[2012] HCATrans 241
IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Canberra No S172 of 2012
B e t w e e n -
MAN HARON MONIS
Appellant
and
THE QUEEN
First Respondent
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES
Second Respondent
Office of the Registry
Canberra No S179 of 2012
B e t w e e n -
AMIRAH DROUDIS
Appellant
and
THE QUEEN
First Respondent
ATTORNEY‑GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES
Second Respondent
FRENCH CJ
HAYNE J
HEYDON J
CRENNAN J
KIEFEL J
BELL J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON THURSDAY, 4 OCTOBER 2012, AT 10.01 AM
(Continued from 3/10/12)
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
____________________
FRENCH CJ: Yes, Mr Reynolds.
MR REYNOLDS: Thank you, Chief Justice. Your Honour, just before the adjournment last night your Honours, Justices Hayne and Kiefel, asked to have a look at a couple of issues. I would like to attempt to deal with those two matters now and also to come back to aspects of them as part of the argument. Your Honour Justice Hayne referred to your Honours’ judgment – this is in transcript at around line 1485 – referred to paragraph 189 of your Honours’ reasons in Coleman v Power and asked us to have a look at the respects in which the law:
either civilly or criminally [regulates] private interaction between people in the form of words.
That picks up not only what your Honour said with Justice Gummow at paragraph 189 but also if I can give your Honours another reference, an important part of your Honour Justice Heydon’s reasoning at paragraph 322, that is about the private nature of the communication.
To answer your Honour Justice Hayne’s question directly, so far as the civil law is concerned can I note the following, first of all the tort referred to by your Honour yesterday, generally known as the tort in Wilkinson v Downton. Secondly, there is the law of defamation but with a very large qualification and that is that if there is a communication via the mail between a sender and a recipient then normally – I withdraw that – that will not amount to an actionable defamation of the recipient and therefore, except in extremely exceptional circumstances which we perhaps do not need to go into, there would not be any defamation action available for the recipient.
Thirdly, there is the fraud and various variations of it; fourthly, negligent advice causing loss; fifthly, the misleading and deceptive conduct under various statutes; sixthly, the tort of intimidation; and seventhly, torts in the nature of conspiracy. That is the list that we have compiled in that respect.
So far as crimes are concerned: first of all, crimes involving threats, menace or intimidation, which we perhaps do not need to specify with particularity; secondly, fraud offences; thirdly, criminal libel, but again with the caveat I mentioned before in relation to defamation; fourthly, obscenity and such like; fifthly, crimes…
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- [2012] HCATrans 241
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the High Court included whether the actions of Monis constituted a terrorist act within the meaning of the *Criminal Code*, and whether the jury had been correctly instructed on the elements of murder and accessory after the fact. Specifically, the Court had to determine if the jury was properly directed on the requirement for a terrorist act to be done with the intention of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause, and whether the evidence supported the finding that Droudis had the requisite knowledge and intent to be guilty of accessory after the fact.
The High Court, in a joint judgment, analysed the statutory definitions of a terrorist act and accessory after the fact. The Court affirmed that the definition of a terrorist act requires an intention to advance a political, religious or ideological cause, and that this intention must be objectively discernible from the act itself. Regarding the accessory charge, the Court reiterated that the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused knew the principal offender had committed a serious offence and intended to assist them to avoid apprehension, prosecution or punishment. The Court found no error in the trial judge's directions to the jury on these matters.
The appeals were dismissed.
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