FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v Toma [2011] FCA 91
Citation: Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v Toma [2011] FCA 91 Parties: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP v ELIA TOMA and ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL File number: NSD 871 of 2010 Judge: EDMONDS J Date of judgment: 16 February 2011 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for review of decision of Tribunal to set aside decision of delegate of Minister to cancel visa under s 501 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether Tribunal erred in its approach to ‘Direction [No 41] – Visa refusal and cancellation under s 501’ in respect of two considerations – the need to protect the Australian community from serious criminal or other harmful conduct, particularly crime involving violence; and the obligation to have regard to the best interests of the child.
Held: Application dismissed, no error of law.
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 501 Cases cited: Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 cited
Attorney-General (NSW) v Quinn (1990) 170 CLR 1 cited Avon Downs Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1949) 78 CLR 353 applied
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 applied
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 cited
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 citedDate of hearing: 26 November 2010 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 82 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr S Lloyd SC with Ms A Mitchelmore Solicitor for the Applicant: Clayton Utz Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr NL Manousaridis with Mr HPT Bevan
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 871 of 2010
BETWEEN: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
ApplicantAND: ELIA TOMA
First RespondentADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
EDMONDS J
DATE OF ORDER:
16 FEBRUARY 2011
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs.
Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
The text of entered orders can be located using Federal Law Search on the Court’s website.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 871 of 2010
BETWEEN: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
ApplicantAND: ELIA TOMA
First RespondentADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
EDMONDS J
DATE:
16 FEBRUARY 2011
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
This is an application under s 476A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (‘the Act’) for review of a decision of the second respondent (‘the Tribunal’) handed down on 9 June 2010. The Tribunal set aside the decision of a delegate of the appellant (‘the Minister’) to cancel the first respondent’s Class TY Subclass 444 Special Category (Temporary) visa under s 501 of the Act: Re Toma v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] AATA 431.
The Tribunal observed that the…
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- Case
- [2011] FCA 91
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered whether the Tribunal had erred in giving weight to the adverse impact that separation from his children would have on the respondent. The Minister contended that this approach was contrary to Australia’s international obligations which focus on the best interests of the children. The court found that the Tribunal had correctly adhered to Direction 41 and appropriately balanced the primary considerations, particularly the protection of the Australian community. The Tribunal had correctly assessed the risk of re-offending based on the respondent’s criminal history and seriousness of his past conduct, without overlooking the need to consider the best interests of the children as part of the broader community protection objective.
The court concluded that the Tribunal did not err in its approach to Direction 41. The court dismissed the Minister’s application for judicial review, finding no legal error in the Tribunal’s decision. As a result, the application was dismissed with the Minister ordered to pay the respondent's costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs.
Note:
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In reaching its decision, the Tribunal correctly observed that it was bound to comply with directions the Minister had made under s 499 of the Act, including Direction 41 (at [7]). Although it recognised that there were four primary considerations which must ‘generally be given more weight than any other relevant consideration’ (at [9]), the Tribunal devoted most of its attention to the first primary consideration, namely the protection of the Australian community from serious criminal or other conduct, particularly crimes involving violence (cl 10(1)(a)).The First Primary Consideration: Protection of the Australian Community Clause 10.1(2) of Direction 41 provides that the factors relevant to assessing the level of risk of harm to the community of the person’s continued stay include:(a)the seriousness and nature of the relevant conduct; and(b)the risk that the conduct may be repeated. In relation to the seriousness and nature of the conduct, cl 10.1.1(1) provides that crimes involving violence or the threat of violence are of special concern to the welfare and safety of the Australian community. Murder is given as the first example of offences and conduct that are considered serious: cl 10.1.1(2)(a). Clause 10.1.1(3) states that the sentence imposed for an offence is considered indicative of the seriousness of the offender’s conduct against the community, and stipulates that due regard ‘must’ be given to the extent of the person’s criminal record, including the number and nature of offences, the period between offences and the time elapsed since the most recent offence. In relation to the risk that the conduct may be repeated, cl 10.1.2(1) emphasises a person’s ‘previous general conduct and total criminal history’ as ‘highly relevant to assessing any risk of re-offending’: cl 10.1.2(1). The requirement to have regard to a person’s previous general conduct is unconstrained as to any particular period, as is the person’s ‘total criminal history’. Clause 10.1.2(2) then provides that the following factors are to be considered as particularly relevant to this assessment:‘(a)a recent history of convictions, which should be considered as indicating an increased risk of re-offending;(b)evidence of the extent of rehabilitation already achieved and the prospect of further rehabilitation. Greater weight should generally be given to evidence from independent and authoritative sources, such as judicial comments, professional and psychological reports, pre-sentence reports for the courts, parole assessments, and similar sources of authoritative information or assessment; and(c)evidence that the person has breached judicial orders, including parole, bail, bonds, suspended sentences and any other relevant undertakings or conditions imposed by the courts.’ Although cl 10.1.2(2)(a) states that recent convictions should be considered to be indicative of increased risk, there is no corollary to the effect that the further a person’s convictions are in the past, the lesser the degree of risk of that person committing further offences, although evidence of a person’s rehabilitation may well have an impact in that regard.