Monto Coal 2 Pty Ltd v Sanrus Pty Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Monto Coal 2 Pty Ltd & Ors v Sanrus Pty Ltd & Ors [2018] QCA 309

PARTIES:

MONTO COAL 2 PTY LTD
ACN 098 919 414
(first appellant)
MONTO COAL PTY LTD
ACN 098 393 072
(second appellant)
MACARTHUR COAL LIMITED
ACN 096 001 955
(third appellant)
v
SANRUS PTY LTD as trustee of THE QC TRUST
ACN 097 049 315
(first respondent)
EDGE DEVELOPMENTS PTY LTD as trustee of THE KOWHAI TRUST
ACN 010 309 529
(second respondent)
H & J ENTERPRISES (QLD) PTY LTD as trustee of THE H & J TRUST
ACN 077 333 736
(third respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 3949 of 2018
SC No 8609 of 2007

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

General Civil Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:


Supreme Court at Brisbane – [2018] QSC 53 (Crow J)

DELIVERED ON:

9 November 2018

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

20 July 2018

JUDGES:

Gotterson and McMurdo JJA and Boddice J

ORDERS:

1.   Appeal dismissed.

2.   The appellants are to pay the respondents’ costs of the appeal on the standard basis.

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – SECURITY FOR COSTS – FACTORS RELEVANT TO EXERCISE OF DISCRETION – PLAINTIFF’S OR APPLICANT’S IMPECUNIOSITY – GENERALLY – where the defendants applied for security for costs – where the learned primary judge dismissed the application – where, under r 671(a) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), a pre-condition for an order of security for costs is that “there is reason to believe that the plaintiff will not be able to pay the defendant’s costs if ordered to pay them” – whether the learned primary judge failed to apply the correct test – whether “there is reason to believe that the [plaintiff companies] will not be able to pay the [defendants’] costs if ordered to pay to them”

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 671(a)

Beach Petroleum NL v Johnson (1992) 7 ACSR 203; [1992] FCA 110, cited
Cornelius v Global Medical Solutions Australia Pty Ltd (2014) 98 ACSR 301; [2014] NSWCA 65, approved
George v Rockett (1990) 170 CLR 104; [1990] HCA 26, cited
Livingspring Pty Ltd v Kliger Partners (2008) 20 VR 377; [2008] VSCA 93, considered
Robson v Robson & Anor[2008] QCA 36, applied

COUNSEL:

A M Pomerenke QC, with A C Stumer, for the appellants
P L O’Shea QC, with D K Fuller, for the respondents

SOLICITORS:

Allens for the appellants
Holding Redlich for the respondents

  1. GOTTERSON JA:  This proceeding was commenced in the Trial Division on 1 October 2007.  It is listed for trial over 16 weeks in 2019.  On 11 December 2007, a consent order was made, on the defendants’ application, requiring the plaintiffs to provide security for the formers’ costs of and incidental to the proceeding in the sum of $250,000.  The security was duly provided.

  2. On 4 December 2017, the defendants exercised the liberty conferred by that order to apply for…

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Details
Case
[2018] QCA 309
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Monto Coal 2 Pty Ltd v Sanrus Pty Ltd, the defendants sought security for costs under r 671(a) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld). This was a complex case involving over 30,000 documents and potentially 60 witnesses, including experts on various topics such as mine planning and financial modelling. The plaintiffs, Monto Coal 2 and Macarthur Coal, were small proprietary companies with limited paid-up capital, which they accepted would be insufficient to cover the potential costs of the trial. However, each plaintiff was also a trustee of a trading trust with the primary asset being their interest in the MCJV, and they argued that they could access these trust assets to meet any adverse costs order.

The primary issue before the court was whether the learned primary judge applied the correct test in deciding whether there was reason to believe that the plaintiffs would be unable to pay the defendants' costs if ordered to do so. The court had to consider whether the plaintiffs' interests in the MCJV were sufficient to meet any likely costs order if their actions were dismissed. The learned primary judge dismissed the application for security for costs, finding that while the plaintiffs could not meet the costs from their own resources, their interests in the MCJV were sufficient to cover any potential costs order.

The court found that the learned primary judge correctly applied the relevant test and did not err in his approach. The judge first considered whether there was reason to believe the plaintiffs would be unable to pay the defendants' costs, and then assessed whether security for costs should be granted considering the discretionary factors. The judge's assessment was that the plaintiffs' interests in the MCJV were sufficient to meet any likely costs order, and therefore, there was no basis for granting security for costs.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellants were ordered to pay the respondents' costs of the appeal on the standard basis.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal dismissed.

2. The appellants are to pay the respondents’ costs of the appeal on the standard basis.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

As the pleadings indicate, this proceeding is evidently a complex one. More than 30,000 documents have been discovered. The conduct of a range of executives and employees of Monto Coal 2 and Macarthur Coal over a lengthy 17-year timeframe is put in issue. As many as 60 witnesses may be called to testify. They will include experts whose evidence will address the likelihood that a Stage 2 Feasibility Study would have demonstrated that mine development of Stage 2 would have been profitable,[35] and cover topics including mine planning, geology, environmental approvals, port and rail capacity, water, coal handling and preparation, foreign exchange, coal markets and financial modelling of cash flows.[36][35]As alleged in ibid at para 23(c), particular (d).[36]Affidavit of M G Ilott sworn 4 December 2017 at para 47(d)(iv): AB2 110-111.The decision at first instance The learned primary judge noted that r 671(a) permits the court to give security for costs only if it is satisfied that the plaintiff is a corporation and there is reason to believe that it will not be able to pay the defendant’s costs if ordered to pay them.[37] His Honour observed that an applicant has an evidentiary burden of leading cogent evidence to establish a prima facie entitlement to an order.[38] As well, he set out the discretionary factors to which the court, pursuant to r 672 UCPR, must have regard in deciding whether to make an order.[39][37]Reasons at [30].[38]Ibid at [49], citing Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2001] NSWSC 744 per Einstein J at [60]-[62].[39]Reasons at [31]. In terms of approach, the learned primary judge adopted a two-stage process drawing upon the judgment of this Court in Robson v Robson & Anor.[40] That approach is not challenged on appeal. The first stage in it involved consideration of whether the court was satisfied in terms of r 671(a). The second, which was to be undertaken only if the court was so satisfied, required consideration of whether security should be granted having regard to the factors in r 672.[41][40][2008] QCA 36.[41]Reasons at [32]. In undertaking the first stage, his Honour recorded that cost estimates before him of the defendants’ costs to trial on the standard basis were, from the defendants, $4,000,000; and from the plaintiffs, $2,500,000.[42] Further, he noted that each of the plaintiffs was a small proprietary company with very limited paid up capital. On the basis of their financial statements alone, the plaintiffs could not meet costs orders of the magnitude suggested. The plaintiffs accepted that that was so.[43][42]Ibid at [34].[43]Ibid at [35], [36]. Each plaintiff is, however, the trustee of a trading trust. For each trust, its principal asset is the respective plaintiff’s interest as participant in the MCJV. As trustee, each plaintiff is entitled to indemnity from trust assets for all expenses reasonably incurred in or about the execution of the trust.[44][44]Trusts Act 1973 (Qld) s 72. It was common ground, his Honour observed, that the only asset of value that each plaintiff might access to meet an adverse costs order was the interest in the MCJV held on trust for it.[45] Having made that observation, at paragraph [38] of the reasons, he summed up the essential issue for this stage as being “whether the plaintiff corporations’ interests in the MCJV [are] sufficient to meet any likely costs order in the event their actions are dismissed”.[45]Reasons at [37].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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