Moore v Australian National Car Parks Pty Ltd

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[2009] QDC 374

DISTRICT COURT

CIVIL JURISDICTION

JUDGE ROBIN QC

No 2875 of 2009

MARION MOORE Applicant

and

AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL CAR PARKS
PTY LTD
Respondent

BRISBANE

..DATE 12/11/2009

ORDER

CATCHWORDS - Moore v Australian National Carparks
Personal Injuries Proceeding Act 2002 s 59(2)(b)

HIS HONOUR:  The Court has made an order in accordance with an initialled draft in the following terms:

"1 The applicant be granted leave pursuant to section 59(2)(b) of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 ("the Act") to start before the end of November 2009, a proceeding in the Court, against the respondents, for damages for personal injury arising from an accident on 14 March 2006;

2. Subject to any relaxation by the Court, the proceeding be stayed pending compliance with Part 1 of Chapter 2 of the Act or the proceeding is discontinued or otherwise ends;

3.   The applicant pay the second, third and fourth respondents' costs of the application to be assessed if not agreed. "

The applicant, the Court is told, hit her head on an overhead pipe in a shopping centre car park and fell, injuring herself. 

The first respondent hasn't appeared when called outside the Court today, although service of the application on it is proved.  It has, in the past, identified the relevant insurer. Whereas it operated the car park, the second and third respondents, it's understood, operated the shopping centre in partnership and are to be regarded as the occupiers.  The fourth respondent was the centre manager. 

The applicant had some difficulties in assembling the necessary resources to obtain legal assistance.  She undertook preparation of the appropriate notice of claim in a timely way.  That document was subsequently improved when the solicitors approached originally came into the matter formally.  They are no longer acting for her, new solicitors having come in.

The accident having occurred on the 14th of March 2006, an effective extension of the ordinary limitation period of virtually eight months is being sought. In a proceeding under comparable provisions in section 57(2)(b) of the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994, the relevant principles were identified in Paterson -v- Leigh [2008] QSC 277 at paragraph [8]. The relevance of the same principles for the purposes of section 59(2)(b) of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (PIPA) was accepted in Tiver v. Sunshine Coast Regional Council [2009] QDC 106. In the earlier case, the principles were stated in this way:

"a) The discretion to be exercised in respect of an application pursuant to s.57(2)(b) of the Act is unfettered;

(b)  The onus lies on the applicant to show good reason why the discretion ought to be exercised in his or her favour;

(c) Where an applicant is able to show that the delay which has occurred was occasioned by a 'conscientious effort to comply' with the Act then that would normally be good reason for the favourable exercise of the discretion but is not a 'dominating consideration'. Conversely, claimants who ignore the obligations imposed on them by the Act…

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Details
Case
[2009] QDC 374
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Moore v Australian National Car Parks Pty Ltd was heard in the District Court of Queensland. Marion Moore, the applicant, sought damages for personal injuries she sustained from an accident that occurred on 14 March 2006. Moore claimed that she hit her head on an overhead pipe in a shopping centre car park, which caused her to fall and injure herself. The respondents, Australian National Car Parks Pty Ltd and others, were involved in operating the car park and the shopping centre. The primary legal issue before the court was whether Moore should be granted leave to commence proceedings outside the statutory limitation period, as provided under section 59(2)(b) of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002.

The court considered the principles established in Paterson v Leigh, which were relevant to the exercise of discretion under comparable provisions in the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994. These principles included the unfettered nature of the discretion, the onus on the applicant to demonstrate good reason for an extension, and the importance of the interests of justice. The court acknowledged that while the applicant's delay in initiating proceedings was partly due to her solicitors' failure to advise her of the limitation period, the delay was not solely attributable to her. The court also noted that the respondents had been dilatory in their conduct, with no response provided as required by the Act. Furthermore, the applicant had provided a notice of claim promptly after being advised by her current solicitors of the necessity to do so.

Based on these considerations, the court found that Moore had demonstrated sufficient grounds for the exercise of discretion in her favour. The delay was not due to a lack of conscientious effort on her part, and there was no likelihood of prejudice to the respondents. The court thus granted Moore leave to commence proceedings outside the limitation period, subject to certain conditions, including the payment of costs by Moore to the second, third, and fourth respondents. The proceedings were to be stayed pending compliance with the Act or until they were otherwise discontinued.

Background

Background to the litigation

Marion Moore, the applicant, suffered an injury when she hit her head on an overhead pipe in a shopping centre car park, resulting in a fall and injury. The accident occurred on 14 March 2006. The first respondent, Australian National Car Parks Pty Ltd, operated the car park, while the second and third respondents operated the shopping centre in partnership and are regarded as the occupiers. The fourth respondent was the centre manager. The applicant faced difficulties in assembling resources to obtain legal assistance but prepared a notice of claim in a timely manner, which was later improved when the originally approached solicitors formally entered the matter. However, these solicitors are no longer acting for her, and new solicitors have since come on board.

The applicant seeks an effective extension of the limitation period of almost eight months. She had entrusted the conduct of her claim to a firm of solicitors to protect her interests but did not institute proceedings in time due to their failure to advise her of the relevant limitation period. Despite this, the applicant gave early notice to the respondents of her claim for damages, and there is no prospect of prejudice to the respondents by the late institution of proceedings. The respondents have been dilatory in their conduct of the matter, having not provided a response under section 20 of the Act and making no efforts to progress the matter. The applicant's solicitor has deposed to the claim having reasonable prospects of success, and the applicant has provided explanations for periods of delay attributable to her, such as raising funds to pay her solicitors' fees and changing contact details. The delay in the applicant being advised to bring the application after the expiry of the limitation period was caused by her former solicitors either not being aware, or not advising her, that the limitation period had passed.

