FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs v Su [2024] FCAFC 68
Review of: Su and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (Citizenship) [2023] AATA 3919 (9 November 2023) File number(s): VID 1089 of 2023 Judgment of: WHEELAHAN, CHEESEMAN AND HESPE JJ Date of judgment: 5 June 2024 Catchwords: CITIZENSHIP – eligibility – citizenship by descent – where applicant for citizenship was born outside Australia – whether the Administrative Appeals Tribunal erred in construing and failing to apply ordinary meaning of the phrase “at the time of the birth” in s 16(2)(a) of the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth) – whether the facts as found by the Tribunal necessarily fell outside the description of “at the time of the birth”, properly construed Legislation: Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 44
Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth) ss 12, 16
Cases cited: Collector of Customs v Agfa-Gevaert Ltd [1996] HCA 36; (1996) 186 CLR 389
Comptroller-General of Customs v Pharm-A-Care Laboratories Pty Ltd [2020] HCA 2; (2020) 270 CLR 494
H v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCAFC 119; (2010) 188 FCR 393
Haritos v Commissioner of Taxation [2015] FCAFC 92; (2015) 233 FCR 315
Hope v Bathurst City Council [1980] HCA 16; (1980) 144 CLR 1
Koka v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCAFC 82; (2021) 284 FCR 346
McKenzie v Repatriation Commission [2014] FCA 777
Plaintiff M76/2013 v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] HCA 53; (2013) 251 CLR 322
Sharp Corporation of Australia Pty Ltd v Collector of Customs [1995] FCA 707; (1995) 59 FCR 6
Vetter v Lake Macquarie City Council [2001] HCA 12; (2001) 202 CLR 439
Division: General Division Registry: Victoria National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Number of paragraphs: 30 Date of hearing: 14 May 2024 Counsel for the Applicant Mr N Wood SC and Mr J Barrington Solicitors for the Applicant Australian Government Solicitor Counsel for the Respondent Ms G A Costello KC and Ms B J Goding Solicitors for the Respondent Oboodi Solicitors ORDERS
VID 1089 of 2023 BETWEEN: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Applicant
AND: ENJI SU
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
WHEELAHAN, CHEESEMAN AND HESPE JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
5 JUNE 2024
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The decision of the Tribunal dated 9 November 2023 is set aside.
2.In lieu thereof, the decision of the delegate of the Minister made on 5 January 2023 is affirmed.
3.There is no order as to costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT:
This is an “appeal” brought by the Minister pursuant to s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (AAT Act), from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal setting aside a…
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- Case
- [2024] FCAFC 68
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs challenged the AAT's decision, contending that the Tribunal misinterpreted the phrase "at the time of the birth" and that the facts found by the Tribunal did not align with the proper construction of this phrase. The Minister argued that the Tribunal should have interpreted "at the time of the birth" as the precise moment when the child is born. Conversely, Ms Su maintained that the AAT's conclusions were reasonable and legally sound, and that the Minister's appeal did not properly raise questions of law. The court's analysis needed to consider the ordinary meaning of the phrase in question, the established precedents from H v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship and Koka v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs, and whether the Tribunal's factual findings aligned with the legal requirements.
The Federal Court found that the AAT's interpretation of the phrase "at the time of the birth" was too broad and did not adhere to its ordinary meaning. The court held that the phrase should be interpreted as the precise moment when a child is born, aligning with the Minister's contention. Furthermore, the court determined that the facts as found by the AAT necessarily fell outside the proper construction of "at the time of the birth." Consequently, the decision of the AAT was set aside, and the original decision of the Minister's delegate was affirmed. The court did not make any orders regarding costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The decision of the Tribunal dated 9 November 2023 is set aside.
2. In lieu thereof, the decision of the delegate of the Minister made on 5 January 2023 is affirmed.
3. There is no order as to costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
By an amended notice of appeal, the Minister states two questions of law:(1)Whether the Tribunal’s interpretation of the phrase “at the time of the birth” in s 16(2)(a) of the Act was correct as a matter of law. (2)Whether the facts as fully found by the Tribunal fall within s 16(2)(a) of the Act, properly construed.CONSIDERATION The Minister contends that:(1)The Tribunal ought to have construed the phrase “at the time of the birth”, in s 16(2)(a) of the Act, as meaning the precise moment in time on the particular day that a child is born; and(2)The facts as found by the Tribunal fell necessarily outside the description of “at the time of [Ms Su’s] birth” in s 16(2)(a) of the Act, properly construed. Ms Su contends that:(1)The Minister’s appeal does not raise questions of law; and(2)The conclusions reached by the Tribunal were reasonably open on the facts as found and the Tribunal did not err in reaching its conclusion that Ms Jagelman was Ms Su’s parent at the time of her birth. The parties’ contentions are to be understood against a background of decided cases, in particular, the decisions in H v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCAFC 119; (2010) 188 FCR 393 and Koka v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCAFC 82; (2021) 284 FCR 346. In H, the Full Court (Moore, Kenny and Tracey JJ):(a)decided that: the word “parent” in s 16(2) was not limited to a biological parent and that a non-biological parent could be a “parent” depending on the circumstances (at [127]). The determination of whether an individual is a child’s parent within the ordinary meaning of the word may depend on various factors, including social, legal and biological (at [129]);(b)accepted that the words “at the time of the birth” in s 16(2)(a) qualify both the status of being a parent and the parent’s citizenship (at [67]–[68]). In other words, the section requires that an applicant for citizenship had, at the time of their birth, a parent who was an Australian citizen. In Koka the second of these propositions was confirmed. The Full Court agreed with the primary judge that, except for express exceptions for which it provides, the provisions of the Act dealing with citizenship by descent focus on the factual situation as at the time of the physical birth of a person (at [31]–[32]). The ordinary meaning of the words used in s 16(2) was that the eligibility requirements needed to be established at the time of birth as a matter of fact. As the Full Court said (at [35]):[Section 16(2)(a)] is concerned with the factual question of whether, when a child is born, she or he has — at that particular point in time — a ‘parent’ (construed in accordance with H) who is an Australian citizen. Against that background, it was accepted by both parties and the Tribunal, that the phrase “at the time of the birth” was to be given its ordinary meaning. Ms Su submitted that as the ordinary meaning of words is a question of fact, the first ground of appeal did not properly raise a question of law. The second ground of appeal could only engage a question of law if the Tribunal failed to conform to legal requirements as to the nature of the fact-finding task required to be undertaken. This condition was said to not be satisfied as none of the evidence taken into account by the Tribunal was irrelevant to the task it was required to perform.