Infosys Technologies Limited v Fox

Case [2025] QCA 45

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Infosys Technologies Limited v Fox [2025] QCA 45

PARTIES:

INFOSYS TECHNOLOGIES LIMITED
(appellant)
v
CRAIG JEFFREY FOX
(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 6984 of 2024
ICQ No 15 of 2023

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

General Civil Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:

Industrial Court of Queensland at Brisbane – [2024] QIRC 109 (Davis J, President, O’Connor, Vice-President, Hartigan, Deputy President)

DELIVERED ON:

1 April 2025

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

9 October 2024

JUDGES:

Bond and Brown JJA and Crow J

ORDER:

The appeal be dismissed with costs.

CATCHWORDS:

INDUSTRIAL LAW – QUEENSLAND – GENERAL EMPLOYMENT CONDITIONS – LONG SERVICE LEAVE – ENTITLEMENT TO LEAVE – CONTINUITY OF SERVICE – where the employee was employed by the respondent in India – where a condition of the terms of employment was that the employee could be deployed to locations outside India – where the employee was deployed to Victoria – where, after ten years of continuous service with the respondent, the employee was deployed to work in Queensland – where the employee worked in Queensland for 18 days – where the employee made claim for long service leave pursuant to the provisions of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 – whether long service leave entitlements only arise if the service of the employee has a “substantial connection” to the State – whether the Industrial Court erred in its legal construction of “continuous service” in s 93 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 – whether the Industrial Court was correct to conclude that an entitlement to long service leave arises if the employee has performed ten years continuous service with the respondent before working in Queensland

Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld), s 93, s 94, s 95, s 130, s 554
Payment of Gratuity Act 1972 (Ind)

Comptroller-General of Customs v Pharm-A-Care Laboratories Pty Ltd (2020) 270 CLR 494; [2020] HCA 2, cited
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Trail Bros Steel & Plastics Pty Ltd (2010) 186 FCR 410; [2010] FCAFC 94; applied
Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs v Su (2024) 303 FCR 342; [2024] FCAFC 68, applied

COUNSEL:

P J Hanks KC, with L R Howard, for the appellant
A C Freeman for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Clayton Utz for the appellant
Office of Industrial Relations for the respondent

  1. BOND JA: Section 95(2) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) (the Act) relevantly provides that an employee is entitled to a period of long service leave at full pay if the employee has completed 10 years continuous service with the same employer. Section 95(3) confers an entitlement to a proportionate payment for the long service leave entitlement on termination of the employee’s service if the employee has completed at least 7 years continuous service.

  2. The appellant is a company incorporated under the laws of India and a registered foreign company under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The appellant had employed a particular employee for a continuous period totalling 10 years, one month…

Continue reading Infosys Technologies Limited v Fox

Sign in free to access the full text

Details
AGLC
Infosys Technologies Limited v Fox [2025] QCA 45
Case
[2025] QCA 45
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Infosys Technologies Limited appealed against a decision of the Industrial Court which held that an employee was entitled to long service leave in Queensland. The employee, originally employed in India, worked for Infosys in Victoria and then Queensland. The dispute centred on whether the employee’s service in Queensland constituted a sufficient proportion of his total service to entitle him to long service leave under the Industrial Relations Act 2016. The core legal issues were whether the Industrial Court correctly interpreted the term “continuous service” in section 93 of the Act and whether the employee’s service needed a “substantial connection” with Queensland to trigger entitlement to leave. The Court found that the Industrial Court’s interpretation of continuous service was not erroneous. It ruled that an employee’s continuous service with an employer, even if only partly in Queensland, could suffice for long service leave entitlement. The Full Bench of the Court held that the employee’s deployment to Queensland, albeit for a short period, was part of his overall continuous service with Infosys, thus satisfying the statutory requirements for long service leave. The Court dismissed the appeal with costs, upholding the Industrial Court's decision.