The matter of Moore v Australian National Car Parks Pty Ltd was an application under section 59(2)(b) of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002, seeking an extension of the limitation period to commence proceedings for damages arising from an accident that occurred on 14 March 2006. The applicant, Marion Moore, had initially engaged solicitors who failed to advise her of the impending limitation period, resulting in the delay in initiating court proceedings. Subsequently, new solicitors entered the case and promptly sought an extension of time to commence the action. The respondents, including the car park operator and shopping centre occupiers, had not responded to any statutory notifications or made any settlement offers, contributing to the delay in the applicant's ability to progress her claim. The application was heard in the District Court of Queensland, with the presiding judge considering the relevant principles established in previous cases such as Paterson v Leigh and Tiver v Sunshine Coast Regional Council, which outline the criteria for exercising discretion under the Act. The judge accepted that the applicant had made a conscientious effort to comply with the statutory requirements and granted the application, allowing the proceeding to be commenced before the end of November 2009, subject to compliance with the Act and staying of the proceeding until such compliance. The judge also ordered the applicant to pay the costs of the application to the second, third, and fourth respondents, to be assessed if not agreed.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Does the applicant have a good reason for the delay in commencing proceedings under section 59(2)(b) of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002?
2. Was the applicant's delay in commencing proceedings due to a conscientious effort to comply with the Act?
3. Are there any factors that may prejudice the respondents due to the delay in the applicant's proceedings?
4. Are the interests of justice best served by allowing the applicant to commence proceedings outside the limitation period?
5. Was the delay in the applicant being advised to bring the application due to the actions or inactions of her former solicitors?

Held
1. Does the applicant have a good reason for the delay in commencing proceedings under section 59(2)(b) of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002?
The Court concluded that the applicant's failure to institute proceedings in time was due to the failure of her solicitors to advise her of the relevant limitation period, which constitutes a good reason for the delay.

2. Was the applicant's delay in commencing proceedings due to a conscientious effort to comply with the Act?
The Court found that the applicant had entrusted the conduct of her claim to competent solicitors, which provided an adequate explanation for the delay and indicates a conscientious effort to comply with the Act.

3. Are there any factors that may prejudice the respondents due to the delay in the applicant's proceedings?
The Court determined that there is no prospect of prejudice to the respondents by the late institution of proceedings, as the applicant gave early notice of her claim for damages.

4. Are the interests of justice best served by allowing the applicant to commence proceedings outside the limitation period?
The Court found that the interests of justice are best served by allowing the applicant to commence proceedings outside the limitation period, considering the circumstances of the case.

5. Was the delay in the applicant being advised to bring the application due to the actions or inactions of her former solicitors?
The Court concluded that the delay in the applicant being advised to bring the application after the expiry of the limitation period was caused by the applicant's former solicitors either not being aware or not advising her that the limitation period had passed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Queensland District Court in Moore v Australian National Car Parks Pty Ltd considered the applicant's delay in commencing proceedings under section 59(2)(b) of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (PIPA). The court found that the applicant, Marion Moore, had a good reason for the delay as it was due to the failure of her solicitors to advise her of the relevant limitation period. This provided an adequate explanation for the delay, as the applicant had entrusted the conduct of her claim to a firm of competent solicitors. The court further found that the delay in the applicant being advised to bring the application was caused by her former solicitors either not being aware or not advising her that the limitation period had passed.

The court also considered whether the delay was due to a conscientious effort to comply with the Act. The applicant had given early notice to the respondents of her claim for damages, and the delay in advancement of her claim was due to both inaction by her solicitors or awaiting information from the respondents' solicitors. The applicant had also provided explanations for the periods of delay attributable to her, such as raising funds to pay her solicitors' fees and changing contact details. The court found that the applicant had made a conscientious effort to comply with the Act.

In assessing whether there were any factors that may prejudice the respondents due to the delay in the applicant's proceedings, the court noted that the respondents had been dilatory in their conduct of the matter, in that no response pursuant to section 20 of the Act had been provided, and the respondents had made no efforts to progress the matter. The court also found that there was no prospect of prejudice to the respondents by the late institution of proceedings.

The court further considered whether the interests of justice were best served by allowing the applicant to commence proceedings outside the limitation period. The court found that the applicant's solicitor had deposed to the claim having, in her opinion, reasonable prospects of success. The court also noted that the applicant had brought the application promptly upon receiving advice from her present solicitors that it was necessary.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that where an applicant is able to show that the delay which has occurred was occasioned by a failure of her solicitors to advise her of the relevant limitation period, that would normally be good reason for the favourable exercise of the discretion under section 59(2)(b) of the PIPA. The court distinguished this case from prior authority by finding that the delay was due to the failure of the applicant's solicitors rather than the applicant's own inactions. The court also found that the applicant had made a conscientious effort to comply with the Act and that there were no factors that would prejudice the respondents due to the delay in the applicant's proceedings. The interests of justice were best served by allowing the applicant to commence proceedings outside the limitation period.