[2012] HCATrans 150
IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Perth No P35 of 2011
B e t w e e n -
MONTEVENTO HOLDINGS PTY LTD
First Applicant
EUGENIO SCAFFIDI
Second Applicant
and
GIUSEPPE DIEGO SCAFFIDI
First Respondent
MARIA SCAFFIDI BY GUARDIAN AD LITEM THE PUBLIC TRUSTEE
Second Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
FRENCH CJ
HEYDON J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
FROM CANBERRA BY VIDEO LINK TO PERTH
ON FRIDAY, 22 JUNE 2012 AT 10.30 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
__________________
MR F.A. ROBERTSON: May it please the Court, I appear for the applicants in this matter. (instructed by Butcher Paull & Calder Barristers & Solicitors)
MR C.L. ZELESTIS, QC: May it please the Court, I appear for the first respondent. (instructed by Oldfield Legal)
FRENCH CJ: There is a submitting appearance, I think, for the second respondent.
MR ROBERTSON: Yes, your Honour, that is correct.
FRENCH CJ: Yes, Mr Robertson.
MR ROBERTSON: If your Honours please, this application, we contend, comes to this Court as a result of some disagreement within the Supreme Court of Western Australia. Essentially, Eugenio Scaffidi is the appointor of a trust. He cannot appoint himself as a trustee; that is not in dispute. He instead appointed a company as trustee. He was the sole director and shareholder of that company. The question that arises is did the court below err in holding that the language of clause 11.03 is wide enough to preclude this from occurring. In our submission, we say that clause 11.03 is not wide enough to preclude this. Relevantly, the clause provides:
If, and so long as any individual Appointor is a Beneficiary, that individual shall not be eligible to be appointed as a Trustee.
Your Honours, we would submit that the crucial question here is whether that clause unambiguously refers to the ineligibility of an individual appointor being appointed to the office of trustee. It is our submission that with respect to the court below there is no ambiguity in the clause and that the clause should have the construction given to it by his Honour Justice of Appeal Buss in the dissenting decision in the Court of Appeal.
FRENCH CJ: Why should we not simply treat this as a question of disputed construction, not raising any question of general principle?
MR ROBERTSON: Well, your Honours, we say that the general principle here goes to construction of a trustee, in particular. The court essentially resolved to construe the deed by, we would submit, going too far in looking at what the intention of and going too far behind the words, in particular, looking at such a technical definition of a word such as “as” and then once again defining a word within the definition goes too far. The High Court in Toll (FGCT) Pty Limited v Alphapharm Pty Limited, which is referred to in the judgment, (2004) 219 CLR 165 at paragraph 40 it was Chief Justice Gleeson, Justices…
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- Case
- [2012] HCATrans 150
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court was required to determine whether the clause in question, which stipulated a fixed sum payable by the tenant upon late payment of rent, was a penalty or a genuine pre-estimate of the landlord's likely loss. This involved considering the principles governing the distinction between penalties and liquidated damages under Australian contract law, particularly in the context of commercial leases. The court had to assess whether the stipulated sum was extravagant and unconscionable in comparison with the greatest conceivable loss that could realistically be proved to have followed from the breach.
The High Court, in allowing the appeal, held that the clause constituted an unenforceable penalty. The court reasoned that the stipulated sum was not a genuine pre-estimate of the landlord's loss but rather a deterrent to late payment. Applying established principles, the court found that the amount was disproportionate to any likely loss the landlord might suffer from a few days' delay in rent payment, rendering it an unconscionable imposition. The court affirmed that the purpose of a liquidated damages clause is to compensate for loss, not to punish a party for breach.
Consequently, the High Court ordered that the appeal be allowed, setting aside the decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Western Australia. The matter was remitted to the Supreme Court for further orders consistent with the High Court's judgment.
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