Orders

Orders of the court

The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

For reasons which follow, the appeal should be dismissed with costs.The relevant facts[1][1]The facts recorded under this heading derive from a statement of agreed facts tendered before the Full Bench. The appellant is a company which specialises in information technology solutions. It has a global presence in 247 locations across 54 countries. It has a large workforce based in India and from time to time, it deploys members of that workforce on engagements to various international locations, including to Australia. It refers to those overseas engagements as "deputations," and to its employees deployed on deputation as "deputees". When the need arises for a deputation overseas, the appellant seeks out interest from its Indian workforce, or identifies members of that workforce suitable for the deputation and then the appellant and the employee enter into a "deputation agreement." Such an agreement is a contract of employment of a temporary nature for the period of the deputation and is to be read with the Indian employment contract. Deputations are temporary and deputees are contractually obliged to return to India at the conclusion of their deputation. The employee commenced employment with the appellant on 5 March 2012, having signed on that date the terms of an engagement letter dated 10 December 2011. His engagement letter specified that the location of his initial reporting and training would be Mysore, India and that he would be told of the location of his posting upon successful completion of training. The conditions of his employment included that his services could be transferred to any of the appellant’s units/departments situated anywhere in India or abroad and, at such time, the compensation applicable to a specific location would be payable to him. From 5 March 2012 to 14 June 2018, the employee worked for the appellant in Mysore, India. Pursuant to a deputation agreement dated 13 June 2018, the appellant engaged the employee to perform a deputation to the appellant’s office in Melbourne, Victoria. Amongst other terms the deputation agreement provided:(a)By the chapeau to the letter:“We are happy to inform your deputation to the [appellant’s] office in Melbourne (AU), Victoria, Australia.”(b)By cl 1:“Your deputation will be for a period of about 13 months commencing from 14-Jun-2018. The exact duration, however will depend on specific requirements of the project. This deputation is temporary in nature and you shall return to your home country post completion of your deputation. Your base location continues to be in India.During the course of your Deputation, you shall be required to work at the Australian Branch or at any of the Company's customer sites or in any other location as per the business requirements in Australia in connection with the execution of any contractual obligation that the Company may have undertaken.”(c)By cl 10:“The Company reserves the right to terminate this Deputation at any time with 2 weeks' notice, at its own sole discretion or on the termination of the period of the Deputation mentioned herein. Upon termination of this Deputation, the terms of this Letter will cease to apply and the terms of your original Employment Contract with the Company will regain full effect. …You are required to return to your Home Country immediately after your deputation or intimation of the date of termination of your deputation.”(d)By cl 20:· “We expect you to contribute your best towards the success of your deputation…You are required to observe the local laws…· You are required to return to your home country immediately following the completion of your deputation in Australia.· You agree that, during the term of your deputation with the Company at your work location, it will be your responsibility to give complete and accurate information with regards to any change in your original location of deputation to the Company, failing which you shall provide the Company with authorization to deduct any additional/excess/erroneous payments made to you during your deputation…· The terms and conditions of the deputation are subject to applicable local laws and hence may be altered or modified in order to facilitate compliance with the same.· The terms and conditions of your deputation continue to be governed by the terms and conditions of your offer of employment except to the extent modified herein.”

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Accordingly, I conclude that the order made by the Full Bench was correct, although I arrive at that outcome by a different route.Conclusion The appeal should be dismissed with costs. BROWN JA: I agree with the reasons and the order of Justice Bond. CROW J: I agree with the reasons of Bond JA.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Accordingly, it seems to me that the real question on the present appeal is whether the Full Bench applied the wrong legal test to the analysis of whether the employee’s continuous service with the appellant was to be regarded as “continuous service … partly in and partly outside the State” and therefore falling within the definition of continuous service set out in s 93. I turn now to consider that question.Consideration The Full Bench rejected the appellant’s argument that in order to qualify as continuous service of 10 years “partly in … the State” of Queensland, the part of the service “in . . . the State” must amount to a substantial proportion of the total continuous service. Rather their Honours’ approach is encapsulated in their Honours’ reasons at [74] to [76]:“It might be that in some cases an employee’s presence in Queensland is so fleeting that it might not be able to be said that there was any ‘service in the State’. It is a matter of fact to be determined whether in any particular case, the presence of the employee in the performance of any work by the employee constitutes ‘service … partly within the State.’In order to determine whether there has been ‘service … partly in the State’ it is necessary to look at all the circumstances including the contract of service. The terms of employment of an employee are not exclusively defined by the contract of service in that terms and conditions may be incorporated by statute or industrial instruments. However, subject to those exceptions, the contract of employment will define the relationship.While [the employee’s] employment contract was entered into in India, the terms of employment expressly provided that he may be required to serve the respondent in other jurisdictions. He was required to serve the respondent both in Victoria and in Queensland. The fact that he may have requested deployment to Queensland is beside the point. The respondent chose to send him to Queensland for the purpose of his employment. He worked in Queensland for some 18 days as part of his ‘service’ which was ‘partly in the State’.” (emphasis in original, footnotes omitted) Later, when dealing with an argument which suggested that the law conferring the entitlement might be constitutionally invalid on the grounds of lack of real connection with Queensland (an argument not advanced before this Court), the Full Bench observed at [97]:“Section 93(b) operates with s 95 so as to bestow benefits upon workers who perform work within the geographical boundaries of Queensland. The fact that the entitlement may also depend upon things which have occurred outside Queensland does not render the law one that does not have a ‘real connection’ with Queensland. As was concluded in Mears v Vector Aerospace Australia Pty Ltd, s 93(a) is within the power of the Queensland parliament to make. There is no need to read it down.” The appellant argues that in order to qualify as continuous service of 10 years “partly in … the State” of Queensland, the part of the service “in . . . the State” must amount to a substantial proportion of the total continuous service. To accept that argument would be to engraft onto the text of the statute a conception which is not warranted by the text. On the other hand, the test which seems to have been applied by the Full Bench seems to have been driven by the question whether the contract of employment required the performance of work within Queensland. That too would be wrong.