, Department of Environment and Resource Management [2009] QCA 395; [2011] 1 Qd R 200 at [22] per Fraser JA (McMurdo P and McMeekin J agreeing). The complaint made of the approach of the Land Appeal Court to the matter was that it treated it as an appeal de novo, and not as an appeal by way of rehearing. It was submitted that the Land Appeal Court “set out from scratch” and that it did so “because it thought it identified errors of law which did not exist”.[19] In my view, this submission misconceives both what the Land Appeal Court did and when that court may intervene where factual error is revealed.[19]Appeal Transcript 1-12 ll45-47. A perusal of the reasons for judgment of the Land Appeal Court reveals that it gave extensive consideration as to whether the Land Court member had erred with respect to factual matters. It is sufficient to illustrate that it did so by referring to significant instances of where that occurred. First, the Land Appeal Court concluded that the member had erred in finding that the offers made by the owner of the Comiskey land were not genuine. That conclusion, the Land Appeal Court said, was based entirely on one document and it failed to take into account the evidence of Ms George in relation to them. It reached a contrary conclusion on the whole of the evidence.[20][20]LAC Reasons [78].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